MCDA deployment in Natural disasters and health crises

Case study: Haiti (covering the 2010 earthquake and Hurricane Matthew in 2016)

François Grünewald

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Map of Haiti

Areas affected by Hurricane Matthew

Areas affected by the 2010 earthquake

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List of acronyms:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CDCS:</td>
<td>Centre de Crise et de Soutien (part of French MFA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMCoord:</td>
<td>Civil-Military Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DART:</td>
<td>Disaster Assessment and relief Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG ECHO:</td>
<td>European Directorate for Humanitarian aid and Civil Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD:</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAO:</td>
<td>US Government Accountability Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFTH:</td>
<td>joint Task Force Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCDA:</td>
<td>Military and Civil Defense Assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH:</td>
<td>Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation de Haïti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MITAN:</td>
<td>Matrix for Task Allocation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSF:</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO:</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA:</td>
<td>Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFDA:</td>
<td>Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECDEF:</td>
<td>Secretary of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDAC:</td>
<td>United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID:</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USG:</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In the politically strategic, emotionally sensitive and regularly devastated context of Haiti, the deployment of MCDA to respond to rapid-onset, high-impact disasters requires particular care. The absence of a national army with whom to sign a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the presence of a United Nations peacekeeping mission (the MINUSTAH) which is contested by a part of the Haitian population, and the presence of a large number of development and humanitarian NGOs, means that the use of foreign military assets will be under close scrutiny.

The present study analysed the deployment of US and French MCDA in two different contexts: the 2010 earthquake, which devastated part of Port-au-Prince and neighbouring areas, and Hurricane Matthew in 2016, which affected the Southern peninsula.

The USA and France have important historical and political relations with Haiti and have territories in close proximity to the island. This factor contributed significantly to their decision to use MCDA rapidly, despite the significant costs involved. The assets were thus deployed quickly. However, the time to decide on who shall pay (civilian budget or military budget) has induced some delays as this issue requires decision yob a taken at the highest political levels in the two countries.

The critical role of Military Air / Sea Craft: In the two disasters, the delivery of humanitarian aid in difficult terrain (devastated urban setting for the first one, mountainous areas and coastal bands remains heavily depend on logistical means to reach remote areas. Air and sea transport assets proved to be extremely useful in order to bring in and distribute aid, as well as to evacuate wounded and French and US citizens. When the early phases of an operation are affected by significant logistical constraints, the decision to withdraw these assets can have serious consequences, as happened after Hurricane Matthew.

The importance of health MCDA was less obvious due to the difficult relations with the national health system. Military hospitals, medical vessels and evacuations are extremely costly and not necessarily effective in mass casualty management contexts.

The use of MCDA to help to remove rubble and reopen roads was critical in the two events. Both the French and US military were actively involved in the case of the earthquake, but left the tasks to the MINUSTAH and private companies in the case of Hurricane Matthew.

Coordination: The most important issue with regard to the use of MCDA is coordination, both between the different agencies within a given government, and with the rest of the humanitarian sector.

The USG whole of government approach is definitely giving the upper hand to USAID and OFDA under a Presidential Order. During the earthquake response, the Disaster Assistance Response Team was outnumbered by the number of Military personnel involved in the Joint Task Force Haiti (JTFH) and by the important in-country presence of US Marines. There was an obvious effort to get the balance right during the response to hurricane Matthew, a process that started in the Philippines after hurricane Hayan and was further tested in Nepal as part of the response to the 2015 earthquake. In the French system, although the Ambassador has full authority, the power relations between the different entities involved in the response (the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Prime Minister’s office) make MCDA a complex issue, and this can be felt in the field.
The creation of the JTFH and its engagement with OCHA CIMCood, and more globally with the humanitarian system, was a key element in both responses. The creation of a mechanism to allocate MCDA on the basis of demand, through the MITAN process, was very useful. French MCDA coordination was conducted on a bilateral basis with Haitian institutions and with the dedicated European Civil Protection Mechanisms rather than with the rest of the humanitarian system.

Withdrawal of military forces and MCDA disengagement: This is a key part of operations and is often less well prepared than others, particularly in terms of preparing actors for the consequences of the withdrawal. This can take place late in the process, leaving an impression of “mission creep”, as was the case after the earthquake. It can also take place too early, leaving the aid system without key logistical muscles, before proper alternatives are in place, as seen in the response to hurricane Matthew.

Lessons learnt: The earthquake response provided both countries with numerous lessons regarding MCDA mobilisation, and the mistakes to avoid in the course of the engagement-disengagement process. In both countries, the use of non-military institutions for external evaluations to complement their “in-house After Action Reviews” was critical to the quality and impact of the overall lesson learning process.
1. BACKGROUND

1.1. The 2010 earthquake

The earthquake which struck Haiti on 12 January had a certain number of specific characteristics:

- **Its force:** Though only of magnitude 7 on the Richter scale, the location of the earthquake’s epicentre meant that it hit the urban settlements on the southern peninsula of the country with great force, from the centre of the bay of Gonaïves (Gressier, Léogane, Carrefour) to Jacmel on the other side of the mountain, areas with numerous known faultlines.

![Impact of the Haiti earthquake of 12 January 2010 (source Reliefweb.org)](image)

- **The timing of the earthquake** is also important. At 16.53 a lot of people were still at work or were just leaving and children were still at school. If the earthquake had taken place at night the number of victims would no doubt have been much higher. The earthquake took place when a number of important meetings were taking place at MINUSTAH headquarters, which explains why so many MINUSTAH top level staff were killed. Night fell very quickly afterwards, leaving the city agonising in the dark. When the earthquake struck it was the middle of the night in Europe, which created some mobilisation problems. Fortunately, most specialised units have 24-hour monitoring.

- **The number of victims and people affected by the disaster.** The number of people affected by the earthquake was very high. According to the Direction Nationale de la Protection Civile (DNPC), more than 217000 people were killed and over 300000 people were injured, with a very high number of serious and very serious cases. 1.23 million people were left homeless in Port-au-Prince and more than 500000 displaced people fled the capital. The disaster was as deadly as the 2004 tsunami, but concentrated in one area alone.

