



# **LINKING RELIEF, REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (LRRD) IN AFGHANISTAN**

URBAN SECTOR REVIEW  
IN AFGHANISTAN (2001-2006)



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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

AA	Action Aide
AACA	Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority
ACBAR	Agency Co-ordinating Bureau for Afghan Relief (acbar.org)
AC	Afghanistan Compact
ACD	Afghan Community for Development
ACF	Action Contre la Faim
ACTED	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development
ACU	Aid Coordination Unit
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADC	Area Development Committee
AGCHO	Afghanistan Geodesy and Cartographic Head Office
AIA	Afghanistan Interim Administration
AC	Afghanistan Compact
AIMS	Afghanistan Information Management Service.
AKTC	Aga Khan Trust for Culture
AKDN	Aga Khan Development
ALTAI	ALTAI Consulting
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ARDS	Afghanistan Reconstruction and Development Services
AREU	Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
CARE	CARE International
CAG	Community Action Group
CAWSS	Central Authority for Water Supply and Sanitation
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CDC	Community Development council
C-DAMP	Community Based Disaster Awareness and Mitigation Programme
C-SEP	Civil- Society Empowerment Programme
CDP	City Development Plan
CG	Consultative Groupe
CSO	Central Statistics Office
CT	coordinating team
CUP	Community Upgrading Plan
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
EIRP	Emergency Infrastructure Reconstruction Project
EMG	Emergency Market Group
GoA	Government of Afghanistan
GERES	Groupe Energies Renouvelables et Environnement Solidarité
GTZ	German Technical Cooperation
HSF	Human Security Trust Fund
IDA	International Development Association (of the World Bank)
IDP	Internally displaced people
IOM	International Organization
IRA	Islamic republic of Afghanistan
I-ANDS	Interim - Afghanistan National Development Strategy
I-PRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
ISAF	International Assistance Force
ISTED	Institut des Sciences et des Techniques de l'Equipement et de l'Environnement pour le Development (French)
JCMB	Joint coordination and Monitoring Board
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
KfW	German Development Cooperation
KM	Kabul Municipality
KURP	Kabul Urban Reconstruction Project
LRRD	Linking Relief and Rehabilitation
LTTC	Land Tenure Technical Committee
LTERA	Land Titling and Registration in Afghanistan (USAID)

MEW	Ministry of Energy and Water
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MOI	Ministry of Interior
MoIC	Ministry of information and Culture
MoRR	Ministry of Refugees & Rapatriation
MoT	Ministry of Trade
MoUD	Ministry of Urban Development
MP	Master Plan
MPW	Ministry of Public Works
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
MT	Ministry of Transportation
MUD	Ministry of Urban Development
MUDH	Ministry of Urban Development and Housing
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDB	National Development Budget
NDF	National Development Framwork
NDS	National Development Strategy
NEEP	National Emergency Employment Program
NUP	National Urban Program
OCHA	Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
O&M	Operation and Maintenance
NPP	National Priority Program
NPPS	National (New) Priority Program
NSP	National Solidarity Program
PD&C	Planning, Design and Contracts Management
PIP	Public Investment Program
PIU	Program Implementation Unit
PMU	Program Management Unit
ProMIS	Project Management Information System (See AIMS)
PRR	Priority Reform and Restructuring
PRT	Provincial Rehabilitation Team
SAF	Securing Afghanistan's Future
SOE	State Owned Enterprises
TA	Technical assistance
TAT	Technical assistance Team
TG	Thematic Group (as Cross Cutting Thematic Group)
TSS	Transitional Support Strategy (of the World Bank)
TSU	Technical Support Unit
UMP	Urban Mangement Program
UN	United Nation
UNAMA	United Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UN-HABITAT UNCHS	United Nations Centre for Human Settlements
UNDP	United Nations, Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission fro Refugees
UNOCA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programmes for Afghanistan
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WSS	Water Supply and sanitation

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The urban situation in Afghanistan in 2006, five years after the fall of the Taliban and the beginning of the reconstruction process, is still chaotic and very fragile. The ever increasing urban populations suffer from lack of basic services. Urban and peri-urban zones are disorganised, polluted, crowded, some areas are deliberately overlooked by the overworked authorities in charge. Living conditions are very difficult and urban economy is not in a position to offer jobs. The situation is becoming dangerous in cities in terms of security, hygiene, health and environmental impact. There is a muted discontent<sup>1</sup> about the reconstruction process which is not felt in urban areas.

The analysis below attempts to understand what stage the reconstruction process has reached, where the difficulties lie that are delaying interventions, which authorities are in charge of urban issues, how programmes are being drawn up and why only a few programmes have been implemented in 2006.

Investigations and discussions first of all came up against a highly disorganised sector which was a mere reflection of the disorder that reigned in urban contexts themselves. Secondly, the departments that were responsible for the reorganisation process were most reluctant to give information. In this study, we aim to present the keys for understanding progress and the roles of the institutional actors rather than paint an exhaustive picture of the situation.

### **Institutional restructuring in progress rather than developing urban policy**

In 2005, we could read in the official texts:

*“Significance of inclusion of urban concerns in the NDS: There is recognition and concern that urban matters have not had the full attention required compared to other sectors. There is very little urban baseline information and more information exists about rural areas than urban areas.”<sup>2</sup>*

Afghanistan is a country that is still largely rural and urban issues are neither a priority nor familiar for Afghan authorities. This was one of the explanations for the considerable delay in the urban reconstruction process, the national strategic framework, which was only initiated in 2005.

While strategies and priorities have been spelt out for the urban sector, they are still in the phase of inventory, adjustment and adaptation to financial and temporal constraints and feasibilities. Urban policies are still in their primary stage. Based on field observations, it has been noted that only few stray rehabilitation programmes are operational among a majority of small pilot projects supervised by NGOs for the benefit of certain small communities. Besides, information on the urban situation is often incorrect, inaccessible or nonexistent, and the needs or perspectives that are expressed for urban contexts are often unrealistic. The urban institutional sector is a domain that still uses mechanisms dating from more than thirty years. Urban reconstruction in Afghanistan has entered into a phase of profound structural reorganisation, rather than a practical reconstruction process of the city. The process also involves cultural development, which requires time.

### **Notion of urban sector poorly estimated by Afghan officials**

Not considered a sector by itself, town planning was not expressed as a priority in the national strategies laid down in the document *“Interim National Development Strategies” (I-ANDS)* in 2003. The extent of problems, needs and costs was not the subject of an initial global assessment nor a priority. This sector became a national issue progressively and

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<sup>1</sup> This came to a head in recent riots in 2006 in the centre of Kabul.

<sup>2</sup> National Development Strategy *Briefing with MUDH*, Meeting held at NDS Secretariat, Saturday 9 July 2005.

under the strong impetus of the international community and international banking sector. People have become gradually aware of the notion of urban policy. The Afghan government only communicated the broad lines of a “*National Programme of Interim Urban Development*” in August 2005 within the framework of “*National Development Strategy ANDS*”<sup>3</sup>. This national programme first was drawn up in 2006.

### **Slow process of definition of an urban policy under international technical and economic arbitration**

From 2003, national visions for main major towns were formulated by the Minister of MUDH, during “*Urban Consultative Group*” consultations bringing together partners of international community and relevant Afghan authorities. However, the transition from theoretical visions to policies was confronted the problem of unrealistic strategies. To this day, a national urban policy, suitable procedures and clear, competent responsibilities, have not yet emerged to help cities take charge of their own administration themselves and urban authorities face the multiple requirements of rehabilitation phase, let alone the development phase to follow. A consensus on the definition of urban perimeters has not yet been reached between Afghan authorities and international aid representatives. This has considerably delayed operational decisions. In 2006, repair or completion of many basic amenity networks, such as water, electricity, sanitation, collection of solid waste, asphalted road network, has not yet begun on a national scale nor is it even outlined. The near totality of interventions still depends on international organisations, for example, water supply networks that are only partially complete.

### **Gaps between Afghan strategies and international aid**

Apart from lack of means and expertise, different factors explain the slowness of the process of establishing an urban policy:

- **gap in political priorities**, for example between Afghan desire to support ex nihilo urban extension to solve urban problems, whereas the international community favours financing the rehabilitation of existing localities.
- **gap in social and technical expertise** of Afghan officials to face the magnitude of needs and socio-urban specificities of rehabilitation.
- **gap between fact and law**: between de facto urban land occupation and urban occupation of administrative law.
- **gap in schedule of due dates** between urbanisation of official land “distribution”, preparation and funding of infrastructure.

### **Key stage lacking between levels of urban policy design**

Urban strategies are drawn up at Kabul at government level, rehabilitation programmes are tested and implemented at the community level but the municipalities are absent from process of drawing up an urban policy, or, after consultation, they are not included in the technical functioning of the process that is the responsibility of MUDH in Kabul.

### **Sector-based elaborations at the ministerial level**

At MUDH level, rather than drawing up a global urban policy, partial analysis is underway on several aspects of urban development, such as urban strategies studied at a regional level. However, the study in progress is about Kabul and its region and does not yet concern guidelines for provincial towns. Similarly, a policy of preservation of Afghan architectural and urban heritage is being drawn up at MUDH for the old centre of Kabul but does not consider Herat, which has one of the most interesting heritages of Afghanistan. Another example of a geographically fragmented approach is the ecological waste collection system that was put forward by the World Bank for Kabul but no such measures for limiting pollution have yet

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<sup>3</sup> Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *National Development Strategy*, Urban Development Sector 13 August 2005

been drawn up for Pul-e-Khumri city, whose river is heavily polluted by various different types of refuse, including industrial waste.

### **Restructuring urban institutional departments**

In 2001 in Afghanistan, the state was absent, national authorities were weakened due to decades of war and disasters. The various administrations responsible for the main sectors of Afghan society were organised along the lines of rigid Soviet models and focused on obsolete responsibilities. In the urban sector, national authorities were at a loss when faced with the current situation and were totally absent from the first dynamic phase of reconstruction which was undertaken by different international aid organisations. Moreover, the absence of any Urban Management capacity among Afghan authorities (Ministry of Town planning, technical administrations, municipalities) has contributed to a deterioration of the situation in cities, especially in Kabul, since 2001. Two aspects are directly related to this deficiency of urban management:

**Absence of space management capacity** in the wake of a proliferating urbanisation of self-built constructions that have sprung up in the outskirts, architectural occupation beyond regulation, lack of respect for urban layout and Afghan culture in residential areas. Almost everywhere, large numbers of shops and offices of poor technical quality have been built without any market analysis and hence remain unoccupied. Buildings works are never ending and in the centre of the city the trend for very rapid construction of business buildings bring about obvious risks of disappearance of heritage, urban structure or architecture. This construction is possible due to the non regulated private sector.

**Absence of land control**, resulting in non-assistance to the inhabitants of “informal” areas, in terms of basic amenities (water, electricity, waste removal, etc.) by public, technical and social urban authorities.

Only from 2005 did a slow institutional restructuring process begin for this sector. There were two main priorities: rebuild confidence and rebuild the city’s infrastructure and thus improve inhabitants’ living conditions. These imperatives and the timeliness of international aid interventions should facilitate a rapid development and updating of the sector.

# 1 FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

This study tries to shed light on the urban sector in Afghanistan during the transitional period between the end of conflicts since 2001 and the laying of the foundations for development. This study is part of the Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development programme (LRRD)<sup>4</sup> conducted by Groupe URD<sup>5</sup> in 2005-06, on several sectors under reconstruction in Afghanistan (rural and urban development, water, health, nutrition and education). The LRRD programme is financed by the European Commission.

This analysis attempts to shed light on some of the key issues to understanding the progress, difficulties and challenges that are specific to each of these sectors and the specificities due to a period of institutional reconstruction of the government of Afghan Islamic Republic. It is hoped that this information is of use for the different actors involved in reconstruction, including both institutional and international officials.

For the urban sector, this means establishing an inventory of the urbanisation in progress, understanding the functioning of urban governance departments, providing feedback and analysing data collected on urban policy in general: overall visions, strategies and their definitions, policies and how they are applied, and programmes and projects undertaken since 2002. This study is based on interviews carried out since early 2005 with some of the main actors of the sector<sup>6</sup>, at the relevant ministries, technical and municipal administrations, and with UN structures, donor representatives, NGOs and international organisations or private actors involved in town planning.

The study also relies on conclusions, questions and observations made by Groupe URD during earlier missions in Afghanistan from 2002, and also on the numerous publications produced by all the institutional and international structures involved in the process<sup>7</sup>. Generally, this work of analysis of the urban situation in Afghanistan is fully integrated in studies on post-crisis urban problems that the Groupe URD has been developing in other countries over the past few years.

## 1.1 Earlier studies conducted in Afghanistan by Groupe URD<sup>8</sup> before 2005

Earlier reports and studies conducted in Afghanistan by Groupe URD before 2005 on the aid process for housing reconstruction have raised a number of questions.

### 1.1.1 On emergency shelters

From 2002-03, three reconnaissance field visits carried out in Afghan provinces, financed by ECHO and reproduced in the reports "*Quality Projects I, II, and III*"<sup>9</sup>, enabled Groupe URD to identify right, in this specific post-war context, recurring urban problems that have not been solved by the various housing reconstruction interventions.

Since 1979, nearly a quarter century of conflicts, wars, foreign invasions as well as civil war have left the country drained not only of housing, but also public services (schools, etc.) and infrastructure (water or electricity supply, waste collection or road conditions). Requirements in these domains, even five years after the end of the major conflict in 2001, are still

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<sup>4</sup> See Annexe LRRD

<sup>5</sup> See Annexe presentation of Group URD

<sup>6</sup> See Annexe list of spokespersons

<sup>7</sup> See Annexe list of documents consulted

<sup>8</sup> See Annexe list of earlier studies of Group URD

<sup>9</sup> Groupe URD, *The quality Project in Afghanistan* – missions 1-2-3, 2002-2003

widespread. Traditional emergency aid mechanisms with specific expertise and budget lines which are designed for temporary measures and the rehabilitation of existing infrastructure, are not appropriate for resolving collective needs caused by regrouping of installations<sup>10</sup>. These emergency mechanisms often turn out to be inappropriate in technical, economic, and sometimes environmental or strategic terms. One-off operations establishing temporary shelters, wells, assistance in housing reconstruction or construction, public facilities or infrastructure, should progressively integrate and take into account the administrative frameworks established by technical officers and political decisions for development of cities.

➤ **Shift from urgent need for housing to urban amenities**

The context of interventions in the post-emergency phase is characterised by a shift in people's needs from rural to urban areas and reorganisation of the legal and administrative framework. Aid organisations involved in rehabilitation and reconstruction techniques were obliged to work on two timescales and frameworks. Firstly, in order to cater to the needs and commitments of emergency interventions, they had to implement and finalise projects in hand within a short timeframe according to their mandates and financial commitments. These interventions are generally highly autonomous in comparison with the constraints of local contexts. Secondly, organisations that are specialised in emergency interventions progressively had to deal with an increasing number of interlocutors and several factors: complex interlinked problems, highly deteriorated material infrastructure and buildings, instability due to contradictory issues and an institutional framework undergoing change. The need to adapt and legally integrate these new urban, economic, legal and political situations meant that humanitarian organisations had to strengthen their expertise and change their choice of strategy or position<sup>11</sup>: The question is: What level of replies should be brought to the cycle of emergency, rehabilitation, development. With these evolutions of situations, arise questions of adaptation in terms of competencies, definition of statute, political choices, criteria and financial mechanisms<sup>12</sup>.

➤ **Trend toward development projects in urban areas**

A general reflection on the reduction of humanitarian space and operational timeframes is now underway in the humanitarian world and has been the subject of much debate<sup>13</sup>. The specificity of interventions in the urban context is a component of this development.

### 1.1.2 About urban reconstruction

The UN, commissioned by the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan, is accompanying the reconstruction process for all institutional sectors: elections, restructuring of ministries, support for validating government priorities in the elaboration of national strategies. The UN agency UN-HABITAT, which is responsible for questions related to housing conditions, has been involved from 2002 in **repositioning aid modalities in housing matters in the urban reconstruction context**.

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<sup>10</sup> For instance, rehabilitation or establishment of individual wells in the case of grouped housing requires a collective system and verification of the ground water capacity.

<sup>11</sup> Passing of a law in Afghanistan in 2005 which meant that NGOs had to transfer the operational side of construction programmes to Afghan organisations through a system of tenders.

<sup>12</sup> Groupe URD, *A Review based on a Multi and Cross Sector Approach, chapter urban sector, LRRD*, Avril 2006

<sup>13</sup> Questions of current affairs on the agenda of the conference organised by Groupe URD: *Is humanitarian space in danger? What room for manoeuvre remains to offer quality aid to vulnerable populations?* in the framework of universities of *Automne de l'Humanitaire* on 28, 29, and 30 September at the HeadQuarters of the Association at Plaisians in France.

Groupe URD, specialised in the analysis of post-conflict or post-disaster situations, has closely studied risks and issues of certain reconstruction aid modalities in urban contexts precisely in these periods of an absent or unstable state. The observation and comparison of urban situations across various countries affected by crises has expanded our analysis of problems with which cities are confronted. Indeed Kabul was a case study in the recently published "*Villes en guerre, guerres en villes*"<sup>14</sup>. Recently, in a new article entitled "*Fragiles cites*"<sup>15</sup>, published in 2005, François Grünewald, President of Groupe URD evoked the multidimensional complexity of urban reconstruction process with the interaction of various aspects: demographical, historical, environmental, social, political.

➤ **From autonomy to integrating operations into a multi-actor context**

Humanitarian actors working in the reconstruction sector, who were accustomed to managing their own projects with autonomy vis-à-vis the local contexts and authorities, were required from 2005 onwards to operate within certain constraints and use urban tools. Numerous interventions in urban areas require the creation of specific working systems: coordination, consultation, appraisals and diagnosis, and spatial, social and economic knowledge-sharing tools. Facing with these changes in administrative, legal and technical constraints, organisations that had previously specialised in highly technical emergency interventions do not always possess the required knowledge and expertise for town planning.

### 1.1.3 Forms of urban management

Given that urbanisation stems from complex situations and decision-making processes, it is essential that urban management is recognised as an important component of urban development. Groupe URD's research in 2002 and 2003 highlighted a total absence of directives or coordination. Uncontrolled urban settlements have successively occupied available spaces in cities (hills, parks, disused localities, etc.), peri-urban areas or zones encroaching on rural, deserted or unhealthy areas. Urban occupation has exploded in an uncontrolled manner, throwing cities into disorder. Today, 30-70% of these settlements are still classified "informal".

All reconstruction and urbanisation work should, in a balanced economic and social framework, integrate aspects as diverse as: repair, rehabilitation, technical construction of buildings, network systems, social understanding of populations, especially the most affected, strategies of economic and spatial urban development on a short and long-term basis, planned resource management, elaboration of financial mechanisms viable for municipalities. This is possible only with specific urban management mechanisms, the existence of which was not seen by Groupe URD during its initial investigations. For the past five years, Afghanistan has been trying hard to identify, define and organise the sector with many difficulties and time constraints.

➤ **Need for aid to evolve or risk of inappropriateness with regard to multidimensional complexities of urban reconstruction**

The conclusions of earlier studies conducted in Afghanistan by Groupe URD before 2005 raised a number of questions about the framework of intervention in matters of reconstruction aid. What type of policy or strategic decisions is necessary? What type of follow-up is suitable? What type of multi-actor, inter-sector and technical coordination? What type of control? How best to involve the inhabitants? All these questions relate to the issue of urban management, which this Sector Review on Urban Development attempts to analyse below.

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<sup>14</sup> Grünewald F. and Levron E., *Villes en guerres, guerre en villes*, Editions Karthala, 2004

<sup>15</sup> Grünewald F., "Fragiles cites", *Diplomatie* N°17, Nov-Dec 2005

## 1.2 Approach to the urban question in LRRD framework from 2005-06

Since 2005, with the LRRD study, Groupe URD is interested in the reconstruction process of institutional mechanisms. Town planning problems are manifold due to a number of factors: response to political choices (reconstruction, rehabilitation, relocation, extension, development, etc.), technical diversities (water, electricity, traffic, etc.) or complexity of fields (technical, administrative, political, and legal). In Afghanistan, these factors are multiplied and cross over other issues in a critical manner (security, pollution, hygiene, resources, etc., basically humanitarian) due to a chaotic situation emerging from crises and wars, and uncontrolled urbanisation over several decades. Persisting administrative inactivity only compounds these problems.

In order to understand the different factors at stake in the present development of Afghan cities and the Afghan urban and peri-urban sector in general, this Urban Sector Review is only one component of a more global assessment of the urban sector which includes a number of different perspectives.

Given the major issues involved in urban reconstruction, different approaches have been used to understand such a varied sector:

- **Specific case studies**

In order to understand local situations and the various issues at stake, case studies were conducted in three cities of different sizes, issues and urban features: Bamiyan, Jalalabad and Kabul.

- **A transversal approach**

A cross-cutting approach by means of an investigation on a provincial itinerary was conducted in the northern and eastern province of Afghanistan. The objective was to identify major recurring questions on urban situations by combining information between cities and with other sectors than town planning (health, agriculture, etc.).

- **A general approach**

A general approach, conducted at the government level, at Kabul, subject to this Sector Review, which aims to develop a better understanding of information and actors involved in the process of drawing up strategies, urban policies and administrative restructuring.

### 1.2.4 Specific case studies

Case studies were conducted in the cities of Bamiyan<sup>16</sup> Jalalabad<sup>17</sup> and Kabul<sup>18</sup> with the objective of studying precise situations and the different aspects of urbanisation in action locally, such as: magnitude, forms and apparent consequences of the urban phenomenon, level of understanding about the urban situation by different urban actors, existence or not of urban data, their accessibility, programmes, projects and actors. The factors of local development strategies, forms of information and communication, impact of national directives when they exist were some of the research topics, such as local governance and government administration. Different interlocutors and urban actors were interviewed on their proposed and ongoing projects with the aim of establishing a better understanding of institutional urban management, roles and impact of international aid, and the role of the private sector.

The different urban features of the three cities studied were the subject of various types of analysis. The case studies attempted to bring out elements of understanding in spatial, social

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<sup>16</sup> From July to September 2005, by Claire Mariani, junior researcher of Groupe URD in geopolitics and town planning .

<sup>17</sup> From May to July 2006 by Rafika Mahmoudi, junior researcher of Groupe URD in geography and town planning .

<sup>18</sup> In 2005, research carried out by J. Patera and C. Mariani and in 2006 additional research and synthesis in progress by Béatrice Boyer, architect and urban development ,Groupe URD.

or geopolitical terms, by relying on different tools of urban analysis. The themes discussed concerned for example:

➤ **Diversity of spatial understanding**

Comprehension and management of spatiality of urban contexts at stake are analysed at intra muros, peri-urban and regional levels. The different surveys focus on the scale of interaction, and in particular, issues related to urban territorial limits.

➤ **Consequences of the dual urban dynamics at play**

Technical impact on rehabilitation of the existing infrastructure, social impacts of choice or refusal to intervene in networks and public services, legal impact on land matters are analysed on the one hand institutional dynamics, on the other informal, or even illegal dynamics.

➤ **Reconstruction issue between rehabilitation and development**

Equilibrium between hypothesis of development strategies put forward by local authorities, and in the other way financial and field realities with redeployment of international aid and national rehabilitation programmes.

**a) Survey on Bamiyan as a small-sized city**

Bamiyan city was the subject of a Survey on urban development and an article entitled: "*Is building a city an appropriate response to development issues in Bamiyan?*"<sup>19</sup>. The study initiated by Groupe URD was subsequently the subject of university research in France on the theme of, "*Development of an urban society in rural spaces: the case of Bamiyan, Afghanistan*"<sup>20</sup> and certain conclusions are echoed in a wide-reaching study conducted at the international level under the guidance of UNESCO<sup>21</sup>.

Groupe URD's research, which was conducted by a specialist in urban issues with a background in political sciences<sup>22</sup>, raised the question of the **relevance of local political motivation for urban development focused on the notion of a "tourist city"** as a solution to different problems: living conditions of a poor rural population, broken-up territory, preservation of historical heritage, development of tourist industry. In reality, Bamiyan is seen as a sparse and heterogeneous collection of geographically scattered villages located in a high valley. This territorial entity is comprised of numerous old traditional hamlets, cave dwellings and recent settlements since 2002, government projects for refugees or natives who have returned. There are no suitable spatial links between the different settlements. The only economic source is a bazaar that has been suffocating since 2001 by spreading out endlessly, without any control, at the foot of a cliff occupied previously by the Buddha statues until their provocative destruction by the Taliban in 2001. No infrastructure binds this broken-up territory: no roadway, nor even water supply.

