The Future of Development Cooperation: a post-ODA World?

With just five years to go before the 2030 target date, we already know that none of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will be met. The current situation is that fewer than 20% of SDG targets are likely to be met at the global level; there is limited or marginal progress on around half of them; and 18% are regressing.[1] At this rate, the SDGs as a whole will remain unachievable, even by 2050.[2] The SDG financing gap increased by 60% to 3.8 billion euros ($ US 4 billion) in 2022, and resources are inadequate to meet growing needs.[3] The human consequences speak for themselves. On the first SDG alone, an estimated 165 million people fell into poverty between 2020 and 2023.[4] Official projections indicate that nearly 575 million people – more than half of them women – will still be living in extreme poverty in 2030.[5]

Nonetheless, the direct costs of eradicating extreme poverty (income below a threshold of $US 2.15 a day) and moderate poverty (income below a threshold of $US 3.65 a day) are not prohibitive: 63.7 billion euros ($US 67 billion)and 307 billion euros ($US 324 billion)  respectively, that is 0.12% and 0.56 % of the GNI of the rich countries.[6] These figures suggest that, globally, the funds required to eradicate extreme poverty (and perhaps as much as 60% of moderate poverty) are already available. If, for example, the countries belonging to the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) met their commitment to provide 0.7% of GNI in Official Development Assistance (ODA), resources would total some 393.1 billion euros ($US 424.32 billion) for 2023: more than the cost of eradicating moderate poverty worldwide.[7]

2023, however, was the year when ODA ‘reached its peak’, a record total of 206.6 billion euros ($US 223.3 billion).[8] This ‘peak aid’ signals a downward trend in total ODA in the coming years. It is impossible at this stage to predict how far ODA will fall. We know that the figures for 2024 show a 9% decrease compared with the previous year. Eight major ODA donors have already announced cuts to their ODA budgets totalling $US 17.2 billion over the next five years (i.e., Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the EU.)[9] This was well before Donald Trump’s return to power and the dismantling of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) at the beginning of 2025. Preliminary estimates suggest that ODA will decline by a further 9 – 17% in 2025.[10]

The consequences for the most vulnerable groups of people daily come to light. In June 2025, OCHA revised its projected humanitarian aid disbursements downwards, from the $US 44 billion required for 2025 to $US 29 billion, entailing the ‘hyper-prioritisation’ of aid for 114 million people.[11] It is estimated that the United States’ ODA accounted for 41.8% of global humanitarian assistance worldwide, in 2024 alone.[12] The steep cut-back in US ODA programmes could lead to more than 14 million additional deaths by 2030, mainly impacting the most vulnerable, including one-third of children under five.[13]

A post-ODA world?

This macro-trend illustrates what some experts refer to as a ‘post-ODA world’. They anticipate a scenario where ODA no longer serves as the primary framework for development cooperation, making way for other types of international financial flow, such as climate finance, concessional financing by multilateral development banks, philanthropy and South-South and Triangular cooperation. This trend moves us further away from calls to initiate negotiations for a UN convention on international development cooperation as a mechanism for reparations.[14] While the principles of international solidarity fuel this latter concept, the current trend reinforces the financialisation of ODA (based on securing a return on investment).

The ‘post-ODA world’ is characterised by a crisis of purpose which has led to a situation where four rationales  – poverty reduction, humanitarian aid, refugee support and financing of global public goods – are pulling the system in different directions.

The ‘post-ODA world’ is characterised by a crisis of purpose which has led to a situation where four rationales  – poverty reduction, humanitarian aid, refugee support and financing of global public goods – are pulling the system in different directions.[15] The ‘post-ODA world’ evokes a scenario in which rich countries reject their duty to support countries still struggling with fundamental development challenges (that is, most of the world) and abandon their historical commitments to meet  global goals (with 0.7% of GNI allocated to ODA being the flagship goal). In other words, a world where they deny their responsibility for persistent poverty and hunger, multiple humanitarian vulnerabilities, growing inequalities within and between countries, accelerating man-made climate change, lack of access to basic services by the most vulnerable groups, and the inability to guarantee human rights for everyone, everywhere.

As a product of the ‘old world’, the galaxy of international aid actors – including NGOs – now face an almost existential question: should they reluctantly go along with the transformations needed in the sector, or should they give up and acknowledge the demise of the system from which they emerged? In the absence of an answer, this article aims to offer some food for thought.

The double imperative: decolonial and environmental

The crisis facing development cooperation actors is dramatic, to say the least, both in its scope and in the speed with which it has developed. It is clear, however, that this crisis is simply an acceleration of a fundamental trend in the sector, which we call the double imperative: decolonial and environmental.[16] For the past decade or so, international aid organisations, in particular Western humanitarian aid NGOs, have faced two constraints within the system as it was established.