- **Port-au-Prince, the capital and strategic nerve centre of the country was severely damaged.** National command centres were completely destroyed. Even though the government itself did not lose any of its ministers, a large part of the Presidential palace was destroyed and the ministerial quarter was raised to the ground. Human loss in the administration was high. Many civil servants spent the first days trying to find their friends and families and tending to their wounds.
- **The total lack of anti-seismic strategies in the building codes**, whether public or private, meant that buildings which were not designed to resist earthquakes were severely damaged. Basic rules concerning wall ties and concrete reinforcement in areas affected by earthquakes were hardly ever respected. More flexible buildings like the old traditional buildings on stilts or many of the houses in the shanty towns, which are made of very light-weight materials, suffered much less than the buildings made of concrete.

1.1. Constraints involved in managing the crisis

**State institutions were seriously hit:** Haitians and many international actors felt that the Haitian government’s leadership was very poor. It was clearly very badly affected by the earthquake and the weakened state in which it found itself reduced its speed of reaction and limited its ability to take charge of operations. In interviews, many Haitians repeated the same phrase: “the President is in shock”. This state of shock, which lasted a long time in certain sectors, led to disaffection within the population and increased the suspicion felt by the population with regard to the authorities. The political repercussions of this situation were probably not sufficiently analysed.

**The MINUSTAH lost its leader, the UN Secretary General Special Representative and many of its managers:** The fact that top staff of the MINUSTAH were among the victims of the earthquake was disastrous. The UN Secretary-General quickly nominated a replacement for his missing Special Representative, which no doubt saved the reputation of the MINUSTAH. However, the MINUSTAH did not immediately cooperate with humanitarian actors. On the contrary, it felt that its political and security-based mandate did not allow it to do so, which created tension and difficulties, for example, with the UNDAC. Very quickly, the UN Security Council met on 18 January to listen to the Secretary-General who had just returned from a first visit to Haiti. On 19 January, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1908, increasing the authorised number of soldiers and police officers in the MINUSTAH by 2000 and 1500 respectively and, at the request of UNSG, it gave the MINUSTAH a more humanitarian role\(^1\). The authorised number of MINUSTAH personnel was thus increased to over 12500.

As is typical in this kind of disaster, a certain number of constraints (including rapid arrival of many agencies with all kinds of objectives, capacities and relief goods), which were not properly taken into account led to problems. As a consequence, aid was blocked and operations were not coordinated.

**Very rapidly, there were major communication problems:** As often happens in disaster contexts of this kind, telecommunications networks were affected within the region and between the region and the rest of the world. Communication problems were significant due to the fact that the nerve centre of the country, its capital, had been hit. Skype and internet nevertheless continued to work intermittently after the mobile phone system had stopped working. For example, the MINUSTAH quickly had to switch to its High Frequency network to contact its different offices in the country, because the cell phone network had broken down. During the first days, information only really circulated via CNN.

**Airport:** Though the airstrip was not affected by the earthquake and could continue to be used by large carriers, the airport was not easily accessible except for pilots capable of landing without the support of the control tower, which was no longer operational. Aircraft, volunteers and money rapidly arrived, leading to the typical phase when the airport is blocked. The 82\(^{nd}\) Airborne Division of the US army quickly took control of the airport,

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\(^1\) Letter sent by the UN Secretary-General to his Special Representative, Edmond Mullet on 22 January.
launching a large-scale military operation to evacuate thousands of US citizens and prepare the arrival of reinforcements.

Though the decisions made by the Americans regarding priorities irritated numerous observers, everyone in Haiti agreed that the fact that they took control of the airspace around Port-au-Prince was essential to limit disorder and prevent accidents which would have had disastrous repercussions. This localised, rapid and planned action allowed the aid to be regulated to some extent. But the fact that authorisation to land was much more restricted for non-American, civilian planes, carrying medical supplies, for example, clearly shows that the US army’s needs took priority over flights in connection with the emergency response.

**Logistical issues:** Though certain USAR teams, UN agencies and NGOs had what they needed in their “deployment kits” to be autonomous, this was not the case for everyone. Many teams had difficulty finding means of transport. Many cars had been destroyed or blocked in the city by the debris of collapsed buildings. For example, the roof of the garage of the French Embassy collapsed destroying the majority of the Embassy’s fleet of vehicles. Fuel was very hard to come by during the first days.

**Initial problems with the MINUSTAH:** The MINUSTAH did not make its logistics resources available to the humanitarian community for several days as it did not want to take responsibility for activities outside the DPKO mandate. It was not until 19 January and the new directions given by the Security Council for the following 6 months that the situation improved. It was only from that point that UNDAC was able to use MINUSTAH helicopters to carry out reconnaissance outside Port-au-Prince, on the coast towards Léogane and Gressier and on the other side of the mountains towards Jacmel.

**From engagement to withdrawal:** Many of the military assets were deployed rapidly as part of a dynamic response to a dramatic situation. The initial period was highly dynamic with new developments taking place every day.

**Timeline of the first two months of the response to the earthquake**
1.2. The 2016 Hurricane Matthew

Hurricane Matthew made landfall near Les Anglais (south-western Haiti) on 4 October at 11h00 UTC, as a very intense Category 4 Hurricane, with maximum sustained winds of 230 km/h. The Cyclone and its cyclone surge impacted a large coastal band covering the extremity of the Grand Sud Peninsula (Sud and Grand Anse departments) then moved across Haiti with decreasing impact from the South to the North. Winds had a devastating impact on human settlements and vegetation with large variations depending on the location, elevation and orientation of each site. However, all coastal areas were significantly affected by a strong, yet slow cyclone surge of up to 1.5 meters in height, leading to specific devastating impacts on coastal cities and communities.

While the southwest peninsula (‘Grand Sud’) – a mainly agricultural zone interspersed with some towns – was particularly affected, Gonâve Island, Artibonite, Nippes, and the northwest (in particular the northwest) were also hit. These were already amongst the poorest areas in the country, and had been badly affected by years of drought. The few NGOs working in these departments called for these areas not to be forgotten in the response, particularly as they were affected by heavy floods a few days after the passage of hurricane Matthew.
Several factors need to be taken into account with regard to the context in Haiti before hurricane Matthew hit the island. Already impoverished by years of underdevelopment, Haiti was suffering from a multiannual drought which had increased vulnerability. Attitudes to the humanitarian sector continued to be strongly influenced by the difficult experience of 2010 earthquake response. In addition, political instability, electoral challenges and an ongoing strike by the medical profession created a very complex political landscape.