➤ **To what extent does the local context influence the options of urban governance?**

The study was based on the following hypothesis: "Is building a city an appropriate response to development issues in Bamiyan?" At the conference held in December 2005<sup>23</sup>, the researcher concluded that Bamiyan did not present any features and problems that were particularly urban in nature and that the urbanisation projects planned for the only plateau that was partially equipped with buildings for administrative or international functions would not solve the problems of this diverse territory. On the

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<sup>19</sup> Report and article are available on Groupe URD's website: [www.urd.org](http://www.urd.org)

<sup>20</sup> Claire Mariani, "*Development of an urban society in rural spaces: the case of Bamiyan, Afghanistan*" Institut Francais d'Urbanisme, DESS Urbanisme et Aménagement; Option Expertise Internationale-villes en développement" 111p, April 2006,

<sup>21</sup> UNESCO, ACD(Aachen University), Japan Cooperation, Ministry of Urban Development, Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism, *Bamaiyan Master Plan, Preservation of the World Cultural heritage in Bamiyan*, 2005

<sup>22</sup> Claire Mariani, junior researcher of Groupe URD

<sup>23</sup> Presentation at Groupe URD conference, Ministry of Agriculture at Kabul, 13 December 2005

contrary, consistent inter village development is required. Urban analysis revealed discrepancies between the local situation and political motivation, and a failure to integrate the improvement of people's living conditions as an essential element of urban strategies at a political level.

➤ **Absence of communication at the research level**

Due to difficult access to the content of the UNESCO study<sup>24</sup> in 2005, this analysis could not consider the elements of multi and interdisciplinary detailed work on the conditions of a development of territorial consistency in Bamiyan at the level of the valley in relation to the preservation of a world recognised heritage.

Although since the research conducted in May-July 2005, several professional and public information meetings have been organised in Kabul and Bamiyan, the persisting difficult access to information and communication between the researchers ahead of the meetings, especially on public issues, is regrettable and unproductive. The difference in the scale of means, between a small structure and a multi partner international structure is not a handicap to participate in research synergies.

**b) Survey on Jalalabad as a medium-sized city**

Jalalabad city was the subject of a Survey on urban development and an article entitled: "*Jalalabad: a resort town of change*"<sup>25</sup>. The study initiated by Groupe URD was subsequently the subject of university research in France by the same author who insists on assessment issues with the following title: "*Are urban projects implemented in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, in keeping with the economic, social and geographical context*"<sup>26</sup>

The study was conducted from May to July 2006 by an urban specialist with a background in geography<sup>27</sup> who immediately raised the question of scale of urban analysis. Jalalabad, an average city, is one of the five Afghan cities along with Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif and Kabul for which the government has developed a development and financing strategy in association with international aid. Deeply affected by frequent refugee movements since the end of Soviet war, the city is strategic on the national level given its links with Pakistan. Besides, it has various potential attractive assets (gardens, rivers and canals, excellent winter climate, lush and fragrant vegetation), that make it historically a favourite resort city.

➤ **Location and spatial consistency of development in progress**

Urban analysis ensured that spatiality was taken into consideration in the various issues, strategies, decisions and projects. The method of comparative analysis of existing maps has led to the drafting of complementary maps to bring in key elements for understanding or discussing problems related to spatial management of urban space.

➤ **Remarks on the research**

There is a lack of knowledge and tools for spatial management of the city, which in turn results in 'informal' areas, which are hitherto ignored by authorities, differences in spatial comprehension, and inadequacy of positioning and limits of intervention areas.

➤ **Need for spatial analysis and good coordination**

The city has environmental advantages that need to be protected from uncontrolled urban expansion and from various projects, including municipal projects. A spatial

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<sup>24</sup> UNESCO, Protecting the world heritage site of Bamiyan, key issues for the establishment of a comprehensive Management plan, 2004

<sup>25</sup> Report being made accessible on the site of Groupe URD [www.urd.org](http://www.urd.org)

<sup>26</sup> Rafika Mahmoudi, Mémoire de Master Aménagement et Urbanisme, parcours opérateur urbain et expertise internationale-Ville en développement, Institut Français d'Urbanisme, Paris 8 Université, Nov 2006.

<sup>27</sup> Rafika Mahmoudi, junior researcher of Groupe URD

analysis and drawing up of plans are necessary for the management of the city's development. Urban inter-actor coordination has been established with UNDP aid<sup>28</sup>.

### **c) Survey on Kabul as the main city in Afghanistan**

Kabul city was the subject of an Urban Development Survey<sup>29</sup> in 2006<sup>30</sup>.

This survey was preceded in 2005 by a first overview with an article entitled: *"From the spreading of the Pakistani architecture to the growing urban expansion of Kabul into the surrounding hills, what will Kabul look like in the near future?"*<sup>31</sup>

Considering the importance of the urban analysis which has been carried out for several years now on Kabul, numerous reports that have been written, programmes developed and studies conducted as much by international organisms (WB, JICA, UNDP, AREU, etc.), as by institutional officials (SDP, KURP at MoUD), Groupe URD will attempt to update and analyse certain lines of thought around the urban situation, programme development, institutional roles and international aid in this context.

To tackle this highly complex situation, different approaches adopted at different intervals were required

#### **➤ Interviews to improve our understanding of the sector**

First of all, early 2005 was devoted to research with the main actors concerned (MUDH, Kabul Municipality, World Bank, UN) and trying to discern where the most urgent needs lie, and programmes underway. This phase also consisted of finding out what research was currently being undertaken on urban vulnerability criteria<sup>32</sup> with some field work.

#### **➤ Observation and analysis of uncontrolled urban development**

The second observation phase, including a field trip and interviews in November 2005 was the subject of reports and discussions presented in Kabul in December 2005<sup>33</sup>. Contrasting situations, revealing informal uncontrolled development, deteriorating or missing infrastructure, extension of settlements of proliferating lands, anarchic building work, exogenous with imported styles, private programmes for a new city, were highlighted on this occasion.

#### **➤ Analysis on the institutional links between Kabul and the Ministry of Town Planning**

In 2006, the author conducted many interviews, either as a complement to earlier discussions or with a view to understanding the progress of the situation and decisions. Given that Kabul is the capital and represents 50% of the total urban Afghan population, the questions raised on institutional functioning of the sector are intimately related.

## **1.2.5 A transversal approach**

A crosscutting approach was conducted within the LRRD programme, through a comparative study in provinces: *Urban sector issues in LRRD chapter2 in LRRD: a review based on a Multi and Cross Sector Approach: April 2006*<sup>34</sup>. This report was based on observation of recurring problems in various areas of urban occupation and attempts to analyse the causes.

Visits at different times of the year and complementary approaches to various cities such as Kunduz, Pul-e Khumri, Ghazni, Jalalabad or Mazar-e Sharif enabled us to improve our

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<sup>28</sup> Provincial Development Committee

<sup>29</sup> Béatrice Boyer, architect and urban development researcher in Groupe URD

<sup>30</sup> Report will be available in 2007 on Groupe URD's website, [www.urd.org](http://www.urd.org)

<sup>31</sup> Claire Mariani, junior researcher of Groupe URD;

<sup>32</sup> Different studies conducted by AREU, ACF, UN-HABITAT

<sup>33</sup> Groupe URD conference at the Ministry of Agriculture at Kabul, 13 December 2005

<sup>34</sup> Report will be available in 2007 on Groupe URD's website, [www.urd.org](http://www.urd.org)

understanding of reconstruction problems in urban areas and helped bring out some conclusions, discussed in the chapter on the urban sector in the April 2006 report “*A review based on a Multi and Cross Sector Approach*”. This analysis was the focus of a presentation at the Ministry of Town planning (MoUD) on 5 August 2006.

Our analysis looked at urban space and responsibilities:

➤ **Inaccuracies of urban contexts**

The cross-cutting approach looks at the following questions in provincial cities: how spatial limits and urban administrative responsibilities are being called into question, how to achieve a socio-cultural equilibrium in this period of change, what demographic data are available, to what extent town planning documents are obsolete, how authorities can absorb new urban populations, and how political inactivity or uncertainty has hampered the development of the sector.

➤ **Administrative gap between responsibilities and territories**

This approach looked at how urban territories are divided up under territorialised fragmented responsibilities. Most of the time, urban occupations spread into rural areas and then lie outside urban responsibilities. One of the consequences of the disconnection between responsibilities and territories is the arrival of non-specialist urban actors on the urban scene.

➤ **Questions relating to local governance**

Absence of urban policy at municipal level was highlighted with some observations:

- A key stage is missing between levels at which urban policy is drawn up;
- Town planning capacities are weak at municipal level and we have observed an absence of external advisors;
- Widespread weak coordination is being tackled with the UNDP at Jalalabad.

➤ **Need for synergy for urban development**

Some of the suggestions that were put forward in the conclusion of the *Multi and Cross Sector Approach* report to accompany a synergy of urban development are repeated at the end of this Sector Review.

### **1.2.6 A general approach**

The present survey “Urban Sector Review in Afghanistan” is a general overall approach. This Sector Review does not claim to be exhaustive but aims to shed light on the main institutional changes. Our research focused on questions such as: what are the urban issues linking reconstruction and development, what formal documents give a structure to this transition, who participates in drawing up strategies, who is involved in defining policies, how are reconstruction programmes integrated into institutional structures, who are the main urban institutional actors? This involves getting to know who is involved in the sector and trying to improve their understanding of some of the key issues with respect to local contexts, the roles of different organisations involved in decision making, defining policy and programmes. Research mainly focused on institutional organisations.

## **1.3 Urban Sector Review: objectives, limitations, constraints and methods**

### **1.3.7 Objectives of the Urban Sector Review**

For the past five years, the urban reconstruction process, with the support and management of international financial institutions and the UN is slowly taking off because of the enormity of needs and also diverging viewpoints between the international community and Afghan bodies. Since 2003, a large number of international organisations have been analysing the situation and producing study after study. The findings of these studies are communicated serve as preparatory documents for the general and specific strategies that are being drawn up by government for Kabul and five major cities: Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad Mazar-e Sharif and Kunduz. These appraisals look at different aspects of town planning, including:

economics, with financial organisms (ARTF, World Bank, ADB, KfW, etc.), governance, with the UN agency UN-HABITAT, assessing vulnerability of urban populations with research institutes such as AREU or ACF, land issues with EMG/USAID, the preservation and restoration of architectural heritage (AKTC). Other appraisals are expected, especially on environmental questions.

➤ **Analysing mechanisms and institutional role**

Given the multiplicity of actors, organisations, specialists and the frequency of publications, reports, studies and preparatory documents for government reports, themselves updated successively in relation to progress in state rebuilding, this Sector Review attempts to contribute a specific viewpoint. Rather than carrying out an analysis using specialist urban techniques, this study aims to identify factors that promote or hamper progress in the institutional reconstruction process in the domain of town planning.

### **1.3.8 Constraints and limitations**

As a result of the lack of communication between urban officials, insufficient coordination at different levels between actors and programmes, lack of transparency between government and municipal organisms and finally a lack of up-to-date data in general have complicated our research work. Over the past thirty years, these factors have also sadly had a negative impact on the capacity of all our interlocutors and officials at one level or another to improve their knowledge in urban matters. MoUDH has embarked on its restructuring process (to become the MoUD, without the Housing dimension), hence the hesitation on the part of the Ministry to communicate. It took time to earn the trust of Afghan interlocutors and for them to understand the objectives of this study, the author was required to spend more time in Kabul. The urban sector since 2005 has been the subject of many meetings for analysis purposes, consultation, exchange about issues currently under study by different actors (e.g. JICA for the extension of a Greater Kabul, EMG/USAID for questions of land informalities, UN-HABITAT for questions on governance). The relevance of this Sector Review would have benefited from a continual presence at these exchanges and communications in the past months.

Analysing field observations has also been difficult because of the variation in reconstruction dynamics. Small-scale specific rehabilitation operations, implemented by international organisations as pilot schemes are the only visible effects of the rehabilitation process. Alongside these operations, private investment is having a powerful impact. These private actors have launched a number of initiatives, including the construction of numerous offices and business buildings as well as luxurious private houses in cities, whilst on the outskirts of self-build housing is spreading out horizontally, doubling the urban population and the size of the city.

➤ **Flexibility of the analysis method**

The method of analysis conducted by Groupe URD had to be flexible in view of the successive difficulties and complexities: multiplicity of actors, rigidity or uncertainty of roles of different administrations in charge of the sector, instability of the political situation, ignorance of the interlocutors on urban topics, lack of information or difficult access, disparities between data or overproduction of publications on the same urban issues (for example on the subject of unofficial occupation or legal problems related to land deeds).

➤ **Adapting to constraints**

Groupe URD has used these constraints of time, situation and place to understand the progress over several stages, successively and repeatedly: field trips, meeting interlocutors several times, understanding publications of studies conducted now and then.

### 1.3.9 Methods

The minutes of initial meetings held by Groupe URD in 2005, as well as interviews with different officials and institutions involved in town planning complement our research carried out in 2006. The lapse of time between the start of our research and now helped us to perceive the progress made, details or changes. In January-February 2006, an inventory was carried out of all the documents that have been written by the different actors in government reconstruction in general, and involved in the urban sector in particular, with a view to understanding what progress had been made in the Afghan reconstruction process with international aid since 2001. From March-July 2006, complementary research on projects and roles of institutional actors gave rise to new meetings with some of the main actors.

This study attempts to shed light on the situation, as well as respond to one of the MoUD's requests to move closer to their concerns of reorganisation.

The method of research followed a spiral path from the exterior towards the interior then in the opposite direction:

#### *1.3.9.1 At first, an informal yet informative way of understanding the situation*

For this study, a series of visits to websites, inventory, compiling documents, reading, visits to urban areas, discussions with inhabitants, a survey of National Solidarity Programmes (NSP) operations, discussions with representatives of communities and resident workers, meetings with non-institutional actors, NGO officials in charge of training, follow-up operations, setting up projects and fundraising was carried out. Also meetings were held with local technical officials in the provinces: MoUHD, CAWSS, AGCHO offices, technical department of town councils, NGO agencies, as well as interviews with mayors, provincial representatives of UN agencies like UN-HABITAT, UNAMA and UNOPS. In short, in a narrow spiral curve of the investigation process, at Kabul the capital, interviews with government officials, Afghan and foreigners advisors, private actors (architects), of economic cooperation structure (economic mission, French Embassy), headquarters of international organisms (ICRC), then different meetings with department officials of the Ministry of Town planning.

#### *1.3.9.2 Subsequently, blockade and official opening up*

Although anyone can just walk into the Ministry easily, access to information dried up and subject to a very positive introduction meeting with Minister Pashtun in the presence of two Deputy Ministers.

#### *1.3.9.3 Formalities and an institutional transition towards understanding mechanisms*

More time was spent assessing the needs of the MoUHD and how Groupe URD could contribute to the Ministry, including the drafting of a formal agreement<sup>35</sup> of this exchange and again a host of more focused interviews in different departments of the MUDH, units of National Programmes, the CAWSS administration, in order to collect information on the rebuilding in progress.

#### ➤ **This Sector Review is a crossed synthesis of findings**

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<sup>35</sup> See Annexe: Agreement between the MoUDH and the Groupe URD May 4, 2006

## 2 FOREWORD ON CULTURE

At this point, the author would like to highlight the cultural importance of an Afghan symbol, the “Daira-yi’idalat” (Circle of Justice) and the following interpretations that can be made as a means of understanding Afghan culture.

### 2.1 Symbolic practice, moral model and institutional guide of Afghanistan

This Sector Review is based on the main ideas contained in the strategies and overall visions for institutional reconstruction of Afghanistan. Afghan culture, right up to the highest levels of power, uses as its reference a symbolic geometrical image as a regulatory principle of ongoing issues. This symbol, the ‘Circle of Justice’, is referred to in the introduction of the new Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan prepared in 2002 with the drafting of the I-ANDS (Interim- Afghanistan National Development Strategy)<sup>36</sup> in these terms:

*“The Government of Afghanistan’s model of governance and development today derives from an ancient concept of this region called the Circle of Justice (daira-yi ‘idalat).[ ...] :“There can be no government [...]. and no prosperity without justice and good administration.”<sup>37</sup>*

#### ➤ Approach to the Afghan identity

Since our study looks at the institutional aspects related to current day Afghanistan, we felt it was interesting to dwell on this topic of ‘Circle of Justice’, an old Afghan symbolic reference, which has been revived in the process of the reconstruction of the State. This symbol guides Afghan people’s visions, analysis, government strategies and activities. As a foreword to this Sector Review, the author tries to identify some of the meanings and values conveyed by this concept in order to approach the urban institutional context with a better understanding of some of the features of the Afghan identity.

### 2.2 Spatial practice, permanence and people’s use of this symbol

The circle of justice is a reference that commonly crops up in terms of governance and is incarnated in a traditional Afghan game, *Buzkachi*, which is still very popular today. During a visit to Pul-e Khumri in December 2005, in order to better understand the situation and mechanisms at work in the urbanisation of a provincial town, the author attended a *Buzkachi* game and observed the popular vitality of the game and the symbolic value of the circle. A symbolic presentation of desirable values is acted out in a popular spatial custom, directly under the watchful eyes of a crowd of spectators.

Two aspects are of interest to us in this enactment of the Afghan symbol.

#### ➤ The issue of space with multiple actors

The Afghan capacity to position an objective and establish a consensus between the different issues at stakes through an exercise in space with multiple actors. Taking this circle of justice and applying the model to the city of Kabul and finally to Afghanistan illustrates how different interests interact on the spatial plan.

#### ➤ Geometry and territorial planning

The geometrical formulation of this symbol brings us closer to spatial territorial and urban planning that passes through lines in space.

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<sup>36</sup> I-ANDS, (Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy), Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, executive Summary

<sup>37</sup> I-ANDS

## 2.3 Circles of justices: a symbol of centres with common issues

Today, interesting comparisons can be drawn between this symbol and *Buzkachi*, and Kabul and Afghanistan in general, and a set of stakes that go beyond the city or the country itself, placing it at the centre of crossed national and international preoccupations. With the 'Circle of Justice', the epicentre of the constitution as a great traditional sport representing Afghan values, the city of Kabul, in the role of the national capital becomes the symbolic urban centre of the Afghan state. Just as Afghanistan is updating its pivotal role in regional and international issues with recent History.

### ➤ **Circle and centre of responsibilities**

This picture repositions Afghanistan and what it is going to become at the centre of responsibilities shared between Afghans and the international community.

### ➤ **Circles of issues at stake, circles of consultation**

And successive declension of circles of stakes is a reflection of the different levels of consultation already at work with traditional Shuras. New organisations need to be set up for exchange, consultation, coordination and decisions.

## 2.4 Circle of justice: Symbolic line, regulatory line

The symbolic concept of the Circle of Justice is materialised in the game of *Buzkachi* by a line which is drawn on the ground with chalk in the middle of a territory whose limits are adaptable to the local situation. These lines in the limited and circular space define a framework with stakes and rules between interior and exterior, legal and illegal. Even though Afghanistan traditionally is traditionally accustomed to managing rural space rather than urban space and decisions are traditionally made orally, it is interesting to know that its administrators also refer to values represented by a concept of geometrical line to regulate issues in their society.

### ➤ **Concept and consultation on a spatial issue**

Two elements deserve to be retained: the capacity of the Afghan people to conceptualise the stakes in space and the capacity of consultation around a spatial concept. Drawing up urban plans requires stakeholders to call on these two faculties.

### 3 THE LAST 50 YEARS: IMPACT OF POLITICAL EVENTS ON URBANISATION

Contemporary Afghan history has been particularly eventful over the past few decades, resulting in an imbalance between its urban and rural populations. Even though 80% of Afghanistan still remains largely rural, disorderly growth and continued, uncontrollable increase of its urban population have created many problems for the urban authorities. Afghan history has been punctuated with brief periods of peace, interspersed with alternate periods of successive wars. Hence the urbanisation process has been a discontinuous one of progress, stagnation and regression. The disastrous urban situation inherited in 2001 towards the end of all these periods, owes its complexity to the superimposition of all these periods. All our interlocutors mention urban disaster, confusion, chaos and critical situations prevailing at the close of these historical ups and downs.

We have attempted to understand the different stages of this urban destructuring process by creating tables that summarise overlapping time sequences by identifying:

- Main events in the history of Afghanistan from the 1950's up to the fall of the Taliban in 2001
- Impact on population displacement
- Resulting urbanisation process and urban policies
- Consequences of international presence and aid.

#### 3.1 Identification of main problems

Due to the existence of two types of oppositions, resistance to external pressure and internal power struggles between regions or ethnic groups, Afghanistan has always remained unstable and hence a challenge for the near permanent international presence here for the past few decades

Many urban problems appear clearly during this survey.

➤ **Land tenure issues historically associated with successive conflicts**

Land tenure issues arose long before the most recent conflict and informal settlements commenced many decades ago.

➤ **Longstanding trauma for urban populations**

The roots of successive traumas and non acceptance of heterogeneous populations by urban people also need to be taken into consideration when reviewing the lives of many generations of Afghans.

➤ **Institutional weaknesses: accumulated inheritance**

Rigidity or total absence of institutional responsibilities are both the fall out of the Soviet legacy, the poor capacity for urban governance and also the legacy of diverging challenges and abuse of power.

➤ **An urbanisation process alternating between progress and regression**

Urbanisation has been successively managed, structured, planned, or been the target of uncontrolled destruction and destructuring. The urban situation is the disorderly result of an accumulation of direct and indirect effects of these mechanisms.

➤ **Near-permanent international presence**

Permanent international aid within or near the territory, supports the population, alternating between emergency relief and development.

