



MULTI SCENARIO PLANNING IN NORTH NIGERIA

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1. Situation and need assessment

1.1. A complex socio economic and agro-ecological setting

The northeast region of Nigeria comprises several livelihood zones providing food to a large territory comprising several urban centres. They include the Lake Chad shores and open water (including large and fertile areas for dry season grazing and for water receding cultivation), a large Sahel belt with livestock and dry land cereal production (Sahel savana), a secondary more humid belt with cereal, cassava and sesame (Sudan savana) and one large much more productive area where many food and cash crops grow easily (Northern and southern Guinea savanas). Between these different zones and neighbouring countries, trade has always been very active and allowed the development of trading hubs such as Maiduguri.

In Northern Nigeria, an estimated 80–90 percent of the population depend on agriculture, fisheries and livestock for their livelihoods and food security.




Northeast Nigeria Livelihood Zones Map*

*Source: Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET)



It is important to ensure that all the plans are fully in line with existing crop calendars of Northern Nigeria States with the coming dry season period coming and the need to prepare early next year's rainy season agricultural season.



1.2. The conflict and its consequences

The history of the North of Nigeria is complex. The current confrontation is largely rooted in the pre colonial empires and kingdoms, the establishment of the colonial rules and the political post-colonial era. In an areas where ethnic groups had most of the time established social contracts to manage natural resources, especially around the Lake Chad and on cohabitation between pastoral groups and farming communities, demographic pressures, environmental evolution and local politics had a detrimental impact on the local socio-economic system.


Due to diverse political considerations, north east Nigeria has long been marginalized in terms of development policies. This has opened the door for a conflict targeting not only national administrative institutions and militaries, but also the civilian population at large. The regional strategy for territorial extension of the actors of violence led to a regional military and political response involving Nigeria and its three neighbours (Chad, Niger and Cameroon), with whom Nigeria shares not only borders, but resources, with the Lake Chad, and problems, with the impact of climate changes.

State	IDPs	Main state of origin	Number of camps	IDPs living in camps
Borno	1,600,000	Borno (99%)	49	16%
Adamawa	160,000	Adamawa (71%)	9	7%
Yobe	113,000	Borno (56%)	7	12%
Gombe	27,000	Borno (48%) Yobe (47%)	0	-
Bauchi*	48,000	Borno (45%)	0	-
Taraba*	13,000	Borno (73%)	12	4%

* Number of BH conflict affected IDPs. Both states host IDPs resulting from community clashes
Sources: IOM DTM X, OCHA

Population in needs

States	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5	Total Phase 3 à 5
Adamawa	1 697 300	1 868 200	591 200	38 000	-	629 200
Borno	675 700	1 672 400	2 219 000	886 200	58 500	3 163 700
Yobe	1 544 900	1 074 900	534 900	113 700	6 500	655 100
Total	3 917 900	4 615 500	3 345 100	1 037 900	65 000	4 448 000



1.3. Scenarios and their related consequences for Aid programming:

As the situation in the area is rather unpredictable, the strategy taken to design the Nine Month Action Plan aims at developing an agile and flexible operational framework. Thus a planning exercise has been undertaken, using the best practices in multi-scenario planning. It underlined the unpredictability of the situation (we cannot define what a “most probable scenario” could be), the multiplicity of possible course of events and facilitated the identification of several scenarios for the coming six months. In addition, as the situation in Nigeria in general and in its North Eastern states remains quite unpredictable, there is a need to develop an action plan allowing for agility and adaptability.

The scenarios described below will guide the decision making process on how, where and when to allocate which resources. Some of the features indicating which scenario in underway might be already observable, others might come in the limelight quite late in the process, requiring last minutes reorientations. The following table underlines the different parameters to take into account in the multi-scenario analysis and the possible technical choices to be made depending on the scenario.