It is important to note that the response to this crisis was heavily influenced by the “2010 syndrome” and the strong desire on the part of the government not to repeat many of the features of the earthquake response.

In addition, this disaster occurred at a time when presidential and general elections were being organized. Having already been postponed, these were due to take place while the Matthew response was still unfolding and there were concerns that aid would be manipulated for electoral gain. This contributed to increased political tension, potentially exacerbated around distribution processes and exasperated due to the slowness of the aid response.

The initial part of the response was relatively quick as efforts in DRR and close monitoring of the hurricane formation allowed the early mobilization of resources, including MCDA.

Timeline of the response to Hurricane Matthew
2. THE MCDA RESPONSE: COMPARING THE 2010 AND 2016 RESPONSES

2.1. General points

The response to the 2010 earthquake was marked by a large deployment of MCDA by a large number of countries including significant deployments of both Civil Protection teams and military contingents (US, France, Colombia, Venezuela, etc.). In addition, the MINUSTAH provided both MCDA and troops for the relief operations. The response was marked by:

- a very chaotic situation during the first few weeks due to the death of many high-ranking officials in the UN and the Haitian Government;
- an exaggerated preoccupation with security, especially by the US;
- priority clearly being given to repatriating French citizens to France, US citizens and Haitian green card holders to the US, Chinese deceased blue helmets to China, etc.;
- a strong emphasis on health (emergency surgery, medevac, etc.);
- the relatively dominant role of the US military in humanitarian decision making. The setting up of a JOTF to match humanitarian needs and military capacities had both positive consequences (facilitating processes) and negative consequences (overly dominated by the US military);
- “mission creep” due to the political situation;
- the tragic disempowerment of Haitian Institutions (Civil Protection and Police forces and line ministries).
The situation was very different in the response to Hurricane Matthew, with:

- strong leadership on the part of the National institutions (sometimes seen as over-ambitious in view of existing capacities);
- an important role played by the MINUSTAH with its helicopters and heavy duty equipment for road clearing;
- the leading role played by civilian institutions in the international response (OFDA for the Americans, etc.);
- the crucial role of air and sea transport systems;
- the very rapid disengagement of MCDAs (perhaps too rapid?);
- the most critical issues regarding Civil Military coordination had to do with security management (e.g. securing warehouses and providing escorts for aid convoys).

2.2. The French response to the 2010 earthquake and to hurricane Matthew

For both the earthquake and hurricane Matthew, France reacted rapidly in terms of Civil Protection deployment from both neighbouring French territories and from France. This was made possible by several factors:

- In both cases, the French Embassy reacted very quickly, immediately activating the Paris-based Centre de Crise, with its dual roles (helping expatriates in difficult situations linked to crises and providing humanitarian assistance) and organised the response on the spot;
- In both cases, the CDC very quickly sent an initial reconnaissance team into the area to activate its coordination mechanisms in Paris with the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence, and provided the Embassy with support (during the earthquake response, an experienced manager helped the ambassador with logistics and prioritisation, and junior manager helped with relations with NGOs, Clusters and United Nations agencies);
- The proximity of French units in the Antilles was a key advantage in the two disasters: the first international relief team to reach Haiti came from the French Antilles and arrived in the late afternoon of 13 January, following delays caused by the transferral of freight from a large carrier to medium carriers. The presence in the area of an airborne disaster operations detachment, DICA, was a significant asset. Similarly, Civil Security teams from the Antilles were among the first components of the European Civil Protection Mechanism to reach Haiti after hurricane Matthew. This was facilitated by the rapid mobilisation of the Ministry of the Interior and its crisis mechanism (COGIC) in Paris. For the earthquake, three Départements d’Intervention Catastrophes Aéromobiles (DICA) were deployed (see precise timeline described below): DICA Antilles, DICA Brignole, DICA Guyane and a command unit was rapidly installed in the French Embassy buildings. These Search and Rescue units were accompanied by medical staff who were responsible for administering first aid.

After the earthquake, MCDA played an important role with regard to the actions of the French Consulate. The transferal of French and European expatriates from Port-au-Prince to Fort de France, or even directly to Paris to receive medical or psychological assistance was made easier by sending consular staff to Haiti. It should be noted that all the Ministry of Defence’s flights from Port-au-Prince to Fort de France were made available to all French and European people who wanted to be repatriated.

The fact that French Civil Protection and French Army units had already conducted operations in Haiti in recent years (respectively, during the political turbulence of the 90’s and early 2000’s, and following the hurricanes which struck Gonaïves in 2008) made their work easier as they were familiar with the context and of course were able to speak in French.
After the earthquake, the search and rescue phase, which began on 13 January and which was carried out by 250 Civil Protection agents, ended officially on 22 January following the decision of the Haitian government. The last Civil Protection unit nevertheless stayed until the beginning of February to try to find the bodies of the last missing French citizens. The French Search and Rescue teams worked on around twenty sites and rescued 16 survivors from the rubble.

The MCDA deployed

In both disasters, different MCDA were deployed, with varying emphasis on health and WASH sectors:

MCDAs used to support the management of a health emergency: As frequently observed after earthquake, emergency health response was an essential component of the response to the 2010 earthquake, and less so of the response to hurricane Matthew. The *Elément de Sécurité Civile Rapide d’Intervention Médicale* (ESCRIM) was sent as early as 14 January (decision taken on the 13th), but only arrived in Haiti on the 16th due to the congestion at the airport. Its ability to function autonomously and deal with quite a wide range of post-disaster surgery problems was extremely important in the Haitian context. Meanwhile, 4 Health units were deployed (teams of 30 people each with a doctor, a nurse, a first-aid worker and some equipment) whose mission it was to provide support to Haitian hospitals (Canapé Vert, Sacré Cœur, Dikini). By 14 February, the ESCRIM had performed 203 major operations. In all, the medical staff deployed were able to carry out 17000 consultations, 2550 hospitalisations and 1300 surgical operations between 13 January and 22 February, the date of the ESCRIM’s withdrawal. After hurricane Matthew, medical equipment was supplies but more as a classical relief than as an MCDA.