### 3.2 From 1953 till the withdrawal of the Soviet army in 1989

Afghan calendar (-621 years)

Key Periods	1953- 1979 1332-1358	1979 1358	1979 - 1988 1358-1367	1989 1368
<b>POLITICAL SITUATIONS</b>	<p><b>Theatre appended to the Cold War</b> (Daoud) Strategic International presence altogether or alternately. Play of economic and technical influences by international advisors, Soviets, Americans, Iranians &amp; <b>Attempt to Modernise the State</b></p>	<p><b>Communist Coup d'Etat</b> Followed by Soviet <b>intervention</b> &amp; beginning of <b>JIHAD war</b></p>	<p><b>Soviet Occupation</b> Preparation for withdrawal from 1986 (Gorbachev)  &amp; <b>Armed Resistance Jihad against communists</b> Mujahidins supported, mainly by Pakistan, the Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, etc.), USA, China, etc.</p>	<p>Fall of the USSR. <b>Withdrawal of Red Army from Afghanistan</b> Communists in power (Najibullah) Supported by USSR &amp; <b>beginning of the civil wars</b></p>
<b>MIGRATION &amp; EVOLUTION OF URBAN POPULATION</b>	<p><b>Urban Growth</b> <b>Rural Exodus to the cities</b> from 1970 onwards <b>Heterogeneous Urban Population</b> Educated + international + rural city dwellers</p>	<p><b>Exodus abroad</b></p>	<p><b>Exile – Declining population in Afghanistan</b> 5 million Afghans to Iran and Pakistan of which 2,000,000 from Kabul alone <b>Change of populations</b> Displacements, flight from combat zones Colonisation by the Russians and <b>Massive exodus of rural population to the cities</b></p>	<p>Double flux  <i>Exodus and return</i>  Intra urban Internal displacements.(IDPs)  <b>Insecurity</b> Population taken hostage</p>
<b>URBANISATION PROCESS</b>	<p><b>Planning and Modernising of cities</b> Urban, administrative, technical, and cultural economic process &amp; <b>Exclusion, consequence of this planning</b>  <b>City Centres reconsidered</b> creation of infrastructure systems: <b>Public Works</b> (roads, bridges, tunnels): (dams, power stations, canals) <b>Construction</b> (Hospitals, universities,) &amp; <b>Unofficial Occupation</b> <b>Extension into peripheral zones.</b> <b>Master Plan -</b> Establishment of Master Plans from 1962 to 1978 With soviet engineering: -well planned management of functional zones &amp; <b>Cadastral register</b> only 33% of Afghanistan has a cadastral register.</p>		<p>Double effect of regression in urban life, <b>Militarisation and Ruralisation</b> <b>Slowing down of modernisation</b> Kabul: military base for the Russians  <b>Acculturation of urban population</b>  Powerful military and administrative population  Rural Population in city: traditional self construction  ~ Functional Urbanisation by autonomous zones Ad hoc Colonisation spaces with programmes for grouping collective housing For government officers (Ministries, Enterprises), In the vicinity of airports or factories  prefabricated concrete blocks, with independent city water/ heating networks &amp; <b>Spaces for refuge</b> Squatters and illegal construction. Reconstruction of traditional environment and village type families 80% constr. = mud bricks ~  <b>Stagnation of Urban development</b>  Master Plans Never fully applied.  <b>Technical and Administrative Restructuring</b> Effective for construction</p>	<p><b>Field for Confrontation</b> Challenge of conflicts; Battle field locality by locality.  <b>Physical damage</b>  <b>Double destruction:</b> Direct effects of demolitions due to hits. - Indirect effects destructuring and spatial alteration by displacements and change of occupation</p>

<p><b>MODALITES OF INTERNATIONAL AID</b></p>	<p><b>Developmental</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Building infrastructure</li> <li>- Transfer of expertise with</li> </ul> <p><b>training</b> of Afghan engineers in USSR</p> <p><b>Creation</b> of Cadastral school in Kandahar by USA in 1963</p> <p><b>- But a tool and policy of land registry information abandoned</b> in 1971 under communist influence</p> <p>Financing USA+USSR</p>		<p><b>Western Embargo</b></p> <p>Politicised Emergency Aid: counter Soviet strategy by alternative to exile (war aid and help to the refugees )</p> <p>Aid from Governments</p> <p>1988: accord in Geneva between Kabul-USSR, Pakistan and USA. For « humanitarian encirclement » operations</p> <p><b>Emergency and Rehabilitation Programmes</b></p> <p>: preparation for return of refugees</p> <p>1988 two offices of <b>coordination</b></p> <p>UNOCA at the institutional level and ACBAR for western NGOs.</p> <p>~</p> <p>Medical Aid: setting up of clinics</p> <p><b>And cross border operations</b> with 50 NGOs and 200 million dollars.</p> <p><b>Sustained management of camps</b></p> <p><b>Programmes mainly for rural areas</b></p> <p>English NGOs: support for mujahidins</p> <p>Presence of French NGOs by way of <b>humanitarian and political support:</b></p> <p>Solidarity, MSF, Madera</p> <p>UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, HCR present</p> <p>UNDP programmes in Kabul</p> <p>Extension of aid to the East and the West</p>	
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### 3.3 From 1989 to the fall of the Taliban in 2001

	1989-1992	1992-1996	1996-1999- 2001	2001 1381
POLITICAL SITUATION	<b>Najibullah's Communist Government</b> Supported by Russia Mainly control of the cities and Northern part of the territory	<b>Islamic Republic</b> With Rabani, Supported by Massoud in 1994  <b>Permanent conflicts between Afghan factions</b>  Mujahidin <b>Anarchy</b> with the arrival of the Taliban from 1994 onwards	<b>Take over of Kabul. reestablishment of some order by the Taliban</b> Helped by Pakistan (USA) Accepted by the Pushtuns Progress of the regime to an <b>Islamic fundamentalism, Door open to international terrorism</b> From 1998 <b>American Retaliation</b> <b>UNO Sanctions in 1999</b>	<b>Terrorist attacks in New York</b> Followed by U.S. military operations leading to the <b>Fall of the Taliban</b> end 2001 & <b>Construction of an Islamic Democratic Afghan State: IRA.</b> Under the control of International Community <b>Reconstruction Process</b>
MIGRATION & EVOLUTION OF URBAN POPULATION	<b>Survival strategies:</b>  <b>Exodus</b> <b>and</b> <b>Internal Displacements</b> In the country and in the cities: intra-urban & ex-urban movements. Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)  Some leave the cities (e.g. Kabul), others take refuge in other cities	<b>Insecurity</b> <b>Bombing</b> of Kabul in 1992, 93, 95 10,000 civilian deaths due to battles between Massoud/Hekmatyar Massoud/Hazarat  <b>Population caught in a vicious grip</b> Ethnic Conflicts  <b>Loss of cohesiveness,</b> Of urban social solidarity	<b>Exacerbated and excessive Control of people,</b> Mainly city dwellers and women; <b>Many Prohibitions</b> Like any opening of a culture other than a repressive and regressive Islamism? <b>Loss of</b> Afghan and urban educated <b>general culture.</b>	<b>Increase in Urban population uncontrolled,</b> unknown (absence of data) <b>Population with no social links</b> between: Original inhabitants, new arrivals over the last days of the wars, voluntary returnees, refugees, expelled from Iranian and Pakistan exile, IDPs, Afghan diaspora, rural communities, rich individuals, foreigners from the international community, armed forces present in Kabul.
URBANISATION PROCESS	City besieged by fighting <b>Destruction and abandon</b> of residential localities. <b>Destruction insecurity</b> Effects of fragmentation of the city and conflicting interdependence between inimical districts, no reconstitution of social links. <b>Place of power stakes</b> <b>Place of Confrontation</b> ~ In Kabul <b>Strategic Utilisation of physical properties</b> Nerve centre for battles City centre and hills Scene of action Rocket launching base	<b>Bombing</b> <b>Destruction</b>  of buildings entire localities  of technical, electricity and road systems  <b>Fragmentation</b> of the cities.	<b>Kabul is a capital exhausted</b> by ten years of war,  by 30 years of management and maintenance inactivity and laxity, spatial taking over by more than 4 million people  ~however in positive way <b>Creation of urban administrative tools by the Taliban</b>  Special Law on municipalities adopted in 1999- Art 2: municipality = Public legal entity constituted to meet the needs of the people  Art 7: gives the means for creation of administrative centres and establishment of Master Plan (for cities with more than 5000 inhabitants)	<b>Slow process</b> <b>Repair - Reconstruction</b> Still in negotiating stage in 2006 <b>Divergence in priority</b> between unrealistic Afghan vision for <b>Creation of new cities</b> and financing objectives for <b>Rehabilitation, Renovation</b> of existing localities by the International Community. ~ <b>50 to 70 %</b> <b>of informal settlements</b>  <b>Outdated Planning.</b> <b>Absence of infrastructure,</b> minimum systems of basic amenities <b>Inefficient roadways</b> <b>traffic jams</b> <b>Urban Pollution</b> <b>Economy at a stand still</b> Non existent urban management and policy ~ - Considerable delay of <b>expertise in the urban sector,</b> planning, management and maintenance mechanisms.
MODALITIES OF INTERNATIONAL AID	Emergency aid programmes ICRC, NGO, WFP  <b>Withdrawal of aid from Kabul to rural areas</b> in the North and West	<b>Transition from Emergency to Rehabilitation Development</b> programs NGOs based in Pakistan or at Kabul around the ICRC: UN-HABITAT: Support to local forms of government with <b>Creation of plural representative Assemblies:</b> <b>Shuras</b> District Rehabilitation Shuras ~ <b>Flexible modalities between EC budget lines</b>	<b>Financial withdrawal of governments:</b> Reflection of the international community's hostility toward the Taliban  Coherence of strategies of Intl. Aid <b>Programmes limited to Emergencies</b> <b>vital aid</b> 75% of aid is allocated for emergency.  <b>Risk of</b> dependence, weakening of local adaptation mechanisms, exodus of rural populations to refugee camps perpetuation of camps  <b>Border Aid</b> Return of humanitarian aid around the borders	<b>Massive and coordinated humanitarian Aid</b> under the supervision of the UN  Desire to help <b>institutional reconstruction of the Afghan state</b> and all administrative sectors.  Reconstruction commitments Massive influx of NGOs and funds  <b>Risk of</b> Lack of coordination Lack of foresight in changing emergency programs to stable situations  military humanitarian confusion on the field with Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)

Source: Groupe URD

## 4 FROM 2001: INSTITUTIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

### 4.1 Summary of chronology of events from 2001

#### 2001 – *jaddi 1380*

9 September:	Assassination of Massoud by Arab Islamists
11 September:	Destruction of the Twin Towers in New York
7 October:	International Intervention “Operation Enduring Freedom”
5 December:	Bonn Agreement on Provisional Government in Afghanistan International Agreement within arbitration for forming a transitional government in Afghanistan
22 December:	Inauguration of the AIA, Afghanistan Interim Authority
June:	Creation of Grand Assembly: Emergency Loya Jirga (fully elected representative government for two years)
2003 March:	World Bank finalises Transitional Support Strategy for Afghanistan, which directly supports the government’s National Development Framework. It outlines the Bank’s assistance over a period of two years and focuses on four key areas improving livelihoods; assisting with the government’s fiscal strategy, developing and managing institutions; supporting governance and public administration reform; and enabling private sector development in Afghanistan” <sup>38</sup>
2003 December:	IRA - Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is created by the constitutional “Loya Jirga”
2004 March:	SFA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future
December:	Presidential elections (Mr Hamid Karzai)
July:	NPPs, National Priority Programs
2005 18 September:	Election of the Afghan Parliament and Provincial Councils
December:	Inauguration of Afghanistan’s National Assembly: Kabul Conference
2006 <i>1384</i>	
31 Jan.-1 Feb:	Agreement for “Afghanistan Compact” in London Conference with the International Community. (World Bank commits US\$973 million for 18 development and emergency reconstruction projects in Afghanistan)
2020 (by 1400)	Target for the achievement of the <b>Millennium Development Goal</b>

### 4.2 Reconstruction process of the country

The Afghanistan state reconstruction process was started very soon after the fall of the Taliban, under the aegis of the UN. In 2006, the main state institutions were created and started functioning.

On 22 December 2001 (1 *jaddi 1380*), in line with the international conference agreement at Bonn, the so-called “Bonn Agreement”, the **Afghanistan Interim Administration (AIA)** was put in place with the nomination of Mr. Hamid Karzai as its head. An international agreement, the “Bonn Process” was signed to help the reconstruction process of the country. This formed the basis of reorganisation of government institutions. In June 2002, a provisional Assembly (*An Emergency Loya Girga*) was elected for two years to prepare the new Constitution and for the Constitutional Assembly elections. In December 2003, the

<sup>38</sup> The World Bank in Afghanistan, country update on January 2006 (World Bank website).

**Constitutional Assembly** (*Constitutional Loya Jirga*) created the **Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA)**, which had the authorisation and power to promulgate laws and decrees despite the prevalence of an unstable situation all over the country.

### 4.3 Symbol and moral context of the process

*“Fully consistent with the Circle of Justice, the preamble to our Constitution states that Government will strive: [...]. The I-ANDS<sup>39</sup> aims to move Afghanistan towards these obligations by asking and answering four fundamental questions:*

- 1. What are our vision, goals and objectives? This question drives the Government's policy formulation.*
- 2. What are the contexts and constraints that must be understood and overcome to achieve our vision and objectives? This question drives our analysis.*
- 3. What investments and strategies should we prioritise to overcome those constraints and achieve our objectives? This question drives our strategy and determines the mix and sequencing of programs the Government will prioritise in the I-ANDS.*
- 4. How should we resource, monitor, coordinate and consult on these strategies? This question will drive the implementation of the I-ANDS<sup>40</sup>.”*

➤ **Symbolic Reference in these commitments**

We find under the moral banner symbolised by the Circle of Justice, fundamental questions raised by the Afghans to decide on their strategies of reconstruction of Afghanistan that would form the basis of their dialogue with the international community.

### 4.4 Plans, Vision and Strategies of the Afghan Government

The vision, strategies and commitment of the Afghan authorities vis-à-vis the Afghan people and the international community were the subject of declarations formulated in the **Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS)** document, accepted in a provisional format I-ANDS in Bonn in 2001 by the international community for five years. The decision for an extension of aid was approved in January 2006 in London in a final version with the **Afghanistan Compact**, which extended aid for five years until 2010. Appraisals, analysis and consultations led to a re-evaluation of **NPPs** (National Priority Programme) with the addition of many other subjects, the urban sector being one.

*“We will need international political and financial support. For that reason, the Government of Afghanistan agreed to the Afghanistan Compact with the International Community in 1384 (2006)”.*

➤ **Strategies and vision are also linked to commitments with the international community**

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<sup>39</sup> Interim Afghanistan National Strategy Development

<sup>40</sup> I-ANDS

## 5 FROM 2001 TO 2006: URBAN ISSUES AND INSTITUTIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

The complexity of the urban situation has called for many consultations and analyses in partnership with experts from the international community. This has resulted in a multitude of reference documents, minutes of meetings and an impression of discontinuity in the process of drawing up strategies for the urban context.

The notion of urban strategy is not really present in the early expressions of national strategies of the I-ANDS. It was progressively incorporated only from 2004 onwards, and considerations on the subject first appeared as Urban Development, Technical Annexe within a document on national strategy concerning the country's security<sup>41</sup>. Early strategic orientations and crosscutting priorities expressed in official documents on the reconstruction of Afghanistan put forward a great many problems that needed to be resolved concerning the urban sector. However this strategy does not mention the urban question itself as being a sector that needed a general plan for investment, actions and actors, need for coherence, coordination and an overall management of the situation. An accelerated phase of thought processes only took place from 2005 onwards spurred on by international consultations. Later on, in 2005 and 2006 the sector asked for many working groups to identify urban sector problems, estimate needs, reflect on the mechanisms and begin negotiations for financial commitments.

A series of strategic documents were drawn up in conjunction with the international community with a view to establishing a final reference document: the "Afghanistan Compact", which confirms the framework of the National Development Strategy (NDS), drawn up successively with the I-ANDS and the ANDS. The objective being to "*present the strategy by which the Government of Afghanistan will fulfil its obligations under the Afghanistan Compact. In so doing, it also aims to fulfil the requirements of an Interim-Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP<sup>5</sup>)*".<sup>42</sup>

Phase I in 2003, intermediary stage with **I-ANDS**<sup>43</sup>

Phase II in 2006, final stage with **ANDS**

### ➤ **Slow process**

Stakeholders were slow to fully understand the magnitude of urban challenges and material needs, both at political and technical levels.

### 5.1 Urban sector absent in 2003 strategies

These strategies were expressed in the **Interim Afghan National Development Strategy** or **I-ANDS**. Problems linked with urban conditions only appear in passing in the form of distinct subjects but not as a sector as a whole. In 2003, the Afghan government had still not taken stock of the problem. The I-ANDS is drawn up by the government and its international partners (Asian Development, United Nations Assistance, Mission to Afghanistan, United Nations Development Program and the World Bank) with the April 2004 International Conference in mind. The Afghan government endeavoured to present a coherent National strategy in these commitments. "*The I-ANDS proposes a coherent strategy across three interdependent pillars of activity: (1) security, (2) governance, rule of law, and human rights, and (3) economic and social development, eight sectors, and five cross cutting themes...*".

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<sup>41</sup> Securing Afghanistan's Future, Accomplishment and the Strategic Path Forward: *Urban Development, Technical Annexe*

<sup>5</sup> Interim-Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

<sup>42</sup> ANDS Afghanistan National Development Strategy

<sup>43</sup> I-ANDS Interim Afghanistan National Development

These three pillars deal with eight important sectors for reconstruction, but there is no mention of the urban sector. “1) *Security*, 2) *Governance, Rule of Law & Human Rights*, 3) *Infrastructure & Natural Resources*, 4) *Education, Culture & Media*, 5) *Health*, 6) *Agriculture and Rural Development*, 7) *Social Protection*, 8) *Economic Governance and Private Sector Development*”.

➤ **Slow start**

In 2003, apart from emergency measures, it was impossible to start operational programmes as the objectives were not clear and an urban policy had not been established.

➤ **Identification of urban problems but not of an urban sector**

In 2003, the urban sector was not yet a sector that needed to be developed in itself unlike the rural sector which is traditionally more important in Afghanistan. Even if the urban sector is a technical one, nevertheless, it involves many other aspects broached in the national strategies.

➤ **Crosscutting themes of the urban sector**

A crosscutting sector identified in I-ANDS as a sub-sector (6) of the Infrastructure & Natural Resources field, mainly drawn up and implemented by the Ministry of Urban Development & Housing, which nevertheless involves interaction with practically all other sectors, Public Works, Transportation, Communications, Water and Energy, Mines and Industries, Geodesy and Cartography, National Environment protection.

Assistance and co-action with UN consultants, Cooperation, and the banking sector, have progressively shown to what extent the urban sector had to fully integrate all group strategies and the committed finances. *“To ensure the comprehensive and timely completion of the Afghanistan Compact and to facilitate implementation of the I-ANDS, the Government and the international community will establish a Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, co-chaired by Government and the UN, with the participation of senior government officials appointed by the President to work with representatives of the international community.”*

➤ **A sector needing multiple strategies and policies**

Rehabilitation, Development, Energy, framework for private sector

➤ **Need for competent and transparent governance**

A sector requiring efficient governance in general; need to develop institutional level capacities “Institutional and human capacity building”

➤ **Need for Coordination and Monitoring**

A sector involving the setting up of consultation and coordination mechanisms

➤ **Critical legal aspect**

Subjects thought to be critical for rehabilitation referred to in this phase would become important for reconstruction and development challenges. For example legal problems posed by property rights and land tenure. The mechanisms to be put in place will prove to be very difficult and complex.

In (point 14) of I-ANDS: *“A process for registration of land in all administrative units and the registration of titles will be started for all major urban areas by Jaddi 1385 (end-2006)”*.

## **5.2 Partial starting of the process of defining urban sector in 2003**

1. **Consultative Groups (CG)** on the urban sector met, presided over by Mr Pashtun, the MUDH Minister and in the presence of representatives from international organisations involved in the reconstruction process: banking sector organisations with the World Bank, Japanese Cooperation, European Humanitarian Cooperation (ECHO), UN with UN-HABITAT and officers of the MUDH. Restitution of these discussions constitutes the key to the understanding of the progress in the process of identification of needs and strategies. The summary of the points discussed in the **third meeting of the Urban Management**

**Consultative Group<sup>44</sup> in May 2003**, revealed to what extent the urban subject was still at the starting stage, more than a year after the cessation of hostilities.

## **2. Subjects broached by the Minister of the MoUDH**

- Desire to establish an administrative process under the management of MoUDH, concerning decisions on urban development.
- Confirmation of decision for urban development of the cities of Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, Kunduz and finally Kabul.
- Request for analysis to formulate strategies on the following subjects: *Priority areas, Transportation, Expansion of Residential areas, Water Supply, Environment.*
- Introduction of expert consultants joining the MoUDH, including Mr. Djallalzada who would later play a major role in MoUDH as Deputy Minister
- Information on lack of funds; in particular for the creation of residential development areas.

## **3. Subjects broached by international consultants**

- Sanitation and sewerage issues: ECHO explains its intervention from 2002 for this issue in Karachi, for example.
- System of waste management in Kabul: World Bank<sup>45</sup> confirms its proposal for help to study the problems.
- Urban Governance: UN-HABITAT reiterates its position as Urban Management Focal Point, a technical advisory agency on urban management and not a funding body.

### **➤ Partners encounter difficulties in positioning themselves**

Given the timing of the reconstruction process, eighteen months after the cessation of hostilities and funding commitments for reconstruction, the definition of responsibilities and institutional management within the sector are only just beginning to be set up. On the other hand, if the desire for urban development has been expressed very generally for principal Afghan cities, the inventory of existing needs appears to be only in the early stages and will require time for evaluation.

### **➤ Disparity in Afghan and international preoccupations**

International financial partners and advisors (ECHO, WB, UN-HABITAT) are trying to establish what analysis needs to be done in order to resolve the question of stabilisation, capacity for urban governance by envisaging improvement in living standards in the existing urban zones while the Afghan authorities have yet to ponder on their strategies and their functioning.

### **➤ Positive aspect: a consultation that works**

Consultation which seems to function well between the Afghans and IC representatives could possibly develop into more regular meetings, which bodes well for future progress. Indeed consultation is a factor of good coordination between actors, provided the roles are well defined to make the partnerships work (UN-HABITAT).

## **5.3 First approach to the magnitude of the urban problems in 2004**

Securing Afghanistan's future (SFA) was drawn up on the request of the Transitional Islamic Government to resolve the question of security. This document is accompanied by a first reference document on the subject of urban issues, the Urban Development, Technical Annexe. Among main elements discussed in this report are:

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<sup>44</sup> Third meeting of Urban Management Consultative Group, with H.E. Minister Yusuf Pashtun, Ministry of Urban Development and Housing, Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan., 1 (month) 2003, draft minutes

<sup>45</sup> WB has a team of consultants to look at waste management in a comprehensive way i.e. solid waste and night collection and proper disposal strategies an implementation of works in Kabul. New landfill site and safe closure of old dumping site.

## **Vision and objectives: three main Programmes**

- 1 Urban infrastructure
- 2 Urban Land and Housing
- 3 Urban Planning and management

## **Investment priorities**

An estimated USD1,150 million over the 2004-2010 period (USD525 million for ring roads; USD355 million for urban roads and drains; USD110 million for serviced land; USD600 million for water supply and sanitation).

## **Main Donors**

- International Development Association IDA with the leadership of the World Bank
- German Development Cooperation (KfW)
- United States for International Development (USAID) and other bilateral cooperation funds.

## **Implement strategies and responsibilities**

### **- at municipalities level**

For Kabul: Land and housing programmes

For five major cities: Infrastructure, land and housing

For small cities: Close collaboration with the PMU (Programme Management Unit) of the MUDH

### **-or for Central Authority for Water Supply and Sanitation (CAWSS):**

- Water supply network.

## **Institutional Reform**

-According to this meeting, there wouldn't be need for an in-depth reform but request for a gradual evolution (roles, coordinators, policy makers, technical assistance, gradual local autonomy)

## **Role of private sector**

Private sector participation request in the delivery of urban services (solid waste management)

## **Cost recovery**

Municipal revenue generation capacity is weak.

Could be improved with updated land titling, property valuation and collection of the property tax.

## **Main risks**

Not achieving because of security, increase influx of migrants, incapacity to increase municipal revenues.

The Securing Afghanistan's future details many advances of the process:

### ➤ **A working Consultation**

Opening of the provisional government's capacity to interact with consultants, experts in economics and town planning (World Bank, ADB) to list major problems for urban reconstruction, estimate the magnitude of needs in terms of diversity and complexity of subjects, and cost estimates.

### ➤ **More realistic approach to the multiplicity of needs and costs**

A better technical and financial understanding, the urban sector begins to be understood within a multiple reality, and a realistic need and cost based work begins.

### ➤ **An impasse has been reached for the rest of the process**

This document reveals major hitches and handicaps for the absorption of financial aid and the deployment of aid for urban reconstruction, with the minimisation of two

aspects that nevertheless became major later on and contributed to the slow start of the process and delays in the urban improvement projects:

- **Lack of anticipation on the importance of land tenure problems:** what is the impact of security issues and the economy?
- **Underestimation of the urgency for in-depth reform:** there is an urgent need for wide-sweeping reform within the administrative bodies responsible for the urban sector.

➤ **Vigilance**

Dangers of direct impact of political and economic situations on the growth of the urban sector are elements that need to be considered.

## 5.4 Re-evaluation of national priorities to integrate urban affairs

After having focussed mainly on security, government priorities were reviewed from July 2004 onwards and President Karzai announced the establishment of new priorities, complementing the earlier ones, the **New National Urban Program (NPPS)**, during the *Afghanistan Development Forum (AFD)* in Kabul.

**The new National Priority Programs currently being considered include:**

- National Skills Development
- National Rural and Urban Water
- Priority Program (Drinking Water) Priority
- National Vulnerability Priority
- National Urban Priority Program
- National Agriculture Priority
- National Private Sector Priority
- National Justice & the Rule of Law Priority Program

**The new NPPs complement the major government programs of Education and Health as well as the existing national priority Programs:**

- National Emergency Employment Irrigation and Power Program
- Program (NEEP)
- National Solidarity Program Afghanistan Stabilization (NSP) Program (ASP)
- Transportation Program Feasibility Studies Program
- Education & Vocational Training Health & Nutrition

*“The purpose of NPPs is to accelerate Afghanistan from a position of recovery and to that of rehabilitation sustainable development. The doubling of the number of NPPs significantly advances the ability of Government to direct resources into areas that will have the greatest national impact. This increase in NPPs also demonstrates the strategic intent of Government in a selected number of key sectors that aim to promote prosperity and tackle poverty as the bedrock for Afghanistan’s future”*

➤ **Speeding up the decision-making process**

From then onwards, the manoeuvring of technical and financial government policies on the urban sector were speeded up and took into account the problems and challenges with a series of consultative meetings.