Several key parameters have been identified that could contribute to evolution of the situation:


Levels	Parameters
Internal to the Northeast States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Activities of the BH Climatic patterns in the region (drought, floods) and their impact on food security Dynamics of population displacements Land access and land tenure issues Result of the military and securisation campaign, Behaviours of military and Civil Defence Forces/Vigilantes. Internal conflict in BH
Internal to Nigeria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Impact of oil price decreases and security evolution in the Delta region; Political development in the Biafra area; National food production (taking into account possible floods) and its impact on food prices Devaluation of Niara and impact of the exchange rate fluctuations
Regional (analytical level: the Lake Chad Basin Commission)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Management of borders; Events in neighbouring countries; Level of military cooperation between the LCBC countries Level of international military support they get
Global	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evolution of oil prices in the global market Evolution of cereal and food prices in the global market Global dynamics in the Jihadist sphere, especially the links with ISI, North Mali, and Somali’s Sheebabs, as well as the evolution in Libya.

The analysis led to the identification of a series of likely scenarios:

Scenarios	Description
The optimist scenario	The efforts to regain territory and to ensure security pay off and more areas become accessible. The Nigerian Army and Civil Defense Groups managed to avoid human right abuses. A certain level of confidence slowly gets established, with a progressive return of the populations in their areas of origin in Borno and Yobe, while large IDP populations who fled in Yobe and Adamawa is also returning. This will remain limited during the first part of the 2016-17 dry season and might accelerate from January to April 2017 as people don't want to miss another rainy season. UXO contamination turns out to be limited. The government manages to redeploy at list a certain level of civil administration. Many IDP might decide however to remain in the urban centers and to develop now livelihoods there. Fishing activities and trade resumes very actively, bringing wealth to a large segment of the population. Globally, agriculture activities and trade (allowing the area to benefit from the good production in the rest of the country) resume rather actively and significantly contribute to the improvement of the humanitarian situation.
The second best scenario	Stabilisation of large areas is ensured, but insecurity still remains an issue. Movements back and forth to the villages take place to large scale, but people are still hesitating to resettle in their areas of origin. The states of Adamawa, the extreme south of Borno and Yobé reach to some acceptable stabilization levels allowing activities and civilian government institutions get progressively redeployed in some of the areas they deserted. The Lac Chad area, the western part of Borno and some large forested areas south of Maiduguri area remain much more problematic. The real level of UXO contamination remain unknown but the perception of the issue affects the desire to go back to the village. There is no sign that the internal strife within BH is leading to a risk of resumption of large scale military or terrorist intervention. The level of trade from the Southern states of Nigeria is on the rise, facilitating price decrease and better access to food for the population.
The limited improvement scenario	The efforts of securing the areas pay off but not sufficiently to allow for a massive return to the areas of origin. In addition, oil prices evolution and the impact of the Niara devaluation is affecting seriously the State capacity to properly pay its officials and invest in basic services. Main routes and recaptured settlements are secures but not further into deep in the countryside. Markets starts to function in the main cities, but not in rural areas. Agriculture resumes in a 20 to 30 km around Maiduguri but not much further away. Internal strife with BH raises issues on the evolution of the strategy of the actors of violence. The real level of UXO contamination remain unknown but the perception of the issue affects the desire to go back to the village. The humanitarian system has to deal with many new displacements for the areas where stabilization efforts are taking place to cities and existing IDP concentrations. Cereal production does not resume at large scale while trade with the southern part of the country does not function sufficiently well to significantly reduce food prices.
The Degraded scenario	Internal fight in the BH leads to higher levels of military activities. Attacks resume regularly with suicide bombing and security incidents increase in number and gravity, which leads to the reduction of the aid presence in Maiduguri. As people have completely eroded their asset base, they start to move further south to Gombe, Adamawa and even further. Cities are further cut from their supply and trade routes, leading to new price increases which comes as an increment to the repercussion of the political and economic crisis affecting the whole country (oil price decrease, pipeline sabotage in the South, re-activation of the tensions in Biafra). The rainy season turns out to be below average, limiting even further the impact of the small scale agricultural activities undertaken in 2016. This, compounded with the result of difficult situation worldwide (cereal prices in the international market remains high), drastically limits the capacity of both the Government and aid agencies to supply sufficient food aid.
The Worse case scenario	In the internal strife within BH, the most radical group takes over, with a clear alliance with “global Jihad”. This leads to the resumption of large scale military operations and the multiplication of terrorist attacks and suicide bombing. The Nigerian Army is confronted to multiple fronts with the resumption of the crisis in Biafra and the surge of the insurrection in the Delta States. Multiple population displacements take place while humanitarian access gets limited to a minimum and eventually, the aid agencies in Maiduguri have to be evacuated. The International Task Force does not managed to get the situation under control and there is a significant spill over effect on neighbouring countries.