WASH: In both responses, the WASH component was a key part of the MCDA mobilization. After the earthquake, two “Water treatment” units were deployed, the second of which arrived on 16 January on the same plane as the ESCRIM, to bring water to residents and French personnel at the Ambassador’s residence, which had been transformed into a displaced person’s camp (providing shelter to over 300 people, including families of survivors, journalists, humanitarians, etc.), to health structures and to the population. Two “water” units were also deployed, the second of which was from Guyana. In all, 60 people were deployed for water treatment activities. This contrasted with the hurricane Matthew response, when mainly classical MCDA were deployed under French Civil Security (Ministry of the Interior), with minimal involvement of the Ministry of Defense. The assets deployed were mainly heavy duty water treatment plants that were dispatched to Jeremie city.

Mobilization of air and sea MCDA: At the Ministry of Defence, the crisis unit of the CPCO was only activated on 14 January 2010, that is to say, two days after the crisis began and Ambassador Le Bret had raised the alarm. This allowed supplies brought by air from metropolitan France or from the *Forces Armées Antilles* (FAA) to be made available. The Siroco landing craft was also sent to carry out both medical and logistical functions. In addition to sending a team to set up a centre for the organisation and evacuation of expatriates sent by the CPCO, the military health service deployed a surgical team, a reinforced medical team and an aerial transportation medical team. This was part of the military mission based on the concept of supporting (to French personnel, in evacuating expatriate citizens and transporting freight) with a minimal footprint (only minimal staff and equipment were sent so as not to complicate a local situation that was already restrictive).

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2 Complete field hospital for rapid intervention in disaster contexts.
### Timeline of operations by different components of the French Armed Forces in the response to the earthquake

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Air lifts</th>
<th>Maritime assets</th>
<th>Action on the ground</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15/01/2010</td>
<td>2 turnarounds by CASA tactical military transport aircraft and a military A310 Airbus to bring approx. 200 staff (navy-firemen from Marseille, Mobile Accident Units from the Antilles, Civil Protection staff, and military police). On their return trips, these aircraft were available to transport French citizens to the Antilles.</td>
<td>The Francis Garnier landing ship, based in Fort de France, heads for Haiti. On board were around fifty soldiers from the armed forces in the Antilles, engineering equipment, transportation vehicles and humanitarian freight. The Siroco landing craft, which was off the coast of Senegal, received orders to head for Haiti the previous night. It has a medical unit (2 surgical blocks and 50 hospital beds), freight transportation capacity (2000 tonnes) and can carry 2000 passengers. It was also carrying 4 helicopters (2 Puma, 2 Gazelle).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>16/01/2010</td>
<td>CASA tactical military transport aircraft used principally to bring military police, freight, generators, supplies and water. On their return journeys, these aircraft were available to transport French citizens to the Antilles. A C130 tactical aircraft leaves France for the Antilles the next day, where it increased the air transportation capacity taking into account the difficulties of landing in Port-au-Prince.</td>
<td>The Francis Garnier landing ship travels to Guadeloupe during the night to complete its load of humanitarian freight and then continues on towards Haiti. It is carrying heavy equipment (3 excavators and 2 mini excavators) and transportation vehicles ‘maintenance trucks’, 2 P4s and a 4x4, a medical team and an ambulance, 700 tents and freight for the Red Cross</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>17/01/2010</td>
<td>Four turnarounds by CASA tactical military transport aircraft and two turnarounds by A310 Airbus, principally to transport Civil Protection staff and Mobile Accident Unit staff, military police, freight, generators, supplies and water.</td>
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<tr>
<td>18/01/2010</td>
<td>Arrival of a second C130, which had left France on 17 January to reinforce the tactical transport capacity. Two turnarounds by tactical transport aircraft with 6 tonnes of freight (food supplies and water).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>19/01/2010</td>
<td>Reinforcement of air transportation capacity with the addition of two Civil Protection Dash 8 aircraft (capacity of 50</td>
<td>After arriving on 19 January, the Francis Garnier remains anchored in Port-au-Prince, to provide support.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3 On trips from Haiti to Fort de France, these aircraft were available to transport French and European citizens to the Antilles.
passengers or 10 tonnes of freight). Five turnarounds by tactical transport aircraft of Dash 8 aircraft with freight, plus the return of the CASA, which arrives in Haiti. An Air Force A340 leaves France bringing firemen, military police, and army medical staff to work on the Siroco and freight. Three turnarounds of tactical transport and Dash 8 aircraft. The Puma helicopter provides the Embassy with support to evacuate isolated French citizens.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Supporting Units</th>
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<tr>
<td>20/01/2010</td>
<td>Five planned turnarounds by transport aircraft (CASA, C130 and Dash 8) with freight.</td>
<td>RSMA and 33rd RIMa units take position in Port-au-Prince, they coordinate their actions with international organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/01/2010</td>
<td>Five turnarounds by transport aircraft (CASA, C130 and Dash 8) bring around 50 people (Civil protection staff and soldiers) and 16 tonnes of freight and to repatriate more than 100 people to the Antilles. The Puma helicopter provides the Embassy with support to evacuate isolated French citizens in the region of Jacmel towards Port-au-Prince.</td>
<td>RSMA and 33rd RIMa units are in Port-au-Prince. The RSMA takes part in rubble clearing operations around the Embassy and on the Place du Champ de Mars. They take part in operations providing assistance to victims (putting tents up).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-24/01/2010</td>
<td>Three planned turnarounds by Dash 8 tactical transport aircraft. On trips from Haiti to Fort de France, these aircraft were available to transport French and European citizens to the Antilles. The Puma helicopter continues to support the Embassy evacuating isolated French citizens.</td>
<td>The army medical teams, who are due to work in the Siroco landing craft when it arrives, help in the civilian field hospital next to the Embassy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>25/01/2010</td>
<td>Seven planned turnarounds by tactical transport and Dash 8 aircraft.</td>
<td>The army medical teams, who had been helping in the civilian field hospital next to the Embassy, go to the Siroco to set its role 2 in motion (medical support).</td>
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2.3. The US Response to the 2010 Earthquake and hurricane Matthew

2.3.1. Legal basis of US MCDA mobilization

The involvement of US Military and the mobilization of US MCDA is guided by a series of key doctrinal and legal documents which have evolved progressively over the years, on the basis of regular evaluations and review by DOD internal auditors, by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO, the Congress and by dedicated thinks tanks). These documents include:

Joint Publication, JD 329, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (2014) This JD 329 is the most important document framing humanitarian aid, disaster relief, development and the possible use of military assets. It also presents the overall architecture of USG international aid and its inter-department, interagency coordination mechanisms, chains of command and control, financing and accountability systems.