➤ **But no improvement on the ground**

In July 2004, two and half years after the cessation of hostilities, the people have still not seen any improvement in their day-to-day lives.

## 5.5 Speeding up of sector identification through co-action in 2005

The National Development Strategy (NDS) process helped organise and speed up progress in preparatory work for aid and decision processes by holding meetings for the working groups for each of the priority sectors. As a result of these meetings, the different actors involved in the urban sector expressed concern regarding delays that were being

encountered in fully taking into account the reality of the problems and the mechanisms and finances that had to be put in place:

#### **During the NDS working group of 9 July 2005**

In meetings involving the officers of the ANDS, UN-HABITAT and MUDH, it was recognised that the urban question had not been given enough attention compared with others sectors, that the subject lacked data: *“Significance of inclusion of urban concerns in the NDS. There is recognition and concern that urban matters have not had the full attention required compared to other sectors. There is very little urban baseline information and more information exists about rural areas than urban areas.”*<sup>46</sup>. The urgent need for more in-depth studies on the subject in order to benefit from the last release of funds in 2006 as planned in the process was also added. Recommendations were made to the MoUDH:

- To use its position and take this opportunity to include in the NDS a financial framework that had been unplanned and underestimated previously, in the provisional version of I-ANDS
- To enlarge the scope of the strategy process and development and programme planning to include municipalities other than Kabul.
- To develop a national policy and priorities for the urban sector, by a process of consultation with the other actors involved: funding bodies, NGOs, municipalities, citizens.
- To constitute a working group within the NDS team to organise NDS Consultative Workshops and to get closer to the Kabul Municipality (KM).

#### **With the NDS Working Group from 2 August 2005<sup>47</sup>**

In the presence of ANDS and UN-HABITAT officers *“Essentially, the process recognised that the urban sector is complex and requires the meaningful involvement of the main national and local urban stakeholders. The main national urban institutions have been involved to prepare the urban ANDS as an urban team effort, an output of this was the urban problem analysis framework prepared by the multistakeholder technical working group of: MUDH, MOI<sup>48</sup>, KM<sup>49</sup> and others.”*

UN-HABITAT underlines **the importance of inter partner dialogue** with all the main officers to clarify roles and institutional responsibilities with a view to preparing a framework programme to ensure “Urban Management”.

UN-HABITAT recalls the **main urban questions** that require appraisal in a table of crosscutting analysis “Overview of Challenges and Policy options for the urban sector”<sup>50</sup> in order to understand how the government and urban institutions can respond to them and what type of aid and mechanisms are required.

On institutions of urban management

- Lack of clarify on mandates and official responsibilities for urban management between municipalities, MUDH, Ministry of Interior and other Ministries.
- Lack of government capacity for urban management

On Land management issue

- Limited access to affordable and secure urban land
- Ineffective and outdated land administration system.

On Infrastructure and Services issues

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<sup>46</sup> National Development Strategy Briefing with MUDH, Meeting held at NDS Secretariat, Saturday 9 July 2005

<sup>47</sup> National Development Strategy with MUDH, Meeting held at NDS Secretariat, Saturday 2 August

<sup>48</sup> Ministry of Interior

<sup>49</sup> Kabul Municipality

<sup>50</sup> See Annexe

- Major infrastructure and services deficit (schools ...)
- Shortage of Water Supply, Electricity, Drainage and Roads
- Calibrating the shift toward cost-recovery against affordability

On Financing Urban Development

- Widening the resource base

Regarding **clarification of roles and institutional responsibilities** and the search for a better knowledge of urban management capacities of cities, UN-HABITAT proposes to carry out a sort of audit, the **City Profiling Survey** in the main cities (Kabul, Herat, Kandahar and Maza-e Sharif).

Four **main areas of investigations** in the urban sector will form the subject of a preparatory analysis in an Institutional Framework Programme:

- Institutions of Urban management
- Land Management
- Infrastructure and Services
- Financing urban development with the latest definition of the main lines of the “Urban development sector” programme - each of the urban sectors that need common urban policies have been discussed and decided.

➤ **Importance of working groups in speeding up the process**

➤ **International aid warning on the urgency of reactivating a lifeless process**

Four years after commitments were made, there is a warning on the dangers and lacunae of not considering the importance of the sector; urgency to work on the subject, urgency to establish requests for appropriate finances.

➤ **Points raised by international aid on urban questions needing resolution**

Finally there is a realisation of the complexity of the sector that needs to be listed, of the multiplicity of actors who need to be coordinated and the need to estimate and budget quickly.

➤ **Identification of sectors needing political intervention**

The list of urban problems needing resolution is long but closer to the existing realities<sup>51</sup>.

## 5.6 Urban strategies integrating the diversity of sectors involved

The urban question has become a major challenge and recognised as such in the **National Development Strategy, Urban Development Sector (ANDS)** in 2005: “*Urban development is a top Government priority, as Urban Services are critical for well functioning cities and towns, which in turn support sustained economic growth. Conflict, drought, and returning refugees have contributed to massive urbanization in Afghanistan. The Government wants its urban sector to be efficient, bring economic development and reduce poverty*”.

### Critical urban issues in term of delays

ANDS will assess the Government’s medium and long-term vision for the urban sector, and address critical issues in terms of:

- future urban management
- clear policy for rapid urban growth
- massive service delivery backlogs
- and property rights disputes
- and provincial and local urban management by provincial and/or local urban sector authorities

<sup>51</sup> See ADS Challenges-and-Policy-Options-Urban-Sector 1 and 2, 05-08-03

### **Need for urban framework**

ANDS will assess the strategic framework for the urban development and management, which consists of the following elements:

- (i) policy and institutional development;*
- (ii) capacity building;*
- (iii) private sector development;*
- (iv) employment generation;*
- (v) community participation;*
- (vi) decentralization of network management;*
- (vii) sustainable sector financing and cost recovery;*
- (viii) protection and preservation of environment;*
- (ix) avoiding and mitigating resettlement;*
- (x) absorbing returnee refugees, ex-combatants, and women in construction process;*
- (xi) involvement of the NGO community;*
- (xii) establish financial revenue based institutions”.*

### **Consultation between main actors**

The consultation process must be reinforced with the main actors involved in urban matters:

Between Afghan institutions

- Ministry of Urban Development and Housing,
- Kabul Municipality and
- Ministry of Interior

With the two main international partners

- UN-HABITAT and Aga Khan Foundation.

With the people

- People's participation in the development process must be central to ANDS

#### **➤ Identification of a multiple sector; need for dialogue**

With this government document, areas requiring a lot of thought on a variety of subjects concerning this sector have been identified. It has been clearly established that what is needed is not just one policy but many urban policies, that dialogue is unavoidable, to begin with between the three main Afghan institutions, the deciding authorities on decisions concerning urban strategies.

#### **➤ Need for social participation**

With special emphasis on the request expressed to make the people participate in the reconstruction efforts, it must not be forgotten that the urban sector development must be done for the people and with the people, meeting their specific needs.

## **5.7 Strategies and Commitments – Start of the process in 2006**

With the **Afghan Compact** (AC) agreement signed in London in January 2006, the Afghan Government's strategies were ratified by international aid stakeholders and this aid was renewed for a further period of five years until 2010.

### **Creation of institutional structures**

Government institutions will be created to monitor and evaluate the compatibility of the process with strategies formulated in ANDS, with many coordinating institutions. The National Development Strategy (NDS) will have a set of responsibilities. Consultative Groups (CG) will play a strategic role at the government level; political and technical coordinating organisations will be operational at various levels; at the central level with the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB); and at the level of each of the main priority sectors, the Oversight Committee (OSC). Other coordination and monitoring mechanisms will be the subject of sector-by-sector monitoring procedures with the Working Groups. Participants, including Ministers and members of the international community, will head these CGs.

## **Clarification of roles**

The annexe of the document *The Terms of Reference and Procedures* gives the framework of functioning and the roles assigned to the different actors, which are as follows:

- Joint coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB)
- Oversight Committee (OSC)
- Consultative Group (CG)
- Working Group (WG CG)
- Cross Cutting Issues
- Coordination Team (CT)
- Technical assistance Team (TC)

And procedures for

- Meeting
- Reporting
- Monitoring

### ➤ **Five years to identify major urban problems**

The urban sector had to wait for five years for any analysis, discussions, proposals, financial commitments to become the focus of a concrete, coordinated work of decisions on orienting urban policy manoeuvring, which should be followed by the drawing up of Framework Laws or National Programmes.

### ➤ **Structural inertia of the urban sector when compared to other sectors**

The process of creating institutions has taking longer than anticipated as it involved reconstruction of the state itself, which has considerably slowed down all rehabilitation actions, apart from the most urgent ones. Some sectors of the Afghan society were not off guard as much as the urban sector which seems to have been struck with some kind of paralysis that kept it out of sight. Some sectors benefited from quick and top priority political and financial decisions, such as Education, or from an administration that was already up and running, such as Health, or from highly operational acceleration and adjustments with combined expertise under the MRRD to cope with needs associated with development challenges in the rural areas.

### ➤ **Urban deterioration since 2001 and risk of discontent**

Owing to this inertia, living conditions in urban environments have deteriorated since 2001 and people are increasingly likely to rise up in protest at the smallest provocation. This merely adds to the problems of rebuilding the urban sector

### ➤ **2006: institutional structuring begins**

But no rehabilitation has been carried out yet on the ground.

## 6 THE SITUATION IN URBAN AREAS IN 2006

Since the end of the Taliban regime, urban planners in Afghanistan have had to deal with a rapidly increasing urban population, heavily damaged urban infrastructure and considerable delays in their ability to oversee the urban situation. Here, it is not a question of going into the details of each urban issue but of understanding some major factors influencing the process underway.

### 6.1 Exponential and uncontrolled growth of urban population

Out of a total of 22 million inhabitants, the urban population represents about 6.4 million, that is 30%. This is constantly increasing and is set to double by 2015. More than 70% of the urban population is concentrated in the six main cities, namely Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, Jalalabad and Kunduz. Kabul, the capital, accounts for more than 50% of the total Afghan population. From 1.7 million inhabitants in 2000, the number is likely to exceed 4 million in 2005 according to recent statistics. Many factors contribute to this increase in urban population which is made up of several different categories of people.

#### 6.1.1 Huge numbers of displaced people

A vast majority of the Kabul population, especially those most affected by difficult living conditions, originates from elsewhere and many of them are not originally city-dwellers at all. Fluctuations in urban population are the consequence of population movement which in turn are related to successive political events. People take refuge in cities because they have been affected by exceptional circumstances during the reconstruction period after years of urban insecurity: arrival of large numbers of returnees; refugees returning from their exile abroad; internal displacement of IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) because their homes have been destroyed or occupied by other families. Government and local urban authorities, beginning with the Kabul Municipality (KM), have tried to force these people to leave who they see as being partly responsible for environmental and urban disasters. Urban authorities are reluctant to assume responsibility for these populations because they are considered outsiders, illegal in the eyes of law, coming from elsewhere and settling arbitrarily in areas that are not included in the administrative planning, sometimes in zones that are physically unsafe. The economic and technical inability of local government to satisfy people's needs as a result of this over crowding is a very pragmatic reality.

#### 6.1.2 Presence of a new, rich and powerful minority

Another small group of city-dwellers who have only recently arrived and whose numbers are nevertheless increasing is gradually making its mark on urban dynamics. From a critical urban view, this population occupies and monopolises entire residential areas in some cities, making its presence felt because of its ambitions and significant financial means. Imposing houses and office buildings, without any Afghan cultural references and overuse of flashy imported materials, are mushrooming<sup>52</sup> in the traditional Afghan city fabric. These people are highly influential with the current authorities because of their economic and political power. However in a more positive light, their presence gives an impetus to building activities in the cities, mainly on account of this private investment.

##### ➤ Displacement raises the risk of major social problems

The choice of horizontal development that drives away the most vulnerable population to the city outskirts and allows the most favoured population to settle in the heart of the city raises crucial questions of social and spatial inequality. This includes numerous problems such as the trauma for the people concerned, time required to make these

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<sup>52</sup> Groupe URD, Mariani C., *From the spreading of the Pakistani architecture to the growing urban expansion of Kabul into the surrounding hills, what will Kabul look like in the near future?*, Conference December 2005

displacements and relocations, demolition costs, time and legal difficulties related to expropriation, and resettling and reconstruction costs.

➤ **Need for compatibility with the mandates of aid organisations involved in rehabilitation and not in development**

Moreover, options that need much more space and are therefore expensive (infrastructure, streets, schools, etc.) are not favoured by international aid organisations whose objective is reconstruction by repair and not developmental construction.

➤ **Spatial-economic balance needs to be found**

Managing the distribution of all these populations is a strategic, economic and spatial problem that has to be faced by the cities in the long run. In the short term, it is a question on the one hand of absorbing these populations in situ and on the other of restricting on-going immigration. A balance has to be found between urban integration, development of a regional economy for outlying suburbs and economic support for populations in rural areas.

## **6.2 Insecure urban living conditions, absent or damaged infrastructure**

The poor state of infrastructure, including all technical networks and social facilities, and the almost non-existent urban services are the result widespread destruction during the war and the absence of management and maintenance over many years means that substantial funds are required for repairing 40% of the damaged roads and 50% of the destroyed network, for example in Kabul

➤ **Magnitude of infrastructure requirements**

Infrastructure repair work that is being carried out is considerable in economic terms and complicated in technical and social terms. Financial consultants (WB, GTZ, etc.) and their technical experts are in the process of assessing each of these problems, such as for example, Sewerage and Solid Waste Collect. This is a highly important issue for health issues, particularly for vulnerable people, and for the environmental equilibrium in general. Afghan cities stand to benefit both in terms of better living conditions and in image.

➤ **Urgently awaited improvements five years after the emergency**

The most visible impact for urban populations has been the improvement or deterioration of everyday living conditions. Post-crisis interventions conducted by different organisations (NGOs) concentrated on urgent matters that cropped up sporadically, apart from the water supply network sector that has received consistent, but insufficient, aid in many big cities for over a decade (ICRC, Solidarités, Care International, AKDN). Some rehabilitation work received limited and specific support (from the EC in Kabul). The difficulties arising from the magnitude of people's needs and the lack of spatial data for defining intervention zones have considerably delayed the decision-making process.

For these reasons the Kabul Urban Rehabilitation Programme, a partial rehabilitation programme in Kabul (KURP), is not yet operational.

➤ **Anticipation of Urban Policies by Urban Programmes**

Working groups for synchronised action or strategic policy decisions, technical or administrative assessments have to date established a framework for urban improvement and rehabilitation mechanisms. Just like the National Solidarity Programmes (NSP), developed by the MRRD for the rural areas, different rehabilitation pilot programmes based on the active participation of the community are beginning to be set up slowly in the urban areas.

➤ **From emergency to sustainable development**

While the national rehabilitation policy is developing slowly, the continued deterioration of urban areas calls for an urgent transition from an emergency approach to one that focuses on sustainable development.

### 6.3 Obsolete municipal management systems and financial resources

Afghan cities do not have the capacity to absorb this continual increase of inhabitants, the demand for land, housing, network infrastructure in general or labour force in general. The situation is not only a cause for concern but is also potentially dangerous and has worsened since 2001. The government and urban authorities know that these stakes are important for social cohesion, environment and security. Urban settlement and the fiscal system still depend on a centralised administrative set-up dating back to 1964, which completely restricts the municipalities' room for manoeuvre and their resources. The role of the different departments and procedures is currently under study in view of radical reorganisation.

➤ **Urban management or governance**

The question of concerted and professional urban over-management (decisions, management, operational follow-up of improvements) is linked to issues of governance (strategies and policy decisions). Aware of the gaps in expertise of Afghan urban institutions, international aid is highly represented at the government level and at the KM level to guide a process of improvement in management skills. It is a long process connected to the reform capacities.

➤ **Necessity for a precise assessment of the situation for a system of sustained management**

Establishment of a sustained financial and technical management system necessitates developing competencies at the national level and also at the municipal level. UN-HABITAT is involved in the evaluation of the competency appraisals at the municipality level with the City Profiling Programmes.

### 6.4 An explosive land situation

According to all our interlocutors, the land issue is critical. During our meeting, Mr Pashtun, Minister for MUDH, spoke of the risks if stakeholders fail to resolve first all lands disputes, dissatisfaction, legal offences and insecurity due to occupation of lands by default, or irregular or fraudulent means. Land tenure procedures that are completely blocked or disrupted due illegal occupation are hampering development and economic revival.

➤ **Land regulation mechanisms are one of the keys to urban development**

EMG<sup>53</sup>, a North American organisation, along with the pilot programme LTERA<sup>54</sup>, has taken up the task of investigating, analysing and developing a means of regularising land issues. This question remains highly sensitive today in political terms, and indeed for military reasons in the past. A certain degree of secrecy enshrouds all that is related to land issues and the use of space, on account of urbanisation.

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<sup>53</sup> Emerging Market Group,

<sup>54</sup> Land Titling & Economic Restructuring in Afghanistan, (LTERA/USAID)

## **7 URBAN INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS**

### **7.1 Multiplicity of institutional authorities**

#### **7.1.1 Traditional institutional structures**

##### **a) Strategic and political questions**

The state has two main ministries that deal with urban issues: Ministry of the Interior (MoI) and Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (MUDH) which is the ministry in charge of technical administrations with a role in the urban sector.

A third institutional department can also be included: Kabul Municipality, with a quasi-Ministry status. The Mayor of Kabul has a direct contact with President Mr Karzai's cabinet.

At the provincial level, six territories have the status of Provincial Municipality: the cities of Balkh (Mazar-e-Sharif); Herat (Herat City); Kabul (Kabul City); Kandahar (Kandahar City); Kunduz (Kunduz City), and Nangahar (Jalalabad).

##### **b) Urban financial questions**

The budget is drawn up by the Ministry of Interior (MoI). The collection of taxes is the responsibility of the municipalities and the Ministry of Finance (MoF).

##### **c) Technical and economic strategies**

The various technical ministries are: Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW), Ministry of Public Works (MPW), Ministry of Commerce or Trade (MoT) (includes Chambers of commerce), Ministry of Mines and Industries (MoMI), Ministry of Transport (MT).

##### **d) Traffic and security**

Traffic and security are the responsibilities of Police and the Traffic Department.

##### **e) Cultural heritage and Tourism**

Ministry of Information and Culture (MoIC), Ministry of Urban Development and municipalities concerned.

##### **d) Urban planning studies, administrative and technical follow-ups:**

Urban planning issues: programming; Master Plan elaboration; project design; tender documents and calls for tender are under the responsibility of the Ministry of Urban Development, Directorate of urban Development and Directorate of Housing Policy, apart for Kabul city where the urban responsibilities are shared between the MoUDH and KM<sup>55</sup>.

##### **f) Public construction and technical issues**

The MUDH's technical departments such as Central Authority for Water Supply and Sanitation (CAWSS), and all the technical directorates, are in charge of technical issues. The Ministries in charge of schools, hospitals and Public Works have their own technical departments.

#### **7.1.2 Institutions independent of urban bodies**

Apart from the authorities directly responsible for urban decisions and settlements, other administrative bodies connected to land information or land titles are indirectly involved as participants in the urbanisation process.

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<sup>55</sup> Kabul Municipality

**a) Maps**

Cartography is very a specific issue in Afghanistan. Afghanistan Geodesy and Cartographic Head Office (AGCHO) with Army's Cartographic services are the only services with the authority to establish maps.

**b) Data about land titles issues**

The responsibility on spatial data is shared between several administrative bodies, depending on how the area is classified, such as the Cadastral Department of AGCHO, or the agricultural register AMLAK, or the civil registers and also Archives for Royal edicts. All ministries and public administrations that are owners of lands in urban or peri-urban areas like the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry (MAAF), the Army, etc., religious leaders.

**c) Statistics**

Statistics are established by Central Statistics Offices (CSO)

### **7.1.3 Organisations exceptionally involved in urban issues**

The chaos that reigns in the urban situation has meant that organisations that are not specialists in urban issues have begun to work in this field. For example:

**a) On account of urban occupation spilling over into rural areas**

The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) is involved in implementing National Solidarity Programmes (NSP) in communities encroaching into rural zones.

**b) On account of problems arising out of increased number of returnees or displaced persons**

The Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR) is directly involved in urban issue because of its role in the creation of new town projects for the rehousing of the homeless.

**c) On account of land disputes**

Legal authorities: Provincial Courts and Supreme Court are responsible for solving disputes on land issues and the Ministry of Justice is going to draw up a new Law on Land tenure.

### **7.1.4 Afghan advisors from abroad and foreign advisors in the institutions**

In comparison with other ministries such as the MRRD, that rapidly took on about fifty advisors to devise means of carrying out rehabilitation operations in rural areas, the MoUDH has no advisors. Interviews were conducted with some advisors at MoUDH, of whom very few were foreigners (apart from a German advisor to the Deputy Minister Mr Djallazada). A group of Afghan/foreign advisors is involved in the reform process within the MoUHD, not as employees, but with various consultant functions related to the ministry.

**a) Advisors as analysts and strategy consultants**

The advisors have different functions such as Urban Specialist, Urban Planning and Policy Advisor, or Legal Advisor. These consultants occupy different positions, depending upon their services.

**b) Advisors in charge of specific domains or projects**

For example, the Strategic Development Programme (SDP) was put forward by an architect engaged as urban regional planning advisor, with strategic regional planning management competences. In the same way, the Kabul Urban rehabilitation Programme (KURP) was put forward by an eng. architect & urban planner in charge of rehabilitation projects in Kabul.

➤ **Disoriented and de-structured institutions**

The slow process of institutional restructuring within the sector has meant that the different interlocutors are not in touch with these changes. Moreover, the level of knowledge about the strategies discussed at the government and international level was not in keeping with the information collected.

➤ **Information on situations facilitated by advisors**

The functions and positions of the foreign Afghan advisors are sometimes difficult to understand in relation to the institution where they work but they are the ones who are capable of giving us information. There are two reasons for this: they are involved in the reconstruction process and English is their main language of communication (not all Afghans are familiar with English). This facilitates exchange on complex information and situations.

➤ **Hesitancy of administrative interlocutors**

Ministries and administration services and departments that are not used to being questioned about the way they operate have difficulty in understanding the reason for this type of study and research, and are therefore reluctant to give information. Certain posts even changed over the course of this study.

➤ **Need for synergy among the different players**

Given the specific, multidimensional and complex nature of the urban sector, efforts to rebuild the urban sector would have been more coherent had an organisation bringing together institutional representatives and a pool of experts been set up.

## 7.2 Major institutional players

This study restricted its investigations to the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (MoUDH) whose structure at first appeared to be a somewhat loose conglomeration. The 2006 organisational chart (cf. Figure 1) gives a clearer picture of the different urban responsibilities. Temporary external departments working under the MoUDH concerning National Programmes do not figure in the MoUDH's organisation chart. Foreign advisors working at the Kabul Municipality were interviewed but the institution as such has not been analysed in this document. Furthermore the magnitude of the land problems led us to make some enquiries at the Afghanistan Geodesy and Cartography Head Office (AGCHO), which was not very well received by its executives. Lastly, a good contact with the Central Authority for Water Supply and Sanitation (CAWSS), an organisation in charge of water and sanitation, gave us information about its strategies. For an earlier report<sup>56</sup>, Provincial Municipalities were visited and the data collected have been integrated in this analysis.

### 7.2.5 The Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD)

The Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (MoUDH, named MoUD in 2006) created in 1992, began its restructuring only very recently. In 2002, this ministry resumed its role and responsibilities but extremely limited resources after a period of institutional de-structuring and physical damage due to the Mujahideen and Taliban regimes. Housed in buildings constructed by Russians in 1970s and 1980s, in the midst of apartment buildings, there was no water or any other facility. In other respects, this ministry is weighed down with Soviet legacies such as:

- Centralisation and therefore lack of initiatives
- Restrictive and rigid procedures
- Overstaffed and ageing workforce
- Outdated know-how and obsolete functioning

Minister HE. Eng Yousuf Pashtun has held the post since the beginning of the reconstruction process.

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<sup>56</sup> Groupe URD, LRRD *A review based on a Multi and Cross Sector Approach*, April 2006

**a) MoUD's roles**

The early phases of the Priority Reform and Restructuring (PRR) process should have started in 2005 but will only bring about changes much later. The Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (MoUDH) is currently changing its name to the Ministry of Urban development (MUD).