On the one hand, since 2016, they have been faced with the aid localisation agenda, the subtext of which challenges the position and role of Western NGOs in a world which is ‘de-westernising’.[17] This agenda includes calls to decolonise the international aid sector in general, and NGOs in particular.[18] As aid intermediaries that have become relatively hegemonic, especially in terms of access to financing, they are confronted with a central issue: the overt or implicit legacies of colonialism, and associated forms of coloniality in their operation and management.[19]

This first decolonial imperative, which challenges their organisational model is coupled with an environmental imperative. Western NGOs, which are the product of countries classified by the OECD as industrialised, are required to reduce their carbon or ‘environmental’ footprint. While the issue is these days treated with considerable seriousness, by both donors and NGOs themselves,[20] the acceleration of man-made climate change calls into question both the relevance and the sustainability of the management models used by NGOs and other development actors.

These two imperatives combined have a common focus on questioning the underlying and underlying power dynamics and persistent asymmetries in the ODA architecture – particularly between Western countries and others – and the organisations that operate within it. Raising these questions – and given the relative difficulty these actors have in transforming themselves – leads to this double imperative becoming a lever for criticism – sometimes exploited to justify authoritarian practices[21] – to question the usefulness of development cooperation as it has been deployed since it emerged in the 1960s.

The current crisis in the aid sector thus appears, at least as we see it, not so much a new development but rather the culmination of a long history of challenges to development cooperation models. As such, it paves the way for a new order of international cooperation. What might it look like, in outline?

Possible future directions

According to an analysis of current perspectives on possible futures for ODA, two interpretive schools of thought emerge: ‘improvers’ and ‘re-imaginers’.

According to an analysis of current perspectives on possible futures for ODA, two interpretive schools of thought emerge: ‘improvers’ and ‘re-imaginers’.[22]

Improvers see the current period, characterised by budget cuts and political shifts, mainly as a crisis that must be overcome. Their concerns are maintaining funding and adapting the existing system, promoting incremental solutions to improve efficiency, transparency, and inclusiveness. The introduction of new actors (foundations, investors, local resources, South-South cooperation) aims to fill the gaps but remains insufficient to match the scale and stability of ODA.[23] They advocate for stronger multilateralism and practical reforms to improve coordination among actors, increase flexible financing, enhance transparency and mutual accountability, and better represent ‘beneficiaries’ voices, without necessarily aiming to fundamentally change the system.[24]

Re-imaginers see the current situation as an opportunity to break with ODA’s architecture, which they consider structurally rooted in models of dependency and hierarchy inherited from colonialism. They advocate for sovereignty, decolonisation, and the emergence of models based on self-determination, local knowledge, and the redistribution of power.[25] They call for the creation of frameworks based on trust, mutuality, and dignity. In stark contrast to reformist discourse, they aim to build an alternative development ecosystem based on local values.[26] Overall, these experts raise significant doubts about new private actors, whom they suspect of perpetuating the international aid industry rather than promoting the autonomy of recipient countries. Supported mainly by analysts and practitioners from the Global South, these approaches favour post-ODA alternatives.

Some points for NGOs to take into consideration

The schools of thought described above agree that the status quo is unsustainable and that the current system is failing to meet global challenges. They diverge on how to proceed: incremental change or radical renewal grounded in sovereignty. The difference between the two also reflects geographical differences (Global North versus Global South) and different views on timing (urgent versus long-term), revealing asymmetries between the experience and the vision of development. The Western NGOs, especially the humanitarian NGOs, as international aid intermediaries that have become indispensable, now face a strategic dilemma.[27] While the paths they take will naturally depend on their respective histories and mandates, we believe there are three key factors to consider.

First, NGOs’ economic models must be challenged, as must those of the development cooperation system as a whole: they are highly dependent on a limited number of Western donors. Since NGOs are, to some extent, ‘sub-contractors’ in development aid, they are constrained – even trapped – by the way in which states (North and South) instrumentalise ODA as a tool – diplomatic or economic – of influence or of retaliation.

Second, these organisations must remain aware of the way their management structures perpetuate multiple forms of domination. Whether these dynamics originate from colonial history, being deeply embedded in the world’s patriarchal structures, or reflect Western organisations’ inability to take specific responsibility for the acceleration of anthropogenic climate change, they now serve to undermine their efforts and the issues they aim to address.

Finally, we believe there is an urgent need to accelerate the deployment of localised, inclusive approaches, led by actors from the Global South. While increased localisation has long been regarded as wishful thinking, the invisibility of national stakeholders in implementing development cooperation programmes is morally, politically and strategically unacceptable.

Although these conditions are not comprehensive, we believe that they should enable Western NGOs to initiate a renewed – and balanced – dialogue on the future of ODA.

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Carlos Cortés Zea holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Paris-Saclay and is a senior policy adviser on development cooperation to the UN’s Department of  Economic and Social Affairs. His work addresses the reconfiguration of development cooperation, Mexican foreign policy, South-South cooperation in Meso-america, the link between democratic governance and development, and the right to development.