DOD Support to Foreign Disaster Relief (Handbook for JTF Commanders and Below) GTA 90-01-003): This document describes in detail the decision, command and control mechanisms in place in the USG, down to the DoD and its repercussions for DoD staff and operations. It describes at length the architecture of international aid, including humanitarian actors and the most important principles and legal instruments. The Oslo Guidelines are described in detail.

DDD 5100.46; (Foreign disaster Relief / FDR) This document clearly indicates that the decision to deploy military assets is made by the President. It describes the chain of command from the White House to the Defence Secretary, to the Heads of agencies and to the Military Commanders. It clearly underlines the importance of a “whole of government” approach and interagency cooperation. It does not make reference to the Oslo Guidelines

Title 10 U.S. Code § 404 - Foreign disaster assistance; Title 10 Code 404 is the most precise document explaining the utilisation of DoD-managed ODHACA funds for different types of assistance: Humanitarian Aid/Disaster Relief, de-mining, the mobilization of transportation means, etc.

One of the key statement the summarizes many of the key evolutions in MCDA deployment is that “Accord to Presidential executive order, the Secretary of Defence (SECDEF) is required to consult with the Administrator of USAID in the Administrator capacity as President’s special Coordinator for Disaster Assistance”[^4].

Central to many of these documents is the required coordination between Force Commanders and Disaster Assistance Response Teams[^5] (DART)sent to the field by OFDA and the fact that in DR/HA, military have to work under civilian authorities (Ambassador, UASID director in the field or DART teal leader).

[^4]: US President Executive order 12966
[^5]: The DART consists of specialists trained in a variety of disaster relief skills and assists the USAID Mission or U.S. Embassy with management of the U.S. Government (USG) response to the disaster. The activities of a DART vary depending on the type, size, and complexity of the disaster to which the DART is deployed.
[^6]: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR304.html
2.3.2. The 2010 Haiti earthquake

Shortly after the earthquake, surviving Haitian government officials made an urgent request for U.S. assistance through the Embassy, where a High level U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) delegation was visiting at the time. President Barack Obama promised U.S. support, directing a whole-of-government response led by the U.S. Agency for International Development with significant support from the U.S. Department of Defence through SOUTHCOM.

Selected U.S. military elements began mobilizing immediately, and SOUTHCOM established Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-Haiti) to provide U.S. military support to the international response and relief effort through Operation Unified Response (OUR). U.S. Army forces constituted a principal component of JTF-Haiti.

Though the principle of using military means for a rapid response in natural disaster contexts where there are large-scale logistical requirements is no longer really questioned as such, any hidden political agendas and issues of perception still need to be analysed. Very quickly, in response to concerns about the risk of mounting insecurity, but also in the context of internal agendas linked to the presence of a large Haitian Diaspora in the United States, the US army deployed a large military presence, with more than 20000 Marines in the area within a few days. Soon afterwards, they were joined by troops from other countries in the region (Canada and countries from Central American and the Southern Cone) for whom there were also political stakes at play in relation to issues such as Latin-American-Caribbean solidarity or relations with Cuba.

Planning the response

Very rapidly, the design of the Operation United Response comprised different phases:

1- Phase 1: Initial response
2- Phase 2: Relief
3- Phase 3: Restoration
4- Phase 4: Stabilisation
5- Phase 5: Recovery

In these different phases, US military had different roles and MCDA were of crucial importance in the first three.

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6 For example, as soon as a clear reference is made to the Oslo Guidelines on the use of military assets in natural disaster response. These guidelines clarify the areas in which military and civil defense assets (MCDA) should be used, define the kind of relations armed forces should establish with the state receiving aid (in the form of a set agreement document) and establish rules with regard to the concept of “last resort”.

6 RTE for the IASC (Groupe URD-GPPI)
6 RTE for the IASC (Groupe URD-GPPI)
Coordinating the DoD response and MCDA deployment:

MCDA deployment and the overall DoD engagement had to coordinate with more than 21 US agencies, including FEMA, which would normally only operate on US territory under the Authority of Home Affairs. The coordination between Military and civil administrations was a key element of the response. The General in charge of JTFH, who was the number 2 in SOUTHCOM, made it clear quite early on that the role of DoD and MCDA was to enable USG engagement and effectively deliver FHA/DR. He received 5000 men rapidly and the US military presence reached 22,000. In order to coordinate with USG agencies, UN bodies, Haitian institutions and NGOs for the deployment of MCDA and overall coordination, the JFT was created on 14 January, 2 days after the earthquake. Initially involving only a few individuals, its staff grew to 78 by 19 January and 355 by 25 January. Yet, as the DART stretched thin, the JTFH had to use a lot of energy coordinating with the Haitians, the UN and NGOs. The number of staff working for the DART reached 38, in addition to the more than 500 search and rescue specialists looking for survivors.

Air and sea MCDA

Very rapidly, in order to secure the only airport of a decent size in Haiti, where the air control tower had been badly damaged by the tremor, the Joint Force Commander requested that airlifts and support to air movement be made a priority. The US Transportation Command (USTC) supported the DoD to establish a standing “DoD Transportation Movement Priority System” to deal with the complexity of moving simultaneously the sheer of the military support to the deployed troops (mainly Marines) sent for securing the situation and to the relief air cargo on its way. Securing the airspace during the first weeks was seen by the whole international community in Haiti as a clear and positive contribution to the Haiti relief operation by the US Military. Using MCDA for sea lifts and air lifts was also a key aspect of the response. This approach is a heritage of the concept of the “sea borne relief operation” dear to the heart of Colonel Robert R. Blackman who led Operation United Assistance from Utapao Air Base (in Thailand) after the 2004 tsunami. In the case of the Haiti earthquake, both means of transportation were used, although for different purposes. Heavy and light aircraft were mobilized as well as Navy ships with a significant medical capacity. Coordinating the use of air transport was a central task for the JTFH, both as a service to DART and as a support to the general humanitarian response. The first prototype of the Mission Tasking Matrix (MITAM) was designed for this purpose.