**General Translation of TOR (Terms of Reference) of the  
Ministry of Urban Development**

- According to the presidential decree 27 which states that every single Ministry should have a TOR.
- The circle of operation of the Ministry is from Capital to provincial centres.
- The ministry covers and ensures social, economical, cultural and political aspects of urban life. So to ensure environmental protection and future expansion of cities.
- To stop informal settlement and all developments should be with a plan and part of the master plan.
- Control all construction works and monitoring them according to codes and standards.
- Control and visa of satellite towns and all town plans.
- Implementation of development projects in a sense so to strengthen the urban sector.
- Design and formulation of all development plans.
- To have a complete and broad strategy for the urban sector.
- To formulate all activities of the sector to generate economy for the sector itself and also for the support of the rural area as well.
- Encouragement and policy to involve private sector in the development of the urban sector.

Source: MoUD

The Ministry of Urban Development has the responsibility of **City Plan** designing and drawing up **Master Plans** for three types of cities:

- 1) Commercial satellite city "sharak"
- 2) Government city;
- 3) Private city (industrial city).

The MoUD also draws up **viability landscaping and network plans** for the Ministry of Refugees & Repatriation (MORR) in order to receive refugees, returnees and other homeless people. In such cases, the MUD draws up the Master Plan and then transfers the responsibility of city management to the municipalities. As far as **networks** are concerned, its responsibility is to take care of water supply and distribution and sanitation networks (Water Supply and Sanitation WSS), that are managed under its control by the Central Authority for Water Supply and Sanitation (CAWSS). Other technical sectors are the responsibilities of the relevant ministries, such as electricity which is managed by the Ministry of Energy and Water; other sectors (roads, public spaces, park maintenance, etc.) fall under the responsibility of the municipalities. There is coordination with other ministries such as the Ministry of Interior (MoI), the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development (MRRD) or the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Food (MAAHF).

**b) Composition of the MoUD** (cf. Figure 1)

The ministry has about 600 employees in MUD departments in Kabul and about 100 in the provincial offices. The ministry with its head office at Kabul has:

- Minister Mr Pashtun, assisted by two Deputy Ministers: Deputy of Housing Policy and Deputy for Town Planning who previously played an advisory role. They are Afghan/foreign advisors who had served in general management posts during the early years of reorganisation (in Afghanistan a deputy is not an elected post but a managerial role).

- Advisors: There is little clarity in the different roles of Afghan or foreign advisors, especially when seen from outside. Some of them are in charge of projects and services, some appear to be free agents.
- Secretarial offices and administrative services
- Eight directorates: Directorate of Planning and Coordination, Directorate of Housing and Planning, Directorate of Building and Construction, Directorate of National Codes and Standard, Directorate of Urban Development, Directorate of Safeguard Urban Heritage and Old Cities, Directorate of Water Supply and Sanitation, Directorate of Administration and Finance.

**In the provinces**, the MUD has regional technical offices spread over seven geographical zones

- Jalalabad (Konar, Lagman ...)
- Khost (Paketia, Paktita...)
- Kunduz (Badakhshan, Baghlan, Taskar..)
- Balkh (Maimana, Samangan..)
- Bamiyan
- Kandahar
- Herat

#### **Five State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) or central authorities**

State owned enterprises have a separate status but are in direct contact with the MoUD

- Banoi Construction Department
- Afghani Construction Department
- Khana Sazi (Housing construction)
- Maintenance of Microrayan (ex soviet apartment buildings locality)
- Central Authority for Water Supply and sanitation (CAWSS)

**Project units** and teams working in direct contact with the Ministry without appearing in the organisation chart:

#### **c) MoUD Departments**

Early visits to the Ministry of Urbanism gave little insight into its functions and resources. A meeting with the Deputy Minister Mr Djallalazada was the key to opening doors and understanding who does what. With the organisation chart in hand, it was possible to find out the functions and the people to meet. Some of these departments (directorates) were visited and the persons in charge were interviewed.

#### **Directorate of Administration and Finance**

The administrative director in charge of this department explained his satisfaction in seeing the progress of the reform process Priority Reform and Restructuring (PRR) in the MUDH. All the departments of the Ministry in Kabul would have started in 2005. This process is composed of three phases:

- Phase 1 - Preparation: An inventory of the fixtures, number and nature of equipments and different functions and status of the personnel (a very important phase for example for MoUD's computer equipment)
- Phase 2 - "Terms of Reference". Each employee must be presented with the conditions of the reform relating to personnel and an acceptance form must be signed. The process is not binding for the Ministry or for the employees but its acceptance has an influence on the aid to restructuring.
- Phase 3 - Process of interviewing individuals, mainly those who are capable of changing and not based on the current skills because everybody knows that the present levels of expertise are not efficient enough.

A commission will take three months to evaluate MoUD's personnel and based on the findings of this process, state employees will be retained or laid off. A major lay-off of at least 30% of staff is expected. The retained personnel will be asked to attend professional training courses (capacity building).

The process is in phase 3 in Kabul at the ministry and should be started in the near future in the provinces.

➤ **Delayed reform in the reconstruction process: five years later**

This restructuring is obviously necessary and urgent. Other ministries such as health and education engaged in this reform process much earlier. This will not be well received by those who are going to lose their job. We are not aware of the modalities accompanying these early retirements and dismissals.

➤ **Process has speeded up but upgrading will take time**

What strikes us as important in order to speed up the improvement process, is that opportunities should be made available for newly qualified young professionals. This topic has not been broached. Is it too early?

### **Directorate of Codes and Standards**

This department is managed by less than ten competent engineers who received Soviet training almost 30 years ago. With limited resources and no specific foreign assistance, this department is very much involved in the Policy and Regulation work in several construction sectors. These sectors are classified into four categories: 1) Urban Sector, 2) Building codes, 3) Technical sectors (water, electricity, sanitation), 4) Public facilities (parks, squares, markets, car parks). Since 2002, the people in charge of this department have been trying to update their Construction and Standards Code with the Urbanism Code following American code models. Their function is to prepare the TORs (Terms of Reference) in support of the urban policy related to these topics.

➤ **Lack of assistance and exchange in this field**

This department, which has been sidelined in the discussions involving major urban reconstruction strategies, deserves greater attention and assistance from international aid. All too aware of the needs, the engineers in charge of this department would like to know more about different urban codes, other than North American codes, and thus assess the different legal frameworks that exist. For example, in France the codes of urban planning are updated frequently as urban policies change, it seems very important to open this department to different expertise and other types of legal and spatial knowledge.

➤ **Necessity for a new Town Planning Code**

Given all the changes that are taking place in Afghan urban areas, a new Town Planning Code needs to be drawn up. This should cover various domains and would benefit from a wide range of experience. Several legal frameworks need to be drawn up in order to have enough flexibility to cover all urban domains. For example:

- Anglo-Saxon **land law** is not necessarily an appropriate reference for Afghan land law, which appears to bear a greater resemblance to French land law. There appear to be fundamental differences in terms of land ownership and usage rights. This issue merits further investigation.
- The guidelines for **preservation of heritage** and for urban and architectural identities should adhere to advanced legislation on the subject (UNESCO, different European countries). This subject calls for exchange among international professionals.
- All the **rehabilitation and reconstruction** requirements should obviously give rise to an assortment of specific legal tools and different standards for new construction.
- The **environmental factors**, natural and industrial risks, must be taken into account.
- The framework of intervention for **private urban and build actors** needs to be set up urgently.

➤ **Necessity for anticipation and flexibility**

This implies long-term work with preparation upstream in the form of specific exchange between international jurists and technicians on a number of topics (such as demarcation between public and private space with appropriate responsibilities or

earthquake safety maps and up-to-date building standards). Reconstruction has hardly started and the process is going to be long. Experience with town planning processes all over the world shows how quickly these contexts evolve and highlights the need to be flexible. The constraints of the Master Plans drawn up in the 1970s are a counterexample of this.

### **Directorate of Building and Construction**

The updating of tools and skills is very clearly in progress with the presence of a few young architects and engineers. This department has more than 100 employees of whom a good number are in the provincial offices. The skills and functions (architecture, civil engineering, estimation-cost, water supply department, power, networks, hospital building and laboratory) are well structured around construction processes, such as check and control land, maps, designing and works visiting.

For the past three years, updated software, such as Autocad, is used in all the international construction agencies, as well as standard processes for setting up operations and follow-up of construction operations: studies (design, technical and economic), controls, calls for tender, of which the vast majority (85-90%) are aimed at foreign enterprises. The range of the nationalities of the responses and undertakings is wide, including Turkish, central Asian, American, European, Iranian, Indian and Chinese companies.

#### **➤ Important role of contracting authority for the MoUD**

In the apparent chaos of the urban situations and the disorder that reigns amongst the competent organisations in the field, it appears that this technical department is sufficiently organised to have adapted and updated its expertise. There was not enough time to carry out more in-depth analysis on the modalities of calls to tender and the awarding of contracts. It is true that this information needs to be followed closely, inasmuch as this department is the contracting authority, the organisation behind all public construction. As Afghanistan is opening up to international enterprises for the operations side, calls to tender are launched. The calls to tender and public contract procedures have to take in account the technical quality and cost control accounting

#### **➤ Architectural quality and identity stakes**

It is easier to understand why Afghanistan, just like any other country emerging from economic and urban stagnation, is highly motivated to build significant architecture to restore its national pride and send out a modern image very quickly after the reconstruction phase. It will be interesting to see what administrative tools are available for launching international competitive appeals at the design level. It would be positive to help them construct these tools, equipped with experience in major international competitive appeals that tend to generate interest among a number of reputed town planning professionals.

### **Directorate of Safeguard Urban Heritage and Old Cities**

Dr Eng. Architect & Urban Planner, Zahra Breshna, whom we met several times in 2005 and who set up this department, no longer holds the post in 2006, after more than two years of reflection, diagnosis, studies and proposals on the topic Program for Safeguarding & Development of Historical Kabul. The following information is the result of interviews and communications regarding this work. This department is currently under the temporary control of the Directorate of Administration and Finance.

The interest in preserving the identity and quality of Kabul's old city centre was explained in MoUDH minister HE. Eng. Mr Yousuf Pashtun's presentation in 2005, with the Program for Safeguarding & Development of Historical Kabul. Aware of the urgency in putting an end to demolition processes due to different factors (years of war, lack of maintenance, past interest or on the contrary present commercial pressures for private improvement), a presidential decree stopped all operations in the old city in 2002 in order to design a policy and a framework for intervention integrated with NUP (National Urban Program) The purpose of

this program is to “*create an attractive, sustainable commercial and residential environment in the old town, that contributes to the overall restoration of pride and confidence in the city...To preserve the traditional structure and historical sites without the development of modern social, ecological and economical institutions...not a museum but as a living entity and part of a changing world*”.

A modern and coherent proposal for the organisation of this department was drawn up by Z. Breshna in partnership with a working group for dialogue, coordination with a number of urban stakeholders and a communication service. The proposed organisation is comprised of:

- Strategy and town planning unit
- Coordination unit
- Communication unit
- Management unit

Strategic meetings succeeded in bringing together different organisations including a number of technical ministries and also the Ministry of Information and Culture, in close collaboration with the architects of the Aga Khan Trust For Culture (AKTC), who is very much involved and competent in the restoration of Muslim architecture.

➤ **Strategy for identity preservation and improvement**

The interest in preserving the heritage, urban architecture and structures, is vital for a number of cultural reasons, particularly in this period of identity reconstruction. It is interesting to note the rapid reaction at the presidential level and the amount of work already done. Strategic and technical approaches for the “framework and guidelines to intervene in town’s old centre” would benefit from closer links with all work that is being carried out on the issue of Development and Preservation in historical Bamiyan valley<sup>57</sup>. This currently does not appear to be the case.

➤ **Development and preservation should advance in parallel**

If specific and symbolic aid such as AKTC’s remarkable work in Kabul’s centre, a speeding up of safeguarding processes is urgent when the old historical centre Herat is likely to be partially demolished under pressure from commercial developers.

### **Directorate of Urban Development**

It was not possible to visit the department at the MoUDH in Kabul because the difficulties in obtaining appointments in the time available. But thanks to meetings with engineers from some of the MoUDH provincial offices and the technical offices of the municipalities it was possible to develop an urban planning approach, via an urban study of Jalalabad or Bamiyan, and with a visit to the offices of Mazar-e Sharif, Kunduz. At Ghazni, which is not a provincial town, but a much smaller town, the plans are drawn up by the municipality’s engineers.

➤ **Anachronism of the town planning administrative references**

Disparities between the town plans and the reality of the situation have been discussed in length in a previous study conducted by Groupe URD following observations made in the provinces and Kabul<sup>58</sup>, and illustrated with a concrete case with the study on town planning in Jalalabad<sup>59</sup>. Although references documents and guidelines, town plans and the expertise of engineers illustrate experienced technical skills and regulated urban administrative frameworks, they no longer function. These skills are out of date and there is a gap between these references, resources, procedures and expertise and the present reality of urban situations and issues.

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<sup>57</sup> Preservation of the World Heritage in Baliyan, Project Unesco ACDC, ISL (Germany), NRICP (Japan), MUDH et MoICT (Afghanistan).

<sup>58</sup> Groupe URD, *A review based on a Multi and Cross Sector Approach*, Urban Sector chapter, April 2005

<sup>59</sup> Groupe URD, Mahmoudi R., *Jalalabad: a resort town of change*, August 2006

➤ **The Master Plans of the 1970s are totally obsolete**

Although these Master Plans are not longer relevant, they are still being used in all the technical departments of the municipalities and MoUDH offices.

➤ **Lack of communication, follow up, consultations and accessibility of new Master Plans drawn up recently at the MoUD**

For example, obtaining a hard copy of 2003 Jalalabad Master Plan is practically impossible. These plans are not computerised and are coloured in by hand. They are designed, developed, drawn and kept in Kabul. Although they were validated by local authorities during the design phase, town planning strategies that are designed with this document are not the subject of consensus on the spot, in as much as this plan cannot be adopted at Jalalabad. The Mayor, having assumed his functions after the document was written, has undertaken programmes and projects that are not in line with the new Master Plan in term of spatial or timing strategies.

➤ **Disjointed process between global strategy design phase and the implementation of pilot programmes**

The timing of funding strategies at the government and international level and implementation of local projects are poorly synchronised.

➤ **Lack of spatial understanding**

Urban issues are poorly integrated in spatial reality in general and lack of appropriate representation of urban plans

➤ **Insufficient dialogue between central MUD and local authorities**

**d) Institutional units not integrated in the MoUD organisation chart**

The 2006 organisation chart given by the MoUD does not include a few departments and working units under its supervision, such as Kabul Urban Rehabilitation Programme (KURP), National Development Strategy (NDS) or Project Implementation Unit (PIU). Indeed, the latter is in charge of monitoring MoUD modernisation process. The components and role of these different units presented further in the following chapter titled “ National programmes and Pilot Projects”, prompts the following remarks:

➤ **Departments not integrated in the organisation chart**

These departments which linked to specific programmes have special mandates with a limited lifetime.

➤ **Departments created and adapted for the current situation**

Working groups for rehabilitation or development programmes are original both in content and the way they work. These groups are often set up specifically in response to certain rehabilitation, reconstruction or construction needs in relation to the current situation and the funds of international aid. Given that they are not completely tied to the constraints of internal MoUD departments, these external services have succeed in building teams comprised of young qualified staff. These departments are appreciated by international organisations for their rapid reaction capacity.

➤ **Lack of coordination and communication**

Given the fragmented response of the different departments in charge of reconstruction, would it not be more efficient to set up a large national rehabilitation and reconstruction agency in order to pool all these different skills and data?

➤ **Question of sustainability and evolution of these departments**

These departments rely on one-off temporary funding mechanisms and it is therefore essential to capitalise on this experience in order to modernise and give structure to the MoUD town planning and Kabul Municipality offices.


e) **Organisation chart of the Ministry of Urban Development in 2006**  
(cf. Figure 1 overleaf)

➤ **Organisation chart communication**

The author only had access to the organisation chart of the Ministry of Urban Development at the end of the fieldwork. It proved vital for understanding the overall structure of how the sector functions and institutional frameworks. Two remarks in this regard are:

- This chart was only **updated in 2006**, which corroborates the slow pace at which the ministry is organising itself.
- This highlights the difficulties specific to this transition period: earlier, the author was given a chart in Dari without any explanation that it was obsolete.

**Figure 1: Organisation chart of the Ministry of Urban Development in 2006**



Source: MoUD, July 2006

## 7.2.6 CAWSS Central Authority for Water Supply and Sanitation

### *Administration under MoUDH's responsibility*

The CAWSS, under the MUDH's supervision, is responsible for urban "pipe WSS systems and functions under centralised authority; with de facto a certain amount of autonomy for provincial offices due to communication difficulties. Departments of Sanitation (DoS) are in charge of sanitation. Policy making, management and operational functions are not clearly demarcated. Circumstances vary in different cities.

#### **a) Role of CAWSS in the State of the infrastructure**

The state of generalised deficiencies and insufficiencies poses a serious risk for people's health, the environment and urban equilibrium. Networks such as, facilities and water supply, drainage and waste evacuation networks are practically non-existent. Access to potable water is the lowest in the world, with only 15% benefiting from it. This is the cumulative result of decades of lack of investment and maintenance by the public technical departments in charge of the Operation & Maintenance (O&M) sector, particularly severe droughts and lastly the direct and indirect effects of repeated conflict. The majority of the water supply is obtained from unsanitary wells. Waste water drainage systems are almost non-existent and the water is released into rivers, most of the time without being treated, representing a major source of pollution for urban rivers, such as in Kabul city and in Pul-e Khumri city. The open drainage sewer system is not emptied but stagnates and overflows onto the footpaths and into shops. Rubbish and solid waste collection functions only very occasionally and meanwhile waste is systematically dumped on the public roads and piles up for days. Earlier, a rural-urban equilibrium existed with the cleaning up of waste by herds of sheep and goats that the shepherds brought into the city, or farmers collecting sewage to be used as manure in fields. Though even today these herds do their job and ingest more plastic than organic waste, obviously this system is no longer a solution for the present-day city. The task of restoring technical facilities is considerable but it also a cultural issue.

#### **b) Constitution, functions and objectives of CAWSS and UWSS projects**

600 employees of whom 400 are in Kabul. The salaries are so low that the engineers and employees resign and accept jobs in international organisations.

#### *Since 2002: significant efforts with international aid*

The urban WSS is considered by the government as a priority component in the National Urban Programme (NUP). Two timeframes were envisaged for the reconstruction process: short-term activities (2005-06) and medium-term activities (2006-2010). The government asked donors (ARTF)<sup>60</sup> to play a main management and coordination function in addition to their earlier emergency aid from 2003 for the Emergency Infrastructure Reconstruction Project (EIRP). KfW, USAID, JICA and probably ARTF are in discussion to extend their help for the expansion and construction of new networks and facilities.

#### *There are the following three objectives:*

Objective 1: Establishing technically sustainable operation and appropriate institutional structure

Objective 2: Establishing financially sustainable operations, increasing revenue to cover 100% of O&M, in social equity criteria

Objective 3: Extending urban WSS coverage

#### *An Urban Water Supply and Sanitation project:*

Component 1. Management Contract(s): The GoA and international aid organisations are looking to establish a contract with one or more foreign professional operators under CAWSS

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<sup>60</sup> Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

control to initiate an emergency programme for the management of the existing networks of potable water supply and also to bring about alternative solutions in networkless areas (water tankers or community reservoirs). Work of identification of investment programs, operational programming, preliminary technical studies is required.

Component 2. Water sanitation and Sewerage: Demand for extension of water network in general and extension of sanitation network restricted to Kabul.

Component 3. On-Site Sanitation: Demand for provision of suction trucks in Kabul and some cities, construction of septic tank facilities and sanitation systems and to build and repair public toilets. A project of solid waste collection is the objective of a separate programme Urban Waste Management Project under feasibility studies in 2006 with the WB<sup>61</sup>.

Component 4. Technical assistance: Demand for assistance from MoUD to create new administrative organisations, from CAWSS to manage intervention conditions and follow-up of external operator, to private sector for construction of latrines and information campaigns.

*Underway in 2005 in short-term framework:*

- i) Feasibility studies for extension of water supply network in Kabul and in more than twenty cities in provinces, including inventory of resources and user capacity regulation
- ii) legal and administrative studies
- iii) projects for Master Plan strategy for sanitation in Kabul sewerage/drainage
- iv) a monitoring of CAWSS
- v) a market survey of international operators and
- vi) a system of concerted action

**c) Preventive measures before partial transfer to private operators (PPP)**

- i) Mobilization of Operator. A call for tender in two stages is more suitable and advisable in order to better understand the demand and the geographical extent of the demand before entering into contract; ii) Tariff level and structure. A progressive levelling of tariff is desirable; iii) Aid for a healthy financial situation of the CAWSS is a prerequisite; iv) MoUDH's low capacity level like that of CAWSS calls for advisor to supervise the selection of operator; v) the legal framework is inappropriate and calls for aid for an updating of legal framework to establish a management organisation, tender calls, contracts, and particularly to prepare Public Private Partnerships; vi) Need to associate communication experts to accompany the institutional reform and the Public-Private Partnerships; vii) There is a consensus between MoUDH, CAWSS and the important financial organisations to consider that the PPP and a certain decentralisation of the WSS are the guarantees for improving the functioning of CAWSS, but at what pace this should be carried out is still under discussion; viii) Assessment of context and the concerned populations ought to be conducted to serve as the basis for analysis of these projects.

**d) Bank procedures and conditions of support to MUDH & CAWSS**

Under negotiation. An accompanying organisation is being created with a coordination team.

➤ **Access to essential services, is it a universal right?**<sup>62</sup>

Access to essential needs (potable water, sanitation, power, telecommunications, public transport, waste collection and disposal) is under consideration at the UN for international recognition that these services are an universal right, an inalienable service for the individual. The issue is important in cities because the individual is dependent on the community and basic services are the responsibility of urban authorities. It is a collective responsibility, an obligation and a challenge for all the players involved in the country's reconstruction, both Afghan and international organisations.

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<sup>61</sup> Conducted by an Italian technical consultant, "Engenharian ambiental e saneamento"

<sup>62</sup> ISTED, Revue Villes en développement N° 72-73, *Accès aux services essentiels*, Xavier Crépin.

➤ **From emergency interventions to development programmes**

For more than a decade, some international organisations (CICR, Solidarités, Care International) have participated in the construction of water supply networks. In 2006, practically all these programmes on emergency budget lines have been stopped or are going to be stopped. They should be replaced by national development programmes. According to our interviews with some of these organisations, the institutionalised transfer of properties and responsibilities of these installations to different CAWSS departments are a cause for concern in terms of changeover of skills:

- Cultural expertise in maintenance and upkeep,
- Accounting capacity and management of spare part stocks for repairs,
- Technical expertise about modern equipments (e.g. learning basic polypropylene welding activities),
- Clarification of tariff and tax collection systems.

➤ **Anxiety over the different timeframes of aid and needs**

Stakeholders need to be vigilant over the creation of local capacity in order to adjust existing technical installations as and when possible and facilitate future adjustments based on financial schedules. For example, Mazar-e Sharif city benefits from a secondary network installed to a large extent by ICRC in central localities but this network will not be connected to a central primary network which is due to become operational only in 2010, according to the World Bank's funding schedule. In 2010, the WB will fund the installation of equipment whose processes and technical components will have changed.

It is important to provide permanent training at all technical levels to ensure that present problems are not re-created: for example, restoring the outdated Soviet-manufactured central hydraulic turbines for which there are no more spare parts.

➤ **Environmental and town planning issues**

For a long time, the network of technical departments was integrated in the collective responsibilities as a technical domain reserved for an acquired expertise. The generally underground aspect of the networks goes with this notion of reserved terrain. Today, no town planning decision can sidestep the balanced environmental development issue. All network domains are affected; a fortiori, the domains related to sources and distribution of potable water and pollution circuits and risks.

Being aware of these issues, the MoUD is very careful about all expertise and analysis of environmental issues and of the responses to technical questions (climate, waste management, etc.). Environmental issues are brought up at MoUD as much by the German advisors as by Deputy Minister M.Q. Djallazada himself, who has been trained in Germany where environmental issues are important.

➤ **Public services and social engineering**

The necessity for investment and motivation to enter into contracts with the private sector for water distribution management should be planned in advance, or at least an analysis of usage costs should be carried out. One objective should be to give to the local bodies, neighbourhood by neighbourhood, the capacity to become interlocutors and actors of water usage management. NGOs could carry out this type of social engineering, such as economic investigation and expertise in aid of the local communities. They should play a role in the coordination process.