Vincent Pradier Goeting holds a Ph.D. in management from the Sorbonne Business School and is an associate researcher at the Canadian Observatory for Crises and Humanitarian Action (OCCAH). Since 2020, he has researched the impact on NGO management of issues relating to the ecological transition, from a decolonial perspective.

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[1] Jeffrey Sachs et al., Financing Sustainable Development to 2030 and Mid-Century. Sustainable Development Report 2025. Paris: SDSN, Dublin: Dublin University Press, 2025.

[2] Independent Group of Scientists appointed by the Secretary-General, Global Sustainable Development Report 2023: Times of Crisis, Times of Change: Science for Accelerating Transformations to Sustainable Development, 2023, p. 39.

[3] OECD, Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development 2025: Towards a More Resilient and

Inclusive Architecture, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2025, p. 13.

[4] Salome Ecker et al., The Human Cost of Inaction: Poverty, Social Protection and Debt Servicing, 2020–2023, UNDP Development Futures Series, 2023, pp. 1-2.

[5] United Nations, The Sustainable Development Goals Report Special edition, 2023, p. 12.

[6] In June 2025, the World Bank updated global poverty thresholds, resulting in a new international poverty threshold of $US 3 per person per day, replacing the former threshold of $US 2.15, based on 2017 purchasing power parity figures.

[7] Andy Sumner & Arief Anshory Yusuf, New Estimates of the Cost of Ending Poverty and Its Global

Distribution, WIDER Working Paper 2024/46 Helsinki: UNU-WIDER, 2024, pp. 11-13.

[8] Nilima Gulrajani, Jessica Pudussery, With the knives out on development spending, have we reached ‘peak aid’? The Guardian, 2025.

[9] Nilima Gulrajani, Donors in a Post-Aid World, January 2025 update, 2025. ODI Global. (Consulted 16 July 2025).

[10] OECD, Cuts in official development assistance: OECD projections for 2025 and the near term. Policy Brief, 2025.

[11] OCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2025. The cruel maths of aid cuts. Hyper-prioritized report, 2025.

[12] ICVA, Lives on the Line: The human impact of US Foreign Aid Shifts, Geneva, 2025, p. 7.

[13] Daniella Medeiros Cavalcanti et al., Evaluating the impact of two decades of USAID interventions and projecting the effects of defunding on mortality up to 2030: a retrospective impact evaluation and forecasting analysis, Lancet Vol. 406, 2025, p. 290

[14] Civil Society Financing for Development Mechanism, Coopération internationale au développement (International Development Cooperation). (Consulted 29 September 2025).

[15] Massod Ahmed, Rachael Calleja & Pierre Jacquet, The Future of Official Development Assistance: Incremental Improvements or Radical Reform? CDG, 2025, p. 12.

[16] Vincent Pradier, Changement climatique et ONG françaises : une analyse décoloniale de leur outillage gestionnaire. Gestion et management (Climate change and French NGOs: a decolonial analysis of their management tools). IAE Paris – Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2025. Note: text available in French only.

[17] Didier Billion et Christophe Ventura, Désoccidentalisation : repenser l’ordre du monde (De-westernisation : rethinking the world order). Agone. 2023

[18] Peace Direct, Time to decolonise aid, 2023.

[19] Humanitaires en mouvement n°26, Quels chemins vers une aide décolonisée ? 2025.

[20] Réseau Environnement Humanitaire, Déclaration d’engagement des organisations humanitaires sur le climat, 2020

[21] Amnesty International, Lives at risk: Chaotic and abrupt cuts to foreign aid put millions of lives at risk, 2025

[22] Sara Kinsbergen & Zunera Rana, Improving or Reimagining: Mapping key narratives on the Future of Development Cooperation, Radboud University, 2025, p.9.

[23] Simon Mundy, Impact investors look to soften Trump’s aid blow, Financial Times, 10 March 2025.

[24] Sara Pantuliano et al., Can Multilateralism Be Saved? Overseas Development Institute, 2025 ; George Ingram, The Global South’s Perspective on 2025: Development Assistance Changes and Future Directions, Brookings Institution, 2025; Olivia O’Sullivan & Jerome Puri, First USAID Closes, Then UK Cuts Aid: What Western Retreat from Foreign Aid Could Mean, Chatham House, 2025.

[25] Nana Afadzinu, Rethinking Development Funding: A call for decolonisation of development, WACSI, 2025; IBON International, Decolonising International Development Cooperation: Towards a Reframing, 2025.

[26] Ali Al Mokdad, The Hyper-Model: Local NGOs Done Playing by the Rules-They’re Making Their Own, LinkedIn, 2025.

[27] Coordination SUD, Poursuivre, s’adapter ou se réinventer face à des vents contraires. Quelles capacités d’agir pour les organisations de solidarité internationale dans un contexte politique et géopolitique qui met en cause leur légitimité? (Pursuing, adapting or re-imagining themselves faced with adverse winds? What is the capacity for action of international cooperation organisations in a political and geopolitical context that challenges their very legitimacy?) 2025.