The health response involved both the mobilisation of Navy and other USG vessels with hospitals and operating capacities, and the mobilisation of air transport to evacuate victims to US soil and hospitals in Florida.

Heavy lifting equipment: MCDA to ensure rubble removal and physical access:

As Port-au-Prince is a densely-populated city with areas where the movement of vehicles was already highly problematic before the earthquake, rubble removal and road clearing were two very important tasks over the first few weeks, and this lasted far longer than it should have done. During the first few weeks, the capacity of US Military engineers and their heavy duty equipment was critical, but rapidly the use of local building companies was much more efficient. However, as the equipment was available having been used to set up military bases, it was the right decision to use it to remove rubble and improve the accessibility of areas within the city.
2.3.3. Hurricane Matthew

In the immediate aftermath of the hurricane, the only means of access was by air. Aircraft and helicopters came from MINUSTAH and the US military (which brought in 18 helicopters in different waves -12 were in permanence in Haiti), while the French Embassy, WFP, and NGOs such as MSF, Oxfam, and Samaritan’s Purse were able to hire aircraft and helicopters.

Government representatives, members of the diplomatic corps, UNDAC, and other humanitarian staff all either wanted to see the extent of the damage or needed to travel to the affected areas. The question of how to strike the right balance between the use of aerial means for VIP visits or to transport badly needed relief items was raised in several interviews in the course of the study. During the first weeks, most flights were for aerial assessments, staff transport and, to a lesser extent, for moving supplies from stocks in Port-au-Prince to warehouses in Les Cayes and Jeremie. In two weeks, the U.S. military helicopters managed to deliver more than 275 metric tons (MT). By comparison, the WFP helicopters that took over after the U.S. military helicopters left had only transported 118 MT by 20 November. Yet, in the first week, much of the commodities were delivered by air to Les Cayes and Jeremie but these two areas ultimately opened up to road transport. This created a perception that relief operation did no longer require air support. More remote locations were more difficult to get to, requiring Landing Zone reconnaissance and had far less offloading capacity at sites. As a result, fewer requests were made for US Military airlift support. This contributed to the decision to demobilize these assets. The two heavy-duty US army helicopters proved extremely useful, some actors concluded that they were withdrawn too quickly. The small helicopters rented by WFP after the withdrawal of the army helicopters could only transport very small loads, and were thus of limited effectiveness and efficiency. Yet they were still not fully utilized due to limited requests in the weeks following US Military aircraft demobilization.

As Haiti is an island and the impact of hurricane Matthew mainly affected the southwestern peninsula, naval transportation in support of the relief effort rapidly became a key factor. The Netherlands and Colombia sent useful navy ships, and initial operations were coordinated by the Logistics Working Group. On one occasion, the Dutch ship had to turn back to sea in a hurry, causing damage to the jetty, when a huge crowd gathered on the shore in Jeremie, creating a security threat. Still, it seems that these ships were underused, and the initial assets withdrawn too quickly, as it became necessary to mobilise small barges and other boats to reach affected coastal communities. WFP, in particular, started to explore maritime options from day 1 after the event and was actively developing naval transportation in an effort to both supply hard-to-reach locations and to increase capacity to deliver goods to the main harbours. The table above shows the relative importance of maritime means within the overall logistical set up.

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*See the table, extracted from Logistic Cluster Overview, 20/11/2016*
3. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE TWO CRISIS

3.1. Decision-making,

The involvement of the MCDA was extremely political for the two responses, although for very different reasons.

The 2010 earthquake: The presence of a high level delegation from US Military HQ at the time of the earthquake and the need to improve the image of American GIs contributed to rapid mobilisation and decision-making, without a full assessment being carried out. Similarly, the large number of French citizens in Haiti and the strong Haitian diaspora in France contributed to the decision to deploy forces. The dynamism of the Ambassador and the presence of French military and Civil Protection forces in the Caribbean (Martinique and Guadeloupe) led to a very fast reaction with the first team arriving on the ground on the day that the earthquake took place. The command structure supporting the Ambassador was strengthened quite quickly by separating decision-making and operational levels: the strategic level with the DoS and the tactical level with COS. Reinforcements continued to arrive from 18 January in the form of a logistics unit and equipment to help to unload supplies at the airport. Finally, a “natural risks” unit arrived on 21 January when the Haitian authorities called off the “Search and Rescue” phase.

Hurricane Matthew: The situation was rather different for this response as the disaster was anticipated as the hurricane trajectory had been monitored by NOAA radars and there had been warnings on all the local TV channels. Many decisions regarding the deployment and early mobilization of MCDA had already been made before the hurricane hit Haiti. One of the criterions of the decision was clearly that it would be possible to deploy Military and MCDA with a light footprint and ensure that all the procedures developed since the earthquake would be applied. For the DoD, this included showing that they were working under civilian leadership (in this case OFDA/DART). The French embassy was on standby and had alerted the CDCS in Paris.

3.2. Needs assessment

Assessments were very random during the initial phase of the earthquake response and key MCDA were mobilized arbitrarily (though largely based on common sense) for:

- Health (with the land-based team, military ships and evacuation processes to Miami or Guadeloupe);
- Rubble removal (in order to allow traffic to circulate in the city);
- Food distribution, including land drops, which proved to be very counterproductive;
- Infrastructure assessment by military engineers.

For the US Military (Marines), security was also a key component of their deployment, but this was largely based on an inaccurate assessment of the security situation and insecurity triggers.
Again, the situation after hurricane Matthew was very different. A very strong DART was mobilized before the event and started to compile information very rapidly. Different types of aerial surveys were carried out. Military assets (MINUSTAH and US helicopters in particular) played an important part in these assessments and helped to visualize the gravity of the situation in the distant departments of “le Grand Sud”. The French Embassy only received a small number of reinforcements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Crisis Centre to deal with the crisis.

### 3.3. Civilian capability gap analysis

After the Haiti earthquake, national and local capacities were very affected and the aid system, including its military component, assumed that all Haitian institutions were down, which turned out to be only partially true. In reaction to this, during the response to hurricane Matthew, the government clearly said that they were in charge, and despite their limited resources, they were determined that the international community would not repeat the mistakes it had made in 2010.