### **7.2.7 Afghanistan Geodesy and Cartography Head Office (AGCHO)**

In our investigations on the urban phenomenon, we turned towards AGCHO, a strategic administration for knowledge and spatial management of the territory. AGCHO is a centralised administration. Its chairman, who also plays a political role equivalent to a Minister, was confirmed in office by the current President of the Islamic Republic. This administrative body that is totally independent of ministerial supervision appears to have failed to move on from previous prerogatives of national secrecy, the remnants of its role in military reconnaissance. AGCHO is difficult to access and is reluctant to share information and transmit data. A difference of opinion on the ownership of the sources and information used

by the Afghanistan Information Management Service (AIMS) has put AGCHO and AIMS at loggerheads. AIMS is an agency of the cartography department created in 2002 by different international aid organisations (OCHA, UNDP)<sup>63</sup>. AIMS produces and circulates maps, computerised data on Afghanistan to all urban sector actors, starting from the international community.

➤ **General lack of updated Afghan town planning maps**

AIMS maps are used extensively by the whole international community by default. Some of them are incomplete, imprecise and out of date, but they are the only accessible maps. Understanding this lack of accessible Afghan spatial data by looking into the source of information was the objective of the visit to AGCHO.

### **Cadastral Department**

The cadastral department, a sector recently attached to AGCHO, deals with the sphere of land, an extremely sensitive issue in Afghanistan to such an extent that it has been the subject of several, successive decrees banning land registration since a few decades:

- - In 1971 under the pressure of the Communist ideology of community
- - During the Taliban period
- - Renewed banning since 2001 by President Karzai to limit occupation disputes.

In Afghanistan, property rights were traditionally registered on non spatial written documents. It was only in 1963 that a school for the training of land surveyors was set up in Kandahar, under American impetus and funding (USAID). The trained surveyor-engineers undertook the cadastre register in the framework of *Cadastral Department Survey*. Land registration was carried out in about 33% of the Afghan territory, mainly in the south and east (towards Jalalabad), as well as in Kabul, before Soviet intervention that banned all cataloguing from 1971. After eleven years and training of around 650 surveyor-engineers, the Cadastral Department Survey in Kandahar had to close down and since then, no surveyor has been trained on Afghan soil and land registration has again been banned. These cadastres mainly related to agricultural areas because the cities did not have the territorial importance that they have now.

#### **a) Inadequate and missing information**

The few existing cadastral information going back to the 1970's are incomplete and obviously outdated. The means of urban development imply land management: definition of occupation zones, knowledge of property boundaries, particularly between the public and private domains, value of transactions to negotiate purchases or compulsory purchases, since urbanisation results in land development (making it viable, creating economic centres, etc.). Following the various regimes in power, ignorance or corruption, the absence of cadastral data hampers urbanisation and urban management.

➤ **Absence of cadastral records and risk of drifting**

The absence of land tenure data opens the door to stagnation, arbitrary decisions, despoilment or simply unofficial or even illegal occupation. The consequences seriously affect the people of non regular or informal areas.

- Insufficient economic investment: With no reliable property deeds and land claims settled at gunpoint, no business would dare to settle on non-regularised land.
- Public buildings and basic services are not provided by institutional authorities for areas that have been established on land without property deeds.
- Wariness of international bodies about sustained investments (water works for example) in urban areas that are not legal.

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<sup>63</sup> The A to Z Guide to Afghanistan assistance, AREU 1<sup>st</sup> edition, 2002

➤ **Political reluctance and wait-and-see attitude despite the issue at stake**

The survey of the plans of urban areas in Afghanistan is an important factor for economic revival. But the Afghan administration with AGCHO firstly lacks modern technical resources adapted to the situation, and secondly remains quite reserved when it comes to sharing information, since it wishes to retain control over the domain.

**b) Agricultural criteria for cadastral classification**

For existing information, land is legally defined as belonging to seven categories, of which the first four concern cultivable agricultural land (cf. Annexe 7<sup>64</sup>): Land qualification was based on the area's potential agricultural production, a vital criterion for a country with a rural economy. Today there is a conflict of interest between rural and urban areas: the closer one moves towards urban areas, the greater the perceived value.

1st degree:	Garden and fruit land (fertile land with two harvests per year)
2nd degree:	Ditto
3rd degree:	Land (one harvest, once a year)
4th degree:	Land requiring one year fallow
5th and 6th degrees:	Land without rainwater drain-off
7th degree:	Mountains or other use (cemetery, religious, army)

In addition, there is a register of legal information about rural properties, the **Amlak Registration**, but it is not spatialised (texts unrelated to the mapped documents).

These criteria for agricultural occupation are called into question in favour of urban occupation in several ways:

➤ **De facto occupation**

The unofficial occupation of many plots that were earlier rural, especially in peri-urban zones, is a major phenomenon that is by no means new. Certain urban areas, such as district seven in Kabul were built more than thirty years ago. Legal-administrative procedures of disqualification of agricultural land are currently in operation with a view to regularising urban occupation and the administrative re-attachment of ex-agricultural zones that are now built up. The argument for these urban development strategies in rural areas are based on the following facts:

- This land is unsuitable for agriculture because of changes in water supply potential (diversion of irrigation systems, disruption following periods of drought, drop in ground water levels);
- Or quite simply, density of urban occupation with no alternative solutions.

➤ **Strategic occupation**

The Afghan authorities are looking for viable land for extending cities (e.g. on land to the north of Kabul, beyond the airport, which used to be agricultural land but is now a desert (Desabbs)). Research on balanced development at the regional level, such as the assessment carried out by the Strategic Regional Development Project, represents an interesting alternative to the current tendency of opportunism in the immediate vicinity of urbanised areas.

**c) State of the cadastre**

The Cadastral Department is a public department with offices in all the provinces. Successive events, wars, changes of government have all served not only to prevent any new land registration but also increased the risk of existing information disappearing. Many cadastral surveys have disappeared. Since the end of the war, an inventory of these documents and their conditions of preservation has been undertaken in several provinces (Kunduz, Ghazni, Jalalabad should begin in 2006), by the American company Emergency

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<sup>64</sup> See Annexe 7: Cadastral register form

Market Group EMG<sup>65</sup>, specialised in land market studies. Similarly in Kabul, AGCHO, the administration under the responsibility of the Cadastral Department, has ordered this inventory in order to find out how many registers or pages have been lost, destroyed or stolen. The situation varies according to each province but in general indicates a certain precariousness in terms of data, a problem that needs resolving urgently. Efforts to preserve and maintain records is being carried out by EMG, including the rebuilding of archives developing techniques for transferring existing paper documents onto computers. A more general project Land Titling and Economic Restructuring in Afghanistan (LTERA) provides a framework of this work, with the participation of the different authorities involved in land registration: AGCHO, AMLAK, Supreme Court and Provincial Courts.

**d) Accessibility to cadastral information**

In theory, the registers can be consulted by the general public. Landowners are given official authorisation to access this information. If there is a cadastral base for a plot of land and if there are questions about the boundaries of the property, claims or disputes between owners (unregistered successions, usurped property titles ...) or lack of updated information, the surveyors of the Cadastral Department may visit the land and make the necessary additional mapping surveys.

➤ **Source of lawsuits, quarrels and insecurity**

Officially, information is provided against a small fee of about 20 Afghanis but corruption is rampant and this information is often sold illegally (100 Afghanis or more). Furthermore, people are not accustomed to having their rights authenticated. Uncertainty or embezzlements of property titles or disagreements on the boundaries abound and are likely to give rise to veritable conflicts, that even go as far as settling matters through murder (recently in Mazar-e Sharif)

➤ **Absence of land value and economic stagnation**

Since the boundaries of property titles are not authenticated, investors wait for these deeds to be secured and an evaluation of the land to be carried out before investing in property and setting up businesses. This was clearly demonstrated by EMG's work in clarifying the boundaries, rights and use of the properties during a small rehabilitation operation in district 7 of Kabul (Programmes CDC 1 & CDC2)<sup>66</sup>: Once they were sure of their right to occupy the premises, some craftsmen (bakers) opened a shop and started up a small business. At the city level or the economic investment required for a large company, the importance of clarifying cadastral information is obviously even higher.

**e) Legal questions of land occupation**

Conflicting situations of not having the right of land occupation are so varied and numerous that they need an arsenal of tools of negotiation, law, judgment to clarify the cadastral map and the property registers when they exist. To control the proliferation of unauthorised houses in and around cities and urban developments, and to build a climate of safety confidence for the economy, MoUD supports and encourages the project launched by USAID Land Titling & Economic Restructuring Project - USAID/LTERA that aims to create legal and technical means to solve this major problem:

*Creating an updated land survey cadastre:*

This project prepares a base for registering land information: the Land Information System (LISI). Three survey techniques are used to analyse the spatiality of situations and recording them on maps: Orthophotos from aerial photographs, Orthophotos from satellite images and Classic field survey.

*Building public facilities to deal with land issues:*

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<sup>65</sup> USAID financing

<sup>66</sup> Rehabilitation work funded by EC.

Following the inventory of archives, documents, procedures and structures around land issues carried out by EMG/USAID, it was proposed to create land ownership centres bringing together all the relevant institutional departments: Bringing together these different bodies under one roof should facilitate data management and the procedure for obtaining official land ownership documents. At present, Afghan citizens often submit up to 27 applications before obtaining a piece of information and a document: with this programme, they should obtain their property titles after only three applications. A building of this type is currently being set up in the province of Ghazni. The relevant bodies are currently working independently although occasionally in the same building, and include: Cadastral Department linked to AGCHO, Amlak, agricultural cadastral registration and the Provincial Court.

➤ **Powerlessness of the present institutions**

The Cadastral Department is today powerless to play an effective role, when it is not itself involved in cronyism. The information recorded in its database has a certain value, both for the rehabilitation of illegally occupied areas as for future urban development projects. Observations in some provincial AGCHO offices highlight the imbalance between the issues at stake and local resources available to resolve them.

➤ **Cultural gap**

The degree of secrecy prevalent in Afghanistan and the fact that all the spatial information systems by satellite, new surveying technologies or the development and accessibility of Computerised map management System (GIS) are made available to an international public is fairly illogical.

➤ **Risk of disputes degenerating into wars, in War Land:**

During our meeting<sup>67</sup> Mr Pashtun, MoUD Minister, said that the situation was explosive and dangerous. On the President's decision, the EMG is introducing a technology that AGCHO does not possess. The partnership is establishing itself slowly, with defiant clashes between AGCHO and EMG.

➤ **Last information in starting 2007**

An agreement was signed in January 2007 between Afghan authorities which aimed at establishing the LTREA as an official national programme. This is a positive step towards the regularisation of land issues.

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<sup>67</sup> Meeting in the MoUDH on 30 March 2006

## 8 NATIONAL PROGRAMMES AND PILOT PROJECTS

Through the National Development Framework (NDF), the National Urban Programme (NUP) is being drawn up.

### 8.1 Temporary Institutional Organisations for short-term Programmes

According to our understanding of the process of structural evolution of the MoUDH / MoUD, which is still pending approval, the NUP will ultimately be responsible for urban issues in their entirety and will give rise to frameworks of sector-based interventions consisting of responsible bodies and appropriate procedures. But, during the current transition phase, the preparation of these institutional frameworks is done through numerous programmes drawn up in direct relation to the emergency situation and financed by exceptional, temporary development budgets through international assistance. Several kinds of programmes and objectives will fall in the scope of this preparation.

**"Bottom-up" programmes of community participation**, drawn up in collaboration with UN agencies (UN-HABITAT) and put in place with help from NGOs, with the objective of a direct and immediate intervention with a view to improving the living conditions of citizens and building democracy.

**"Top-down" programmes of urban development policies** drawn up at the level of decision-making bodies under the guidance of Afghan architect-engineers consultants trained and working abroad, holding a temporary Advisor status. These departments or 'units' falling under MoUD control but not affiliated to the various administrative directorates, are made up of teams of efficient urban professionals with clearly updated skills. These programmes concern different urban issues:

- **Rehabilitation Survey Programmes** for with small urban areas, for instance, with the Kabul Urban Rehabilitation Project (KURP) in Kabul (nineteen small areas not spatially linked).
- **Strategy Development Surveys Programmes** with National Development Strategies (NDS) team
- **Governance Support Programmes** developed by UN-HABITAT, with the City Profile programmes.
- **Land regularisation programme** as a recent institutional decision which establishes a working committee on land issues, under the supervision of the ministry of Agriculture.

### 8.2 "Bottom-up" programmes for institutionalising the role of communities

In these preliminary phases of the slow installation of institutional reconstruction mechanisms, Afghan institutions do not have the necessary material, or financial, legal and administrative resources to respond to the urgent need for improvement the living conditions of its citizens. International assistance is trying to implement rehabilitation programmes as fast as possible and as closely accessible to the inhabitants as possible. The economy is virtually non-existent, notions of social policies are practically unknown, and cities are economically powerless. Urban strategies have become a vast building site of international cooperation at government level. Urban policy is in the process of establishing frameworks for interventions. At the municipality level, technical and administrative skills and resources are still limited to the perimeters and objectives of the Master Plans of the 1970s<sup>68</sup>. International assistance remedies the lack of urban institutional management through emergency measures targeting the most immediate needs and the most vulnerable populations. The urban programmes to be launched by the MoUD will rely on the local

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<sup>68</sup> A Review based on a Multi and Cross Sector Approach, Urban Sector, Groupe URD, 2005

communities' capacity to manage their own development and will be modelled on the National Solidarity Programmes (NSP) whose objective is to improve the living conditions in rural areas, based on the participation of the communities.

### **8.2.1 Community Capacity Building Programmes**

Urban rehabilitation which takes into account citizens' basic needs will be, to a certain extent, a pretext for creating the mechanisms of a participative democracy<sup>69</sup> for **Community Capacity Building**. Programmes modelled on the **National Solidarity Programmes (NSP)** currently being implemented in the rural sector are in the process of being tested on urban zones. Seeking the active involvement of communities in order to make them take over and be responsible for the work done through the assistance received, these programmes rely on the creation of **Community Development Councils (CDC)** aided by humanitarian bodies. Due to the displacement of populations in all directions, existing urban populations are socially and culturally fluid; the creation of communities defined by culture and by space is less obvious in cities than in villages. UN-HABITAT has embarked on a small-scale pilot phase and is drawing up programmes adapted to the urban context.

#### **a) Urban Upgrading Programmes**

In Kabul, Urban Upgrading Programmes, financed by European Commission, concern a few communities of 300 dwellings each. **Community Upgrading Projects (CUP)** are drawn up in consultation with the local citizens, after formal election of community representatives to the **Community Development Council (CDC)** and the drawing up of **Community Development Plan (CDP)** that target development of urban spaces.

#### **b) Human Security Trust Fund Programmes (HSP)**

These programmes, which are financed by the Japanese cooperation, focus on security in an urban locality, drawn up in relation to the Millennium Objectives and were due to commence in 2006 (most likely at Mazar-e-Sharif).

#### **c) Community-based Disaster Awareness and Mitigation Programmes (C-DAMP)**

Non-specific programmes for urban zones but which concern construction and auto-construction (floods, earthquake, drought). The first stages of a test-programme were launched in Bamiyan early 2006.

#### **d) Civil Society Empowerment Programme (C-SEP)**

Not yet begun; its features were not explained to us but it broadly concerns the institutional strengthening of civil society.

#### **e) National Solidarity Programmes (NSP)**

Programmes for rural-urban zones have been started in semi-urban zones where the responsibilities of local authorities remain unclear. These rural lands, occupied by urban population come under the authority of the MRRD).

The rehabilitation policies put in action by these programmes in urban zones consist of pilot operations. There are also other kinds of operations of this type (such as those carried out with German funding in collaboration with the GAA<sup>70</sup> aimed at improvement of domestic supply of tap water for example, or the work on the technical, social and judicial regularisation of properties in collaboration with EMG).

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<sup>69</sup> Under the impetus and skills of UN-HABITAT

<sup>70</sup> German Agro Action

These programmes answer to different objectives:

➤ **Building a democracy through rehabilitation operations**

The principle is to build capacities of participation in decision-making processes related to urban issues, in parallel with building government institutions.

➤ **Building responsibilities, not assistance**

➤ **Gaining time to bring direct assistance to affected populations**

without waiting to train the institutions, which are not yet capable of putting to good use international assistance. The analysis presented in a prior report of the Groupe URD underlined the absence of power, of capabilities in urban planning and management at an intermediate level between Central Government Authority and Communities. Municipalities have little room for making economic changes; nor do they possess the skills needed for urban planning.

➤ **Efforts to avoid corruption or embezzlement induced errors**

that could cause assistance funds to be blocked before they reach affected populations.

➤ **Need for creating intermediate responsibility structures**

In between the "top-down" mechanisms of Ministries to Provinces and "bottom-up" mechanisms being constructed with various projects of Community Capacity Building; it is therefore necessary to develop many layers of urban responsibilities at different level: regional, municipal, local.

## **8.3 Institutional Programmes of urban development policies**

### **8.3.2 Rehabilitation programmes with the Kabul Urban Rehabilitation Programme**

The KURP has been the subject of negotiation for practically three or four years now between the World Bank, the MoUDH and the Kabul Municipality (KM). The KM has reclaimed its institutional prerogatives of autonomy in urban planning and management on its territory in relation to the role played by the MoUDH. An agreement was finally reached in March 2006 between the KM, the MoUDH and the World Bank, which is providing funds. The intervention in rehabilitation will finally concern nineteen spatial urban entities or "gozars" and improvement - rehabilitation measures will be carried out in six major departments:

1. Roads; 2. Water; 3. Sanitation; 4. Sewage water draining; 5. Street lighting; 6. Sewerage management (improvement by latrine).

This programme, under the responsibility of Mr Ahad Waled, Eng.architect advisor and his professional urban team (good urban skills with the participation of young foreign engineers and architects), should make it possible to establish decision making and operational mechanisms of rehabilitation; it should provide a model for rehabilitation of other urban sites in five major cities through the **Urban Rehabilitation Programmes (URP)**.

➤ **Rehabilitation**

The objectives of this rehabilitation programme that give priority to these spatial entities, the 'gozars', are two-fold: a) Rehabilitate these localities by integrating all spatial, social and legal data; b) Finalise rehabilitation mechanisms that can be used in other localities and cities by laying the foundation for a national rehabilitation policy.

### **8.3.3 Development programmes with the Strategic Development Plan**

Studies on strategic urban development at regional level are being carried out under the leadership of Mr. Neimat, advisor architect on Strategic Planning Management and Urban Regional Planning, with a team of about ten engineers and architects well-qualified in analytical techniques (skills, computerisation). The strategic objective is the analysis of urban development in correlation with the region in such a way as to stabilise the balance of

development between the region and the city as such. A feasibility study is being carried out in Kabul and its surrounding region in the first place. A spatio-economic analysis (transport, trade, industries, recreation areas, etc.) is underway and should provide the criteria for development and aid for urban planning in Kabul and later in other cities.

➤ **Town planning and spatialisation**

The remarks made earlier by the Groupe URD, both through a transversal analysis of the provinces and through an urban analysis of the city of Jalalabad bearing on the deficiencies in understanding and means of town planning in terms of spatialisation, find adequate responses in these regional development studies.

Spatial analysis underlines the different levels of understanding urban problems. Cities cannot find all a solution to the present disequilibrium on a theoretical level, i.e. urban administration, nor on a practical level in terms of informal settlements. In order to reduce the rural exodus, it is necessary to identify a means of reorienting them or settling them in other more economically and culturally viable places and establish a balance between the city and the region. Regional strategic analysis needs to define new spatial limits for the city in order to provide more appropriate resources and modes of action.

### **8.3.4 Programme of governance assistance with the City Profiling Programme**

Another preparatory measure for adjustment of aid and reconstruction policies is being carried out in urban context at municipal level, and aims to analyse the skills and capacities of municipal structures in urban management. UN-HABITAT, in close collaboration with the MoUD and municipalities, has launched and conducted a sort of an audit of municipality staff's skills, in Kandahar city following a period of concerted analysis with the different actors of the urban sector. The other major cities of Afghanistan will soon be the subject of similar assessments.

These programmes are being undertaken by UN-HABITAT. Some of UN-HABITAT's offices are located in the MoUDH but are controlled by the UN and are therefore totally independent of the Ministry.

➤ **Link with the Urban Sector Review**

Along with this present Sector Review, the City Profiles confirm the need for an analysis of systems and decision-making organisations in order to bring in complementary information to discussions. This should also ensure that decisions and programmes are better adapted to each organisation's absorption capacity or their internal restructuring processes.

### **8.3.5 Land registration programmes based on the Land Titling and Economic Registration in Afghanistan project survey**

This programme concerns informal settlements and land tenure issues. This question is of importance because there is a large number of city inhabitants living in informal zones, estimated to be about 3 million or 70% of the population in Kabul. These settlements are considered to be illegal in the first place, because they fall outside the perimeter of the reference Master Plan, but also because of the lack of updated cadastral data as explained above. The question of informality is crucial because, apart from the notion of illegality and lack of technical and financial means, Afghan urban authorities refuse to create infrastructures to provide basic services, arguing that the legal problems cannot be resolved.

➤ **Land tenure issue**

The subject of land tenure was presented as an explosive situation in the chapter above on urban situations, and the solutions brought about by EMG (supported by

USAID) with the LTERA programme have been mentioned, along with the questions of land rights in the chapter dealing with the institution of land registers within AGCHO.

➤ **Policy and land law in preparation**

The methods and projects initiated by USAID / LTERA to resolve issues of land regularisation, and of pilot operations, should logically be transformed into a national programme.

## 9 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Complementary to the observations and suggestions made along with each of the subjects mentioned earlier on.

### 9.1 Findings

#### 9.1.6 Direct observations

Two parallel observations arise out of these comments and analysis of the urban sector in Afghanistan. The generalised observation of chaotic disorder dominates, but on the other hand, a number of elements give an encouraging picture of the Afghanistan of cities: an inherent capacity for resilience and dynamism.

##### a) Negative aspects

On the one hand, it is possible to observe increased deterioration of roads, of buildings, traffic congestion, non-regulated trafficking, visual and malodorous pollution of streets, absence of cleaning systems, open sewers over flowing, deserted localities, traces of physical destruction and demolition, insufficient supply of water, electricity and all systems of evacuation, pollution, insecurity, ... the list is long.

##### b) Positive observations

On the other hand, a great deal of dynamic activity by the private sector in construction, more than in rehabilitation is apparent. Multiple operations are ongoing: building offices, shops, big houses so-called "Pakistani" houses, or in peri-urban extensions, proliferating layouts of "housing settlements" surrounded by walls, self-built traditional houses of superior technical and architectural quality, lively markets, emergence of restoration of heritage sites..

It is also possible to observe quality in the traditional Afghan urban fabric: streets on a human scale, walls and buildings at a standard height, frequent presence of trees bordering streets, plots of land large enough to include a private closed garden in the case of practically all the houses, finally, clearly marked division between private and public spaces.

#### 9.1.7 Seeking to understand institutional mechanisms of Urban Management

Enquiries, interviews, analyses were carried out with the objective of making an effort to understand the strategies, policies and programmes put in place since 2001. The following approach was adopted:

- Analysing the place of urban issues in documents of national strategy.
- Seeking to understand the causes of delay in commencement of the process of urban reconstruction.
- Observation of priorities and vacillation between rehabilitation and development.
- Overviews of the mechanism and the objectives of certain pilot programmes.

#### 9.1.8 Identification of institutional structures in Urban Management

To understand the set of stakeholders on the urban scene, which so far has only covered institutional structures, the author has drawn the schematic analysis presented below: Urban Stakeholders & Centralised Governance System. Each structure was observed from the point of view of its evolution in the context of the current transition.

- The MoUDH seeks to achieve efficiency of its structures, in updating its skills, in carrying out its appropriate role of institutional manager of urban issues by means of out-sourced services, and occasionally changed its name to MUD. Is it changing its focus on urban planning and giving up responsibilities in housing matters?
- The CAWSS which has to deal urgently with needs and development investments in networks issues.

- Finally, the inert role of the land settlement authorities of the AGCHO in contrast with the deployment of high technology and deep context analyses, being developed by the Americans as a solution to the problem of lands issues which has caused many disputes and led to a state of economic inertia on the land settlement question.