Scenarios	Actions to be implemented
The optimist scenario:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➔ Preparation and implementation of a dry season action plan based on urban and peri-urban agricultural, livestock and fishery production (including IGA in agro processing); ➔ Accelerated deployment of FAO and its partners in areas of return for need assessments and strong linkage with IOM to ensure proper monitoring of the returns; ➔ Development of a strategy with Nigerian partners (SEMA, NEMA, agricultural ministries, civil society) for agricultural rehabilitation in the newly accessible areas in agriculture, livestock and fishery; ➔ Active preparation for large scale intervention in agricultural input distribution, livestock and fishery interventions through all possible means in order to recapitalize farming households and facilitate their agricultural recovery; ➔ Feasibility study to be undertaken to identify means to facilitate the insertion of IDP which decide not to return to their areas of origin. Urban farming, agro-processing and other livelihood options have to be identified and tested. ➔ Increase the coordination with WFP and its partners to ensure that food is distributed in parallel to the seed distribution in order to avoid seed consumption; ➔ Strengthening of the food security and livelihood coordination mechanisms at the Federal, State and LGA levels.
The second best scenario:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➔ Preparation and implementation of a dry season action plan based on urban and peri-urban agricultural, livestock and fishery production; ➔ Accelerated deployment of FAO and its partners in areas of return for need assessments; and strong linkage with IOM to ensure proper monitoring of the returns; ➔ Development of a strategy with Nigerian partners (SEMA, NEMA, agricultural ministries, civil society) for the implementation of the programmes in both urban and peri-urban areas to facilitate the insertion of IDP which decide not to return to their areas of origin. Urban farming, agro-processing and other livelihood options have to be identified and tested. ➔ Develop a strategy for the areas still hard to reach, to ensure a certain availability of agro-inputs in these areas; ➔ Active preparation for large scale interventions in agricultural input distribution through all possible means in order to recapitalize farming households and facilitate their recovery. Priority is likely to be given to the LGA located in the southern parts of Borno, Yobe and to Adamawa States. ➔ Increase the coordination with WFP and its partners to ensure that food is distributed in parallel to the seed distribution in order to avoid seed consumption; ➔ Strengthening of food security coordination mechanisms at Federal, State and LGA levels.
The limited improvement scenario:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➔ Preparation and implementation of an enhanced dry season action plan based on urban and peri-urban agricultural, aquaculture and livestock production which can continue with adaptation during the rainy season; ➔ Development of a strategy with Nigerian partners (Municipal councils, SEMA, agricultural ministries, civil society) for the implementation of the programmes aiming at facilitating the flow of agro-inputs to areas hard to reach; ➔ Reinforce the collaboration with IOM for displacement tracking to ensure high level of readiness in case situation further evolves; ➔ Increase the coordination with WFP and its partners to ensure that food is distributed in parallel to the seed distribution in order to avoid seed consumption;
The Degraded scenario:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➔ Increase the availability of seeds and other agro-inputs in Maiduguri so IDP and host families can take on themselves to develop alternative forms of livelihood; ➔ Development of a strategy with Nigerian partners (Municipal councils, SEMA, agricultural ministries, civil society) for the implementation of programmes in the new areas of displacement (access to land and water to be negotiated rapidly) in order to stimulate the absorption capacity of the host communities and to help IDPs to rapidly develop some forms of livelihood);
Worse case scenario	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➔ FAO presence is reduced to a bare minimal as most of international staff and the State and LGA administration are evacuated ➔ Activities are redeployed to the accessible areas in the southern parts of the Northeast and where at least some basic access can be ensured.

The geographical implication of these scenarios are presented below:



Scenario « optimistic »

Scenario « second best »

Scenario « degradation »

● Dry season intervention



□ Area targeted by rainy season preparedness activities