Despite their central role in the response in a Mass Case Management (MCM) situation, the deployment of Health assets was regularly called into question. The deployment of hospital ships was not efficient as they are very costly. Western hospital vessels and military emergency hospitals are designed to treat individual cases of people wounded in war and are not aimed at mass casualty situations. Western military doctors and surgeons are not trained to work in these contexts. In fact, most of the time, the decision to deploy health MCDAs is made by political leaders for visibility purposes.

During the 2010 earthquake, and despite the efforts of the OCHA CIMCoord team, there was very little knowledge or use of the Oslo Guidelines. In fact, the decision to use MCDAs and their rapid deployment was more of a “first resort” than a “last resort”.

The situation was radically different for hurricane Matthew. The Haitian Civil Protection department was clearly in charge, under the Ministry of the Interior. The efforts that have been made in terms of DRR over the years finally paid off to an extent. However, during the immediate post-hurricane phase, there was not a great deal of information about local capacities as communications were down. As the cholera situation was also becoming a serious concern in these areas, water treatment MCDAs were deployed in order to pre-empt any further deterioration of the WASH/health situation.

### 3.4. On-site coordination

France’s direct involvement in UNDAC was weak in both disasters despite the fact that Haiti is a French-speaking country. And yet, after the earthquake, there was a significant French contingent within the international USAR teams. There are two basic reasons for this:

**The political decision to choose Europe.** Though France was more involved in the European Civil Protection system, the fact that the French teams did not know about UNDAC and its different tools (how the Virtual OSOCC functioned and knowledge about the INSARAG standards) was harmful, even with a good level of European coordination. Certain other Member States (Scandinavian countries, Great Britain) are very involved in UNDAC, which is the leader in this area.

**The choice of priorities.** The leadership of the French Civil Protection units was only able to devote time and human resources to multilateral coordination mechanisms when it had received reinforcements.
The issue of military to military coordination and Civil-Military relations in humanitarian action once again came to the fore due to the massive deployment of the US army in the days following the earthquake. The other forces present (France, Spain, Canada, Latin-American countries, etc.) remained much more discreet and focused on temporary logistical support and providing medical assistance on ships (including a Spanish aircraft carrier which arrived at the end of January). Counting the 10,000 men of the MINUSTAH, more than 30,000 soldiers were involved in these operations. The Haitian state itself does not have any armed forces, so the issue of SOFA and nationally-led military coordination did not really apply, but external Armed Forces still needed a formal invitation by the Haitian government.

During the acute emergency phase and the gradual implementation of a classic humanitarian response, several questions were raised:

- As there is no national army, how were armies arriving to take part in the post-earthquake response supposed to collaborate with the national civil authorities?;
- How were the different armed forces supposed to collaborate with the MINUSTAH’s military component?
- And finally, how were they supposed to organise themselves in relation to the civilian humanitarian machine (Haitian institutions, UN humanitarian agencies, NGOs, the Red Cross movement, etc.)?

To make the situation even more complicated, as there is no national army in Haiti, one of the key “uniformed elements” in the country is the National Police.

**The complexity of coordination with Police forces**

Collaboration between the humanitarian sector and the Police component of the MINUSTAH, set up by UNPol, was easier to manage due to the greater collaboration between UNPol and the Haitian police. The initial mandate, which essentially concerned the professionalization of the Haitian National Police Force and the training of its officers, was re-orientated after the earthquake. The police component of the Mission has been mainly responsible for the security of humanitarian convoys and organises patrols around and within the 425 IDP camps. In addition, UNPol and the Haitian police have increased the number of patrols in areas where there are banks or money transfer institutions as these are the basis of many Haitians’ resilience, allowing them to receive money from the Diaspora. UNPol has also carried out patrols in sensitive areas (Cité Soleil, near the airport) where several UN agencies and NGOs carrying out operations have warehouses. Before the earthquake, France contributed to UNPol activities in Haiti with 61 police officers and gendarmes and 2 military officers in the MINUSTAH. France argued strongly in favour of strengthening the European engagement within the MINUSTAH for this essential peacekeeping mission. The European detachment, which deployed in February 2010, included 73 French gendarmes, which will bring the total number of French police officers and military police deployed to 130.

**Difficult coordination between Civil Protection units and Armed Forces and their MCDA:**

In the two disasters, there were difficulties in coordinating the very rapid action of Civil Protection forces or the DART and the procedures of the Ministries of Defence, in particular due to the need to ensure proper funding for the deployment of MCDA. During the earthquake response, this had a significant effect on relations between the French Civil Protection leadership and the Armed Forces based in the Antilles (FAA): the level of misunderstanding appears to have been difficult to deal with, being no doubt essentially
linked to personality clashes made worse by institutional competition. Thus, despite the fact that two CPCO officers were sent as reinforcements to Port-au-Prince after the earthquake, coordination problems affected operations and confidence between actors (the impossibility for the Civil Protection units to use the FAA ambulance for Medevacs, etc.). And yet, the existence of a military advisor to the Head of relief operations and the fact that a large number of Civil Protection staff have a military background means that difficulties of this kind should be avoided. The ability of this kind of tension to create problems both internally and operationally should not be under-estimated.

The involvement of the US armed forces via the Joint Task Force and other US Army mechanisms was massive in terms of deployment and involvement in humanitarian operations, to such an extent that it created a certain amount of unease among NGOs. The US army signed an agreement with the MINUSTAH and took part more and more in humanitarian action as an “exit strategy” for security actions. This took place via several mechanisms, the most important of these being the Coordination Support Committee (CSC) in terms of strategy and the changing of the Joint Operations Center (JOC), under OCHA, into the Joint Operations and Tasking Center (JOTC) in order to offer humanitarian agencies logistical and security services. The use of the JOTC has been discussed in OCHA’s Civil-military unit. The French army appears to have been totally absent from these discussions even when a CIMIC officer was present. The perception within French CIMIC circles seems to have remained close to what was known, not long ago, as ACM (civilian actions at the service of the army) and they appear not to have got used to the idea of coordination in contexts where bilateral/multilateral coordination can be essential.