### **9.1.9 Overview of Urban Programmes likely to become Urban Policies**

The different current urban programmes analysed are progressing at different speeds and are encountering different difficulties in improving the situation:

- Not many programmes of Improvement of daily living conditions at the community level
- Partial and small rehabilitation programmes in Kabul
- Strategy Development Programmes at different levels
- Programme for Capacity Building in Governance
- Programme of legal regularisation of land issues

## **9.2 Recommendations**

Following these observations and efforts to understand, assessments and overviews of the urban mechanics being implemented in Afghanistan in 2006, we give below some basic points that require further investigation. We also refer some issues that have already been raised in previous urban studies for the LRRD programme undertaken by Groupe URD (2005-06).

### **➤ Complexity of the subject**

The subject is complex and as explained at the beginning of this study, and multiple research projects have been carried out. It is possible that some of the proposed points have already been studied, appraised and/or even developed as programmes, which may not have been brought to the knowledge of the author. The idea is to give some ideas for further discussion.

### **9.2.1 Suggestion for development of tools and skills in town planning**

Following the multi-sector based survey undertaken in Afghan provinces, and urban studies of the cities, the following suggestions have been made:

- Necessity of spatialisation of urban issues and projects
- Necessity of development of flexible and multiple urban mapping tools.
- Need for creation of mechanisms involved in exchange of competencies
- Necessity of developing tools of communication such as participation in urban co-conception
- Urgency of repositioning the urban housing at the centre of a suitable and modernized administrative and land tenure structure.


### **9.2.2 Suggestions/questions about the different levels of decision making**

The creation of the schematic diagram shown below "Urban Stakeholders & Centralised Governance System" has enabled the targeting of weaknesses in a double-system of governance, of decision making and of implementation of programmes, which is being put in place to deal with urban issues.

- On the one hand, Urban Policy and Planning at National Level, a 'top-down' system inherited from the Soviet occupation, with very authoritative participation of government institutions and administration.
- On the other hand, the Unit Pilot Programmes and Community Capacity Building, a 'bottom-up' system put in place by means of international assistance to make communities of citizens develop projects themselves.

Broadly speaking, there is a lack of intermediate governance, such as at municipality level can be observed.

**Figure 2: Urban stakeholders and centralised governance system**



Source: Groupe URD

The notion of ‘municipality’ is variable but the lack of tools, skills and municipal budgets to manage cities was evident everywhere.

- In the capital city, **Kabul**, which should to enjoy the advantages of better urban management given the presence of the ministry,
- In the few other major cities visited, such as Jalalabad, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kunduz, cities categorised as **provincial cities**, where relocated departments of the MoUD, the CAWSS, the AGCHO are deprived of initiatives because of their strict dependence on central administrations, and at the same time under constant pressure and local influence due to the fact that the city lacks resources.
- **Small average cities** such as Ghazni do not have National local offices (MoUD); and it is the technical departments of the city that provide minimum services.
- Numerous small villages situated in rural zones, depending more on the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development (MRRD) than on urban authorities.
- **New settlements** programmed and negotiated by the Ministry of Repatriation and Refugees (MORR) do not have proper urban department administration.
- Finally the emerging **private towns** founded entirely on private capital with the blessings of the authorities but with no real urban framework.

It seems necessary to strengthen and create organisations at different levels, with participation, concurrence, coordination, communication, urban design, managing town planning and rehabilitation operations.

### 9.2.3 Suggestion concerning Participation of Communities in the Urban Process

The principle of participative consultation has been established with the traditional *Shuras* and the Community Development Councils (CDC) created in the wake of international aid operations. Relying on the tradition for discussion and negotiation around issues inherent to the Afghan culture, the creation of **several levels of dialogue mechanisms** would enable the strengthening of social and spatial ties in the context of urbanisation project issues. Whether these mechanisms rely on tools of shared diagnosis (survey) or on tools for elaboration of collective programmes (needs expressed) or on tools of communication, they can generate synergies of means and intentions to support decisions of town planning and rehabilitation, anticipate urban disparities, or help in the creation of complementary structures. Each level of dialogue should tackle a certain type of participation and a certain number of participants concerned by the issue in hand.

For example:

- **participative work** in the form of small urban workshops.
- **extended consultation** with communities, covering recognisable spatial entities (*Gozar*, localities...).
- **information**, open to district level institutions and also involving other districts.

### 9.2.4 Access to basic urban services, improvement and/or creation of infrastructures such as technical networks

Short and medium-term needs are very important, technical solutions exist, adaptations to different configurations and usages are being studied. The difficulties lie elsewhere:

- much-needed resolution stage preceding the legal and administrative regularisation of land tenure.
- principal problem of funding and, more particularly, the modalities of distribution of funds and the management between public and private. A great deal of vigilance has to be exercised while dealing with the Public-Private partnership, and with the Management Contract, as the CAWSS agrees when asking for frequent aid from bodies that are financing reconstruction.

The state of services, networks and infrastructures in Afghanistan, just like the solutions to be recommended being analysed by international experts, are too specific for this study to make any suggestions in this technical matter. But the idea is to encourage decision-makers on urbanisation to be more involved in the international debate on the question. The problems of deficiencies in basic urban services are not specific to the Afghan situation but apply generally to all under-developed and developing countries, as well as countries crisis situations. In addition to the issue of modalities of financing, questions on the role of social cohesion that the networks can or should bring about also arise. As a consequence, there is also the question of public responsibility of these services, **the question of public service**.

- For example, the question of **private funding** is still being debated along with the analysis of studies<sup>71</sup> on the social and economic impact on the maintenance of social cohesion and access to the most vulnerable people with the liberalisation of markets for creation and management of infrastructure and access services,
- Notions of '**general interest**' or '**public utility**' are culturally different and do not cover the same financing mechanisms<sup>72</sup>. "The privatisation of public services is not necessarily

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<sup>71</sup> Grahal S. and Matin S., *Splintering Urbanism*, Thesis, 2000

<sup>72</sup> "In Anglo-Saxon countries, the construction of public services is above all of an economic nature. Thus, the notion of "public utility" refers more or less to the sum total of individual interests, whereas that of "general interest" assumes something extra: the service has to satisfy total consumption needs and also contribute to social cohesion", according to Sylvie Jaglin.

synonymous with putting general interest at peril. In developing countries<sup>73</sup>, for example, privatisation came in when the public sector failed, particularly the incapacity of the public sector to satisfy the urgent requirements of supply of drinking water to the entire population.

- Ethical debate: International initiatives<sup>74</sup> aim at acknowledging the right of universal access to essential services.

### 9.2.5 Regarding urban fabric and architectural issues

Stakeholders in the urban sector consider the urban situation to be catastrophic and local citizens live with it and deal with it as such. It is however possible to shift the angle of analysis to find great potentials for harmonious urban and architectural development in consonance with the Afghan context.

#### a) Afghan urban asset with structural urban fabric

If there is an obvious lack of vital infrastructure and of planned economic structures, Afghan cities show a great deal of coherence in their architectural landscape: all buildings are made of the same material, local earth, and appear to be well-integrated into the environment in which they have been built. The problem of legality or not of these constructions has not been taken into account in this appreciation. The new urban street network is presented in a clear and large grid layout that should help improve the situation with the installation of different networks. The constructions on hillsides at different levels gives every building a certain intrinsic quality of presenting a clear view, that will someday be very appreciable. Technical solutions are possible for the specific difficulties of the slopes (access with stairs, etc.). Plots of land in the general urban fabric are wide enough to leave place for greenery that the Afghans appreciate, and these should be conserved for their contribution to the environmental harmony. Walls are omnipresent elements in the scheme of urban construction.

#### b) Need to maintain architectural coherence

The presence of self-built houses using rural means and techniques gives to all the dwellings many common characteristics well adapted to the sites: a scale of constructions of limited height, divisions of volume with an exterior-interior usage that works. The evolution of construction programmes using industrialised material and respecting energy-saving standards should integrate the features mentioned above, while modernising them.

#### c) Setting up a Council of Town Planning and Architecture at different levels

The problem is enabling modern qualitative evolution as well as maintaining and making good use of characteristics that give each construction its own identity. Advisory bodies in Urbanism and Architecture could be created for the preservation of the urban or architectural heritage. This could also be useful for keeping at bay or entirely limiting foreign influence, such as the size and material used for houses with Pakistani influence, or for propagating awareness or respect for town planning regulations. These could be an effective link with the urban policies that are going to be put in place for the urban populations.

### 9.2.6 Regarding management of urban policies

A number of MoUD departments have already been out-sourced and today manage KURP, SDP programmes, and tomorrow maybe other programmes such as the 'City Profile'. Similarly, the creation of **National Agencies of Urban Studies** would offer a certain degree

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<sup>73</sup> Jaglin S., *Services d'eau en Afrique subsaharienne : la fragmentation urbaine en question-Paris* CNRS Editions, 2005

<sup>74</sup> UN-HABITAT, on French proposition, support from Brazil, Philippines and South Africa.

of dynamism, coordination and flexibility to the process already put in motion: multi-partnership, opening up to participation of other institutional and non-institutional actors, with autonomy of budget and analysis. These centres can be structured around the different aspects of urbanisation: development, rehabilitation, research. This could in turn enable:

- **Acceleration of study operations** and calls for assistance through ideas and skills with a relative degree of independence vis-à-vis the heavy and slow administrative machinery.
- Opening up towards **synergies of complementary skills by** inviting participation of Afghan or foreign professionals.
- **Creation of specialised institutions in particular sectors of urbanisation:** in the objective to deal with specific urban issues and problems such as a National Agency for Private Housing Improvement<sup>75</sup> to assist in the rehabilitation of private dwellings, or a National Agency for Urban Renovation<sup>76</sup> to deal with the urban renovation of districts (localities).
- **Spatialised Urban Management:** With the creation of institutions like Public Town-planning Agencies<sup>77</sup> for example, to create an equilibrium between public urbanisation and private planning, concretely and in terms of space.

National Agencies or Public Establishments remain state institutions, but can be more flexible than a Ministry or an Administration. And finally, institutions of guidance and coordination are yet to be established at several stages and levels of the entire process of urban planning.

### 9.2.7 Informal settlements and regularisation of land tenure

Problems of land tenure are plenty, complicated, and the subject of dangerous conflicts. These issues affect individuals as much as the traditional and judicial foundations of society. The Americans, with the authorisation of the Karzai Government are testing the mechanisms of regularisation and the creation of a system of land register that combines technological sophistication and traditional, local usages. If this work, at micro and macro levels, has to be carried out over the whole of Afghan territory and in particular, areas of urban occupation, it could lead to:

- **Creation of a centre for learning in land settlement.** The creation of a Graduate School of Land Register Technology thirty-five years after the definitive closing of its equivalent in Kandahar should present a multitude of opportunities: a chance to put history straight; the need to involve Afghans in the reconstruction of their own country; a logic and a continuity of action for American financial and technological assistance. The training of land surveyors should be an opportunity for education and training of Afghans in various fields, and within other types of academic training institutes (polytechnics, universities, law schools, etc.): legal, technical, technological, along with the creation of employment in for qualified surveyors; and finally, the possibility to export this experience and know-how to other countries later on. In many countries, problems of land tenure following the movement of populations have been noted and the case of Afghanistan is so complicated and diverse that Afghans specialists could become experts in the issue.
- **Creation of a public organisation of land settlement** to manage and anticipate future urban development.

Lastly, the following information was brought to the author's attention just before going to print at the end of January 2007. Some days ago a decision was taken at government level to set up all the mechanisms for creating land policy with a coordination Committee under the clear responsibilities of the Ministry of Agriculture. This should be seen as a positive means of solving a number of urban issues.

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<sup>75</sup> For example, in France there is the L'Agence Nationale d'Amélioration de l'Habitat Privé (ANAH)

<sup>76</sup> For example, in France there is the L'Agence Nationale de Rénovation Urbaine (ANRU)

<sup>77</sup> For example, in France there is the Etablissements Publics d'Aménagement (EPA)

### **9.3 Need for a General Directory Town Planning Document**

It is important that urban stakeholders stop working with obsolete Master Plans and instead adopt the Urban Management Guidelines as flexible and adaptable reference tools.

## Annexe 1: Interlocutors met over 2005-2006

Meetings with junior urban researcher in 2005

Update meetings with architect-urbanist researcher in 2006

### **MUDH – MINISTRY OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSINGS (MoUD or MUD – MINISTRY OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT)**

#### **Departments integrated within the 2006 structure chart of Urban Development**

- Minister :
  - o M. Pashtoun
- Deputy Minister :
  - o Dr Sayed Sharif Hossainy
- Deputy minister :
  - o M. Qiumuddiu Jallalzada
  - o M. Eberhard Kohlsdorfer, deputy minister Advisor (german)
- Dr G. Farouq Bashar, Senior legal Advisor
- Directorate of Administration and Finance:
  - o Arch. A. Hasib Latifi, General Administration/ Finance director
- Directorate of Planning and Coordination,
  - o J.NazirP, Coordinator officer, Dept Policy and coordination.
- Directorate of Housing Policy
- Directorate of Building and Construction
- Directorate of National Codes and Standard
- Directorate of Urban Development
- Directorate of Safeguarding of Afghanistan's Urban Heritage and old city
  - o Zahra BRESHNA, Dr Engineer Architect and Urban Planner (Head of Department for Rehabilitation and Preservation of Afghanistan's Urban Heritage, from 2004 to 2006:)
- Directorate of Water Supply and Sewerage
- Wahid Sultan - Architect and Urbanist, Advisor to the MUDH
- PIU
  - o Programm officer : Said Osman

#### **MUD's units non integrated in the 2006 structure chart of Urban Development**

- GIS office,
  - o Mahmoud Samizay, senior advisor
- KURP/ PMU Team leader & advisor to MoUD,
  - o A-Haj Wahid Abdul Ahad
- SDP Strategic Regional Development Project,
  - o Team leader : Arch. Planner Abdul Khaliq (Nemat), Urban & Regional Planning Advisor , strategic Regional Planning Manager,

#### **No more in the MUDH in 2006**

- Sultana Parwanta Urbanism, ex Director of Planning in 2005, (in 2006 in the Ministry of Commerce)
- Nazir Sabiri
- Asadul Haq ex Director of Town Planning

#### **CAWSS**

- President :
  - o Eng. Najibullah " Patan"

#### **AGCHO- Geodesy and Cartography Head Office**

- Vice president
  - o Deputy Engineer **M Askar (Falah)**

#### **MRRD – Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development**

##### **TD - Traffic Department**

##### **MoE Ministry of Education**

- Construction Depart.-In charge of Higher Education

#### **MINISTRY OF REFUGEES AND RAPATRIATION**

- (Baghlan) Provence Refugees and Rapatriation Department, ADL -Aid of Distribution Land

#### **K.M. – MUNICIPALITY OF KABUL**

- Advisors
  - o Ms Pushpa Pathak : UrbanPlanning & Policy Advisor works for UN in KM
  - o Tressan Sullivan: Advisor works as USAID contractor for KM

- Planning department of Kabul
  - o Eng. M. Kuraishi
- Rehabilitation Departement
  - o Eng. Akram contacts UN-Habitat Works on rehabilitation project in districts 6, 7 et 8

#### **UN AGENCIES ( AND MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS**

- UNDP
  - o M A.G. Massoom Fahrad Progrmme Management Analyst
  - o Nicola Rieger, Regional manager
  - o Younus Payad
- UNICEF
  - o Nasifa Qani, Assistant Project Officer
  - o Mr Ali Niazi, Director of Policy and Coordination
- UN-HABITAT
  - o Mohamaed Sharif, represented Un Habitat at the MUDH in 2005
  - o Lalith Lankatleke : Chief technical Advisor, Head of Agency
  - o Fernando DA CRUZ, Urban Profiling and Planning Advisor
  - o Dr Suman Kr.Karna Development Advisor
- UNHCR
  - o Mrs Felicitas Nebril Kabul Province Programme Manager

#### **INTERNATIONAL ORGANISMS**

- AIMS American afghani cartography office
- AKTC - The Aga Khan Trust for Culture(AKDN)
- European Commission
  - o INFRASTRUCTURE SECTOR
- EMG:USAID
  - o LTERA Land Titling and Economic Restructuring in Afghanistan.
- WORLD BANK
  - o Jean Mazurelle Country director (urbanist )
  - o Soraya Goga : Urban specialist South Asia Energy
  - o CONSULTANT in solid waste collect
- JICA; Japan International cooperation Agency Afghanistan office
- French Emabassy
  - o Mission Economique
  - o Centre culturel Français
- IHCR-Interbational Committee of red Cross
  - o Water and habitat sector

#### **AFGHAN AND INTERNATIONAL NGOS**

- ACBAR – AGENCY COORDINATING BODY FOR AFGHAN RELIEF
- AFRANE
- AREU , AFGHANISTAN RESEARCH AND EVALUATION UNIT
- CARE
- GERES
- GERMAN AGRO ACTION
- SOLIDARITES ...

#### **PRIVATE URBAN AND BUILDING SECTOR**

- Farzam Construction Co.LTD.
- Khawer Construction.Co
- FKH Geoexpert Services

#### **ARCHICTURE & URBAN AGENCIES**

- Agence AFIR (Anne Feenstra Idea Realisation)
- A & D Architecture & Development ( french cooperation)
- Nazir Sabiri , ex deputy minister to the MUDH , now has his own architect agency
- Eng. M. Sayeed KAKAR, Teacher to Polytechnic school of Kabul

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I-NDS “*Intermediate National Development Strategy*”

NDS – “*National Development Strategy*”, August 2004

NPP *National Priority Program*, June 2004

PRSPs *Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers*, Juillet 2005

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## **ON GRAPHIC DATAS**

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Website : <http://www.aims.org.af>

- **Historic maps**

Kabul maps 1892, 1942, 1980, 1985, 1986, 1992

- **Present used maps**

AIMS english maps and dari maps

- Kabul city map, february 2005

- Kabul city center, february 2005

- Kabul districts maps, february 2005

Kabul Municipality

- Kabul Municipality map, with districts, scale 1:75 000

- Kabul City, Municipalities and Police Districts, scale 1:75 000, January 2005

Satellite maps used as background

## Annexe 3: Groupe URD Urban surveys in Afghanistan 2002-2006

- 2002 “*The Quality Project In Afghanistan*” – mission 1 – 01/07/2002 au 24/08/2002
- 2003 “*The Quality Project In Afghanistan*” – mission 2 – 15/01/2003 au 12/02/2003  
Chapter “Shelter and habitat sector” concerned
- 2003 “*The Quality Project In Afghanistan*” – mission 3 – 05/06/03 au 26/08/03
- Octobre 2002 – Février 2003  
Projet de recherche : *Villes en guerres et guerres en ville* »  
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URD en collaboration avec ACTED
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- 2005  
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- 2005 *The Case of Kabul – LRRD – july*  
Part I Meeting with institutions, donors, NGOs, UN agencies  
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- 2005 « *Fragiles cités* » Revue Diplomatie N°17 – nov /déc  
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encadré 2 : Villes en guerre et guerres en villes : retour sur l’histoire  
encadré 3 : une pluralité de désastres naturels urbains  
5 Défis pour le futur
- 2005 Décembre Conférence du 13 décembre  
« *Is the building of a city the adequate answer to Bamayan’s low development ?*”  
CI Mariani .. article  
« *From the spreading of the pakistani architecture to the growing urban  
encroachment of Kabul surrounding hills, what Kabul look like in the near future?*” CI.  
Mariani. . article
- 2006  
“Etude urbaine sur Jalalabad », R. Mahmoudi R,  
« Etude urbaine sur Kaboul », B ; Boyer  
« Etude urbaine cadre multisectoriel », B. Boyer

## Annexe 4: Agreement between the MoUDH and Groupe URD



Kabul, 4 May 2006

### **Proposition of collaboration from the Groupe URD to the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing**

#### **❖ Groupe URD achievement and plans**

The Groupe URD is a French research institute which main activities are research, training and evaluation. The Groupe URD is working in different countries in several sectors, including urban issues.

**One of Groupe URD's main programme in Afghanistan is a two-year EC funded programme: "Linking relief Rehabilitation and Development". The programme has three main components:**

- Learning and sharing lessons through iterative multi-sector reviews;
- Increasing knowledge and experience by carrying out applied research on key issues as identified during the lesson learning process; in the urban and agriculture sector.
- Contributing to the capacity building efforts of relevant ministries and national NGOs

The LRRD programme includes 6 different sectors: health, water, nutrition, agriculture, education and urban development.

In the urban development sector, the two first components are tackled:

#### 1 – Learning and sharing lessons:

A review of the urban sector is on going as well as in the agriculture, education and nutrition sectors. The health and water sector reviews are finished and are published on the web site. A hard copy is also available if requested. The objective of the review is to have a good understanding of the evolution of each sector since 2001 through the different stakeholders: NGOs, International organisations, donors and governmental institutions.

A multi sector review has just been conducted by the pool of experts from Groupe URD in each sectors. The experts travelled in different provinces of Afghanistan to visit projects, field offices and provincial departments of the Ministries. The same types of missions have taken place since 2002 on a 6 month bases. It enhances the understanding of the evolution of each sector. The report of this month review will be finalized within the month of June. For the urban sector, the cities of Bamyán, Mazar-e Sharif, Kundunz, Ghazni were visited. Pul –e Khumri and Jalalabad were visited in December.

These multi and cross sectors reviews will be a base to identify the gaps, opportunities and main constraints for Afghanistan development in each of the sectors.

## 2 – Increasing Knowledge and experience by carrying out applied research:

Within this second component, three surveys on urban development are conducted by junior experts in three different cities, one small (Bamiyana), one medium (Jalalabad) and one large city (Kabul)

- The report on Bamiyana, finalized in December 2005 after a 5 month field research, is entitled: "Is the building of a city the adequate answer to Bamiyana low development"
- The survey in Jalalabad will start in May 2006 up to October 2006. The junior expert will analyse the structure and development of the city of Jalalabad.
- In December 2005 a general review has been conducted in Kabul to have a first approach on the main issues of this city. An article has been written based on that survey: " From the spreading of the Pakistani architecture to the growing urban encroachment of Kabul surrounding hills, what will Kabul look like in the near future"

This survey will be continued and some of the selected issues tackled in more details within the current year.

### ❖ **Propositions of support to the MUDH**

According to the request of Mr the Deputy Minister of the MUDH Dr Djallalzada on the 26 April, and following the meeting on the 30 April with M. Eberhard Kohlsdorfer, his advisor, Groupe URD proposes to link its research with certain issues highlighted by the MUDH:

#### **On the short term: First proposition**

The on going institutional urban sector review conducted within the framework of the two year EC funded programme LRRD (dead line with a conference in December 2006), could feed the research on the updating of the urban sector structure.

This review is a first step to have a better understanding of the situation, in terms of gaps or opportunities. The will unable Groupe URD to focus on more precise issues.

The ongoing review as well as the urban surveys made in the three different cities could be the opportunity to identify recommendation to establish better urban mechanisms, as well on Ministry level, than on the coordination level with the other Ministries, Technical Administrations, and Municipalities.

#### **On a longer term Groupe URD could focus on a broader issue**

The urban sector review, as well as the research conducted by Groupe URD in the urban development sector, will be a base for future possible studies.

The Environmental issue, suggested by the Ministry, is very much within the scope of Groupe URD's interest and competences. We will be very interested in taking a close look at this issue. Groupe URD plans on writing a proposal in collaboration with the MUDH in order to submit it to the donors.

The possible themes of this survey will be closely link with the following issues:

- Pollutions, preservation of resources (water- vegetation ...)
- Information, communication campaign at different level of the urban actors.
- Needs of coordination mechanisms with other sectors (education, health)
- Lack of urban participation within the heterogeneous population
- Needs of training in participation process for all the urban stakeholders

We hope to manage to raise funds for this survey to be able to launch it as soon as possible.

For the Groupe URD

Béatrice Boyer

Urbanist researcher

## Annexe 5: Overview of Challenges and Policy options for the Urban Sector 1

ISSUES	CAUSES	CONSEQUENCES	GOVERNMENT ACTION REQUIRED	SUPPORT ACTION NEEDED
<b>INSTITUTIONS OF URBAN MANAGEMENT</b>				
LACK OF CLARITY ON MANDATES & OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR URBAN MANAGEMENT, between Municipalities, MUDH, M. of Interior and other line ministries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>History of centralized, largely unaccountable administration</li> <li>Politicization of urban institutions</li> <li>Lack of professionalism</li> <li>Lack of continuity in key positions</li> <li>Absence of effective, sustained technical support</li> <li>Marginalisation of local authorities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Turf-wars around "control", leading to paralysis of surviving management systems.</li> <li>Manipulation of land and service delivery, often for political ends</li> <li>Institutional inertia / Resistance to reform</li> <li>Lack of leadership</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Executive decree to define clear responsibilities mandates and follow-up</li> <li>Revise and introduce laws for reform</li> <li>Exercise strong leadership</li> <li>Seek technical assistance on options for emergency administrative reform of urban institutions – and milestones</li> <li>Enhance communication and coordination between Municipalities and MUDH</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Engage properly in identifying appropriate administrative reform options and their institutional implications</li> <li>Provide and sustain technical assistance in implementation and monitoring</li> <li>Set conditionalities for funding, including effective application of laws and monitoring</li> </ul>
LACK OF GOVERNMENTAL CAPACITY FOR URBAN MANAGEMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lack of official capacity to identify, prioritize and address key urban issues</li> <li>Lack of experience in undertaking appropriate surveys, analysis/diagnosis and developing realistic strategies</li> <li>Poor understanding of the medium-term long-term impact of large urbanisation plans</li> <li>Lack of continuity, motivation &amp; training of official staff</li> <li>Lack of professional accountability, leading to divided loyalties</li> <li>Outdated Master Plans documents, throughout the country, coupled with lack of updated data &amp; information</li> <li>Insufficient knowledge of history of urban growth of Afghan cities</li> <li>Over emphasis on centralised planning – no local area planning</li> <li>Patchy law enforcement</li> <li>Inconsistent application of laws and standards</li> <li>Lack of public awareness and understanding of government line of actions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Building anarchy leading to an urban "free for all"</li> <li>Lack of local value-based vision (context specific)</li> <li>Mistrust and marginalization of urban institutions</li> <li>Inadequate planning strategies and instruments leading to the erosion of public land ear-marked for open spaces, roads, infrastructure etc</li> <li>Inappropriate and costly strategies for new projects (e.g. the "satellite cities" in Kabul)</li> <li>Blanket disregard of "informal" settlements when discussing investment</li> <li>Informal settlements remain invisible on official plans / strategies and are generically labelled as "illegal"</li> <li>Urban environmental degradation</li> <li>Non-recognition of significant contribution of informal (self-help) housing</li> <li>Overwhelmed bureaucracy / slow work</li> <li>Lack of transparency in decision-making</li> <li>Over-staffed and inflexible institutions</li> <li>Patchy management, with consequences on staff motivation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Development and implementation of an Action Plan for the reform the management of all urban institutions</li> <li>Seek international assistance</li> <li>Appoint &amp; empower an inter-agency "Urban Task Force" to re-direct the focus of government efforts from "control" to "facilitate" mode</li> <li>Appoint a "Working Group" to focus on planning within the Urban Task Force</li> <li>Get to grips with the legal / physical implications of informal settlements</li> <li>Recognise the disparities between the different "informal" areas in question and the need for a pragmatic case-by-case approach</li> <li>Identify who is doing what in the different areas</li> <li>Ensure that the economic dimension is included in urban strategies</li> <li>Involve local community representatives</li> <li>Engage professional bodies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Step into the breach</li> <li>Engage with the Urban Task Force and the "Working Group" in identifying priority management/capacity needs</li> <li>Sustain technical assistance in key areas over the long-term</li> <li>Support area-based urban development</li> <li>Update practice through on-the-job training of young civil servants and professionals (learning by doing)</li> <li>Share lessons learned from project implementation in Afghanistan and other countries with similar experiences</li> <li>More focus on urban governance</li> <li>Ensure monitoring and oversight of institutional responsibilities</li> <li>Consult widely with senior afghan professionals in Kabul and provinces</li> <li>Professional bodies to provide commitment and engagement</li> <li>Fund a secretariat for the Task Force</li> </ul>
<b>LAND MANAGEMENT</b>				
LIMITED ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE AND SECURE URBAN LAND	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>History of politicization of urban land development projects</li> <li>Unaffordable subsidies on land and servicing</li> <li>Lack of resources &amp; management systems to analyse, plan &amp; implement urban projects</li> <li>Inappropriate administrative procedures (bureaucracy)</li> <li>Corrupt distribution systems</li> <li>Profiteering on land sales</li> <li>Under-utilisation of extensive government land in the city</li> <li>High expectations of government-provided land</li> <li>Lack of updated data &amp; information</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Existing systems are prone to speculation and illicit dealings, whether by land developers or government officials</li> <li>Availability of serviced land is outstripping demand</li> <li>Access denied to those who most need land (including vulnerable returnees and IDPs)</li> <li>Inability of authorities to keep up with the urban growth (in terms of land, infrastructure and legal framework), leading to proliferation of informal settlements</li> <li>Informal urban settlers tend to build on areas that are otherwise undesirable and hazardous (steep slopes, flood areas etc), therefore very difficult to service</li> <li>Undefined urban sprawl eroding peripheral areas and valuable agricultural land</li> <li>Unaffordable environmental consequences (long-term impact) affecting health of people</li> <li>Risk of social unrest and political instability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Break with the past</li> <li>Appoint "Land Task Force" or "Land Reform Commission" to identify existing constraints, propose and oversee appropriate remedial measures</li> <li>Seek technical assistance in evaluating &amp; costing alternative development options</li> <li>Establish coordination body between technical ministries and MoJustice</li> <li>Explore alternative tenure arrangements (lessons learned from other countries)</li> <li>Define and defend public land</li> <li>Reviewing procedures</li> <li>Reform Land Law (MoJustice)</li> <li>Cabinet to engage with land laws</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improve donor and agencies coordination</li> <li>Advocate for pro-poor land strategies rather than a "free for all"</li> <li>Support the revision of planning and land management policy reform</li> </ul>

ISSUES	CAUSES	CONSEQUENCES	GOVERNMENT ACTION REQUIRED	SUPPORT ACTION NEEDED
INEFFECTIVE & OUTDATED LAND ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Lack of investment</li> <li>■ Outdated and ineffectual land/property registration system</li> <li>■ Responsibilities of the different organisations (5) carrying out formal land administration are overlapping and often confusing</li> <li>■ Weak linkages between the informal and formal titling systems</li> <li>■ Lack of training &amp; transparency</li> <li>■ Corrupt officials &amp; citizens</li> <li>■ Impunity of officials and influential afghans</li> <li>■ Powerlessness of professionals</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Manipulation of registrations for private gain</li> <li>■ Illegal property seizures / high percentage of government offices in the violation of people's property</li> <li>■ Vulnerability of urban dwellers</li> <li>■ Limited private investments, due to mistrust of official systems</li> <li>■ Property disputes due to insufficient/informal proof of ownership</li> <li>■ Uncontrolled land development outside the municipal boundaries</li> <li>■ Paralysis in the allocation of land for housing, open spaces, greenery, industrial uses, transport &amp; circulation, infrastructure)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Appoint independent oversight body to oversee new land registration</li> <li>■ Seek technical assistance</li> <li>■ Seek ways to register informal deeds</li> <li>■ Provide a modern, updated and secure system for deed registrations</li> <li>■ Strengthen system of land courts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Technical support</li> <li>■ Independent monitoring for infringements or violations of land titles and security of tenure</li> </ul>
INFRASTRUCTURE & SERVICES				
MAJOR INFRASTRUCTURE/ SERVICES DEFICIT + SHORTAGE OF SUPPLY IN: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Water</li> <li>■ Electricity</li> <li>■ Drainage</li> <li>■ Roads</li> <li>■ Schools etc</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Unaffordable subsidies on basic services and unwillingness to recover costs</li> <li>■ Lack of investment (expansion of networks and maintenance)</li> <li>■ Failure to anticipate demand due to urban growth</li> <li>■ Inability to stay-ahead of informal settlements</li> <li>■ High expectations of government-provided services</li> <li>■ Unsustainable investment (O&amp;M)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Very limited coverage of basic services, particularly for the urban poor and those living in "informal" settlements</li> <li>■ De-facto exploitative privatisation due to lack of coverage (e.g. water)</li> <li>■ Impact on health / social, economic &amp; physical vulnerability</li> <li>■ Widespread environmental crisis</li> <li>■ Resistance to official cost-recovery for services</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Negotiate service-delivery plans linked with the regularisation of established settlements</li> <li>■ Combine private and public supply</li> <li>■ Coordinate donor-investment through strategic planning</li> <li>■ Avoid excesses of politicisation of funding of infrastructure and services</li> <li>■ Define coverage targets &amp; technical standards</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Provide support to emergency provision of basic services in unserviced settlements</li> <li>■ Demand leadership and strategic planning from counterparts</li> <li>■ Invest in community-driven upgrading plans</li> <li>■ Prepare upgrading guidelines</li> </ul>
CALIBRATING THE SHIFT TOWARDS COST-RECOVERY AGAINST AFFORDABILITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Ill-conceived fast-track strategies of cost-recovery</li> <li>■ Lack of awareness of urban poverty</li> <li>■ Weak institutional capacity</li> <li>■ Unwillingness to perpetuate even modest subsidies</li> <li>■ Patchy enforcement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Reduction in coverage (i.e. water) due to lack of means to pay</li> <li>■ Wide areas of anarchic, largely un-metered use (e.g. electricity)</li> <li>■ Investments will be wasted</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Pressure on donors to phase cost-recovery strategies</li> <li>■ Raise public awareness of the imperative of cost-recovery</li> <li>■ Incorporate "operations &amp; maintenance" (O&amp;M) in project designs</li> <li>■ Clarify responsibilities with Ministry of Public Works</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Donors need to be more flexible about cost-recovery</li> <li>■ Share lessons learned from other cases of privatisation of basic services</li> <li>■ Provide technical training</li> </ul>
FINANCING URBAN DEVELOPMENT				
WIDENING THE RESOURCE-BASE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Institutional rivalries leading to tug of war over revenues</li> <li>■ Un-sustainability of current subsidies</li> <li>■ Lack of transparency &amp; accountability summed with institutional confusion and unclear devolution of responsibilities</li> <li>■ Seemingly poor bookkeeping</li> <li>■ Captured revenues (particularly in the provinces)</li> <li>■ Poorly paid civil servants</li> <li>■ Marginalisation of local authorities in the budget process (lack of incentives)</li> <li>■ Archaic tax rates and inflexible official collection and disbursement procedures</li> <li>■ Apparent inability to ear-mark resources to specific districts &amp; provinces</li> <li>■ Limited capacity within institutions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Limited revenue for official investment</li> <li>■ Excessively dependant on central budget and external funding</li> <li>■ Unsustainable and unaffordable investment in infrastructure extension and maintenance at the expenses of real prioritisation (mismatch between revenue and expenditure)</li> <li>■ Poor forecasting of budget and program for investment</li> <li>■ Opportunities for informal levies</li> <li>■ Excessive dependence on sale of land for revenue</li> <li>■ Public mistrust</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Comprehensive fiscal reform and monitoring of revenue generation</li> <li>■ Promote transparency and accountability to tax payers</li> <li>■ Reform policy, targets &amp; rates; define clear milestones and performance benchmarks</li> <li>■ Promote appropriate devolution of responsibilities to provinces; consider District level budget</li> <li>■ Develop financial incentives linked to local authorities performance</li> <li>■ Enhance regular consultation with urban dwellers about priorities and budget</li> <li>■ Stronger MoI / MoF oversight</li> <li>■ Call donors for support in legal issues</li> <li>■ Improve audit</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Support partnerships with Municipality &amp; others</li> <li>■ Provide technical support for fiscal reform for "double-entry bookkeeping"</li> <li>■ Incorporate the economic dimension in urban strategies</li> </ul>

Source: Ministry of Urban Development

## Annexe 6: Overview of Challenges and Policy options for the Urban Sector 2

ISSUES	CAUSES	CONSEQUENCES	GOVERNMENT ACTION REQUIRED	SUPPORT ACTION NEEDED
<b>INSTITUTIONS OF URBAN MANAGEMENT</b>				
<b>LACK OF CLARITY ON MANDATES &amp; OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR URBAN MANAGEMENT</b> , between Municipalities, MUDH, M. of Interior and other line ministries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>History of centralized, largely unaccountable administration</li> <li>Politicization of urban institutions</li> <li>Lack of professionalism</li> <li>Lack of continuity in key positions</li> <li>Absence of effective, sustained technical support</li> <li>Marginalisation of local authorities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Turf-wars around "control", leading to paralysis of surviving management systems.</li> <li>Manipulation of land and service delivery, often for political ends</li> <li>Institutional inertia / Resistance to reform</li> <li>Lack of leadership</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Executive decree to define clear responsibilities mandates and follow-up</li> <li>Revise and introduce laws for reform</li> <li>Exercise strong leadership</li> <li>Seek technical assistance on options for emergency administrative reform of urban institutions – and milestones</li> <li>Enhance communication and coordination between Municipalities and MUDH</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Engage properly in identifying appropriate administrative reform options and their institutional implications</li> <li>Provide and sustain technical assistance in implementation and monitoring</li> <li>Set conditionalities for funding, including effective application of laws and monitoring</li> </ul>
<b>LACK OF GOVERNMENTAL CAPACITY FOR URBAN MANAGEMENT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lack of official capacity to identify, prioritize and address key urban issues</li> <li>Lack of experience in undertaking appropriate surveys, analysis/diagnosis and developing realistic strategies</li> <li>Poor understanding of the medium-term long-term impact of large urbanisation plans</li> <li>Lack of continuity, motivation &amp; training of official staff</li> <li>Lack of professional accountability, leading to divided loyalties</li> <li>Outdated Master Plans documents, throughout the country, coupled with lack of updated data &amp; information</li> <li>Insufficient knowledge of history of urban growth of Afghan cities</li> <li>Over emphasis on centralised planning – no local area planning</li> <li>Patchy law enforcement</li> <li>Inconsistent application of laws and standards</li> <li>Lack of public awareness and understanding of government line of actions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Building anarchy leading to an urban "free for all"</li> <li>Lack of local value-based vision (context specific)</li> <li>Mistrust and marginalization of urban institutions</li> <li>Inadequate planning strategies and instruments leading to the erosion of public land ear-marked for open spaces, roads, infrastructure etc</li> <li>Inappropriate and costly strategies for new projects (e.g. the "satellite cities" in Kabul)</li> <li>Blanket disregard of "informal" settlements when discussing investment</li> <li>Informal settlements remain invisible on official plans / strategies and are generically labeled as "illegal"</li> <li>Urban environmental degradation</li> <li>Non-recognition of significant contribution of informal (self-help) housing</li> <li>Overwhelmed bureaucracy / slow work</li> <li>Lack of transparency in decision-making</li> <li>Over-staffed and inflexible institutions</li> <li>Patchy management, with consequences on staff motivation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Development and implementation of an Action Plan for the reform the management of all urban institutions</li> <li>Seek international assistance</li> <li>Appoint &amp; empower an inter-agency "Urban Task Force" to re-direct the focus of government efforts from "control" to "facilitate" mode</li> <li>Appoint a "Working Group" to focus on planning within the Urban Task Force</li> <li>Get to grips with the legal / physical implications of informal settlements</li> <li>Recognise the disparities between the different "informal" areas in question and the need for a pragmatic case-by-case approach</li> <li>Identify who is doing what in the different areas</li> <li>Ensure that the economic dimension is included in urban strategies</li> <li>Involve local community representatives</li> <li>Engage professional bodies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Step into the breach</li> <li>Engage with the Urban Task Force and the "Working Group" in identifying priority management/capacity needs</li> <li>Sustain technical assistance in key areas over the long-term</li> <li>Support area-based urban development</li> <li>Update practice through on-the-job training of young civil servants and professionals (learning by doing)</li> <li>Share lessons learned from project implementation in Afghanistan and other countries with similar experiences</li> <li>More focus on urban governance</li> <li>Ensure monitoring and oversight of institutional responsibilities</li> <li>Consult widely with senior afghan professionals in Kabul and provinces</li> <li>Professional bodies to provide commitment and engagement</li> <li>Fund a secretariat for the Task Force</li> </ul>
<b>LAND MANAGEMENT</b>				
<b>LIMITED ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE AND SECURE URBAN LAND</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>History of politicization of urban land development projects</li> <li>Unaffordable subsidies on land and servicing</li> <li>Lack of resources &amp; management systems to analyse, plan &amp; implement urban projects</li> <li>Inappropriate administrative procedures (bureaucracy)</li> <li>Corrupt distribution systems</li> <li>Profiteering on land sales</li> <li>Under-utilisation of extensive government land in the city</li> <li>High expectations of government-provided land</li> <li>Lack of updated data &amp; information</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Existing systems are prone to speculation and illicit dealings, whether by land developers or government officials</li> <li>Availability of serviced land is outstripping demand</li> <li>Access denied to those who most need land (including vulnerable returnees and IDPs)</li> <li>Inability of authorities to keep up with the urban growth (in terms of land, infrastructure and legal framework), leading to proliferation of informal settlements</li> <li>Informal urban settlers tend to build on areas that are otherwise undesirable and hazardous (steep slopes, flood areas etc), therefore very difficult to service</li> <li>Undefined urban sprawl eroding peripheral areas and valuable agricultural land</li> <li>Unaffordable environmental consequences (long-term impact) affecting health of people</li> <li>Risk of social unrest and political instability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Break with the past</li> <li>Appoint "Land Task Force" or "Land Reform Commission" to identify existing constraints, propose and oversee appropriate remedial measures</li> <li>Seek technical assistance in evaluating &amp; costing alternative development options</li> <li>Establish coordination body between technical ministries and MoJustice</li> <li>Explore alternative tenure arrangements (lessons learned from other countries)</li> <li>Define and defend public land</li> <li>Reviewing procedures</li> <li>Reform Land Law (MoJustice)</li> <li>Cabinet to engage with land laws</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improve donor and agencies coordination</li> <li>Advocate for pro-poor land strategies rather than a "free for all"</li> <li>Support the revision of planning and land management policy reform</li> </ul>

ISSUES	CAUSES	CONSEQUENCES	GOVERNMENT ACTION REQUIRED	SUPPORT ACTION NEEDED
INEFFECTIVE & OUTDATED LAND ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Lack of investment</li> <li>■ Outdated and ineffectual land/property registration system</li> <li>■ Responsibilities of the different organisations (5) carrying out formal land administration are overlapping and often confusing</li> <li>■ Weak linkages between the informal and formal billing systems</li> <li>■ Lack of training &amp; transparency</li> <li>■ Corrupt officials &amp; citizens</li> <li>■ Impunity of officials and influential afghans</li> <li>■ Powerlessness of professionals</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Manipulation of registrations for private gain</li> <li>■ Illegal property seizures / high percentage of government offices in the violation of people's property</li> <li>■ Vulnerability of urban dwellers</li> <li>■ Limited private investments, due to mistrust of official systems</li> <li>■ Property disputes due to insufficient/informal proof of ownership</li> <li>■ Uncontrolled land development outside the municipal boundaries</li> <li>■ Paralysis in the allocation of land for housing, open spaces, greenery, industrial uses, transport &amp; circulation, infrastructure)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Appoint independent oversight body to oversee new land registration</li> <li>■ Seek technical assistance</li> <li>■ Seek ways to register informal deeds</li> <li>■ Provide a modern, updated and secure system for deed registrations</li> <li>■ Strengthen system of land courts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Technical support</li> <li>■ Independent monitoring for infringements or violations of land titles and security of tenure</li> </ul>
INFRASTRUCTURE & SERVICES				
MAJOR INFRASTRUCTURE/ SERVICES DEFICIT + SHORTAGE OF SUPPLY IN: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Water</li> <li>■ Electricity</li> <li>■ Drainage</li> <li>■ Roads</li> <li>■ Schools etc</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Unaffordable subsidies on basic services and unwillingness to recover costs</li> <li>■ Lack of investment (expansion of networks and maintenance)</li> <li>■ Failure to anticipate demand due to urban growth</li> <li>■ Inability to stay-ahead of informal settlements</li> <li>■ High expectations of government-provided services</li> <li>■ Unsustainable investment (O&amp;M)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Very limited coverage of basic services, particularly for the urban poor and those living in "informal" settlements</li> <li>■ De-facto exploitative privatisation due to lack of coverage (e.g. water)</li> <li>■ Impact on health / social, economic &amp; physical vulnerability</li> <li>■ Widespread environmental crisis</li> <li>■ Resistance to official cost-recovery for services</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Negotiate service-delivery plans linked with the regularisation of established settlements</li> <li>■ Combine private and public supply</li> <li>■ Coordinate donor-investment through strategic planning</li> <li>■ Avoid excesses of politicisation of funding of infrastructure and services</li> <li>■ Define coverage targets &amp; technical standards</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Provide support to emergency provision of basic services in unserviced settlements</li> <li>■ Demand leadership and strategic planning from counterparts</li> <li>■ Invest in community-driven upgrading plans</li> <li>■ Prepare upgrading guidelines</li> </ul>
CALIBRATING THE SHIFT TOWARDS COST-RECOVERY AGAINST AFFORDABILITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Ill-conceived fast-track strategies of cost-recovery</li> <li>■ Lack of awareness of urban poverty</li> <li>■ Weak institutional capacity</li> <li>■ Unwillingness to perpetuate even modest subsidies</li> <li>■ Patchy enforcement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Reduction in coverage (i.e. water) due to lack of means to pay</li> <li>■ Wide areas of anarchic, largely un-metered use (e.g. electricity)</li> <li>■ Investments will be wasted</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Pressure on donors to phase cost-recovery strategies</li> <li>■ Raise public awareness of the imperative of cost-recovery</li> <li>■ Incorporate "operations &amp; maintenance" (O&amp;M) in project designs</li> <li>■ Clarify responsibilities with Ministry of Public Works</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Donors need to be more flexible about cost-recovery</li> <li>■ Share lessons learned from other cases of privatisation of basic services</li> <li>■ Provide technical training</li> </ul>
FINANCING URBAN DEVELOPMENT				
WIDENING THE RESOURCE-BASE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Institutional rivalries leading to tug of war over revenues</li> <li>■ Un-sustainability of current subsidies</li> <li>■ Lack of transparency &amp; accountability summed with institutional confusion and unclear devolution of responsibilities</li> <li>■ Seemingly poor bookkeeping</li> <li>■ Captured revenues (particularly in the provinces)</li> <li>■ Poorly paid civil servants</li> <li>■ Marginalisation of local authorities in the budget process (lack of incentives)</li> <li>■ Archaic tax rates and inflexible official collection and disbursement procedures</li> <li>■ Apparent inability to ear-mark resources to specific districts &amp; provinces</li> <li>■ Limited capacity within institutions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Limited revenue for official investment</li> <li>■ Excessively dependant on central budget and external funding</li> <li>■ Unsustainable and unaffordable investment in infrastructure extension and maintenance at the expenses of real prioritisation (mismatch between revenue and expenditure)</li> <li>■ Poor forecasting of budget and program for investment</li> <li>■ Opportunities for informal levies</li> <li>■ Excessive dependence on sale of land for revenue</li> <li>■ Public mistrust</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Comprehensive fiscal reform and monitoring of revenue generation</li> <li>■ Promote transparency and accountability to tax payers</li> <li>■ Reform policy, targets &amp; rates; define clear milestones and performance benchmarks</li> <li>■ Promote appropriate devolution of responsibilities to provinces; consider District level budget</li> <li>■ Develop financial incentives linked to local authorities performance</li> <li>■ Enhance regular consultation with urban dwellers about priorities and budget</li> <li>■ Stronger MoI / MoF oversight</li> <li>■ Call donors for support in legal issues</li> <li>■ Improve audit</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Support partnerships with Municipality &amp; others</li> <li>■ Provide technical support for fiscal reform for "double-entry bookkeeping"</li> <li>■ Incorporate the economic dimension in urban strategies</li> </ul>

Source: Ministry of Urban Development

## Annexe 7: Cadastral register form

Form 6س ب  
 Date of survey ( )  
 Page ( )

**Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan**  
 Afghan Geodesy & Cartography Head Office  
 Cadastral Survey Dept  
 Local Cadastral Survey Directorship  
 Land Tenure List

Province ( )  
 Sub-district, district ( )  
 Total Financial Tax ( )

Regards	Non-Agricultural Land		The degree of land from Cadastral point of view						Identification of the TAX provider		Identification of the owner			Dimension (Jeerib)* local unit	The number of the map	The number of the land
	Type	Dimension	Rain irrigated	Lowest	Lower	Middle	High	Garden	F/Name	Name	ID-NO	F/name	Name			

Arranged by:

implemented by:

Comments and signature of director

\* (Jeerib) is a local Afghan measuring unit for land that 1 jeerib land is = 20,000m<sup>2</sup>