(IASC RTE report, Groupe URD/GPPI, April 2010)
In the case of the US operation, the main task of the Commander is to establish humanitarian dialogue and coordination with USAID/OFDA and the DART. There has been significant improvement in this area between the 2010 earthquake response, when the military took over the response, and the hurricane Matthew response, when OFDA/USAID took the lead. The establishment of the JTOC and the development of the MITAM represent significant areas of improvement as they allow the proper deployment of MCDA when properly staffed with empowered humanitarian staff (DART for the US, DFID CHASE OT and Civ-Mil coordinators for UNOCHA). It remains to be seen how well they coordinate with the OSOCC and UNDAC teams.

3.5. **Drawdown of assets**

The drawdown of assets depends on the intelligence and common sense of the Commanders, or the extent to which the assets are needed for another crisis. For the Haiti earthquake, no real drawdown plan became effective until March 2010, although key health MCDA, including the Military hospital boat, were withdrawn relatively rapidly. The transition and redeployment were not clearly planned at the outset of the response. The cost of keeping this equipment deployed in a HumanitarianAssistance/Disaster Relieff operation was high and there was growing pressure on the Force Commander to bring back “boys and toys”.

France’s MCDA’s were taken back relatively rapidly as well. The ESCRIM military hospital was taken back to France three weeks after the earthquake, leaving quite a few people unattended for post operation care despite significant attempts to transfer them to NGOs or Haitian hospitals.

The withdrawal of US Forces, including MCDA’s, took much longer as the troops were involved in many different types of activities ranging from “security missions” to logistics (the establishment of Camp Corail).

(IASC RTE report, Groupe URD/GPPI)
In the response to hurricane Matthew, the situation turned out to be quite different. Other than road transport, air transport provided a critical service to the relief effort. In the immediate aftermath of the hurricane, the only way to gain access to victims and to bring assistance to remote areas was by air. These assets were withdrawn fast, while they would have been very useful for a few more weeks.

As Haiti is an island and the impact of hurricane Matthew mainly affected the south-western peninsula, sea transport rapidly became a key factor of the relief effort, but neither the French nor the Americans deployed any significant naval assets, although other nations did\(^\text{10}\).

### 3.6. Evaluations and lessons learnt exercises

**France**

After the 2005 tsunami, a civilian-led evaluation was carried out, with the authorisation to talk to the Military, but not to evaluate their response. After the Haiti 2010 earthquake, the same civilian team was asked by the Ministry of Defence’s Department of Strategic Affairs to evaluate the military response. However, this was not repeated for subsequent responses. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Defence’s RETEX team regularly carries out specific lessons learnt exercises. In addition, due to the importance of the crisis in the media and public opinion, two dedicated missions were send to the field: one by the French Parliament and one by the Cour des Comptes (Court of National Audits).

The RTE of the French intervention in Haiti underlined several points:

- The weak engagement of the French Civil Protection and French Military forces in existing coordination mechanisms (OSOC, CIM Coord, JOTF). There are two reasons for this: France coordinates its deployment of Civil Protection assets with the European EERC, and in Haiti the French Military coordinates with MINUSTAH.
- The French military did not engage with the population in the same way as the US military. The French patrols were lighter in terms of visibility, and were not organised as displays of force.
- The mobilisation of air and sea assets to support operations was significant, but relatively light compared to the US.

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\(^{10}\) The Netherlands and Colombia sent Navy ships, which were useful and initial operations were coordinated by the Logistics Working Group. Reportedly, the Dutch marine ship caused major damage to the port of Jeremie when it had to leave in haste due to increased insecurity. Generally, the RTE team believes that that these ships may have been withdrawn too quickly as it became necessary to mobilise small barges and other boats to reach affected coastal communities.
Several missions, evaluations and reviews took place after the earthquake, including by US government Accountability Office (GAO), by the US army itself and by different think tanks. A series of key lessons were learnt after the 2010 earthquake

- U.S. Department of Defense policy on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief needs to be updated.
- The Joint Task Force-Haiti Commander's informal approach to determining initial requirements and his liberal use of oral orders had people and resources assigned quickly, and U.S. military leaders had significant latitude to exercise initiative in directing response efforts.
- U.S. Southern Command lacked well-established plans for such a mission. The informal, top-down process that pushed resources to the effort quickly generated inefficiencies that might have impaired the operation's effectiveness, but a lack of established metrics meant that performance could not be measured.
- Specific circumstances may have worked to the advantage of the Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-Haiti): U.S. Southern Command military deputy commander, LTG P. K. Keen, was in Haiti and at the U.S. ambassador's residence when the earthquake struck; the ambassador's residence withstood the earthquake, and the communication equipment there remained functional; General Keen was a longtime colleague of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti commander; the Global Response Force was available for rapid deployment to JTF-Haiti; the JTF-Haiti commander had a positive professional relationship with the XVIII Airborne Corps commander; and many service members assigned to JTF-Haiti had a high level of experience in civil affairs and other aspects of working with local citizens.

For Hurricane Matthew and on the basis of the lessons learnt from the 2010 earthquake, the US army tried to have the smallest possible “footprint”, to deploy only “mission critical MCDA” -mainly air vectors- and to depart as soon as possible. This extremely short deployment (2 weeks only) of a relatively small set of assets (8 helicopters) was seen as relatively unbalanced in view of the large DART deployed (more than 60 people) and the fact that it was extremely difficult to reach the most affected areas. The political drive “not to stay too long” did not match the “needs base”. It has been reported that the US response to typhoon Hayan in the Philippines was among the first where all the lessons learnt from Haiti were implemented by the US, with stronger engagement in the Command and control chain by DART.

It seems that in the recent response to hurricane Matthew in Haiti the size of the DART team (more than 50 people) was to ensure that the civilian contingent counterbalanced the Military logistics contingent.
ANNEX : CONSULTED LITERATURE


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Groupe URD (2005): Haiti, autopsie d’une gestion de crise, Proceedings of a conference organised by Groupe URD and Paris XII University, Paris


On Hurricane Matthew

UNITED NATIONS (2016), New UN system approach on cholera in Haiti, New York, United Nations, 1 p.
The INSPIRE Consortium supports DG ECHO in developing policies through research, workshop facilitation and the dissemination of results.

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