Human rights NGOs and the reduction of civic space

Today, human rights and democracy as global moral norms are called into question, and the organisations whose mandate it is to protect them are on the front line of attacks on civil society.

In recent years, we have seen an accelerated trend to curtail civic space worldwide. According to the last report of the V-Dem Institute, around 3 out of 4 of the world’s population – 72% – are now living in autocracies.[1] This pulling back from democracy is especially shocking after the 1990s trend towards political and economic liberalisation in many countries. Access to rights became progressively a cardinal principle for many international cooperation organisations: there was reason to think that a ‘universalising’ dynamic had been definitively launched, until it recently went into reverse. Today, human rights and democracy as global moral norms are called into question, and the organisations whose mandate it is to protect them are on the front line of attacks on civil society.

While the primary function of all human rights organisations is to record and publicise violations of rights and freedoms, the organisations themselves are very different. For ease of understanding, this article will identify three types of organisation. First, the major international NGOs, funded by individual donations (e.g., Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch), which have significant financial autonomy and are extremely well known. Second, the medium-sized NGOs, professional organisations with international outreach, for the most part financed by official subsidies (particularly from western countries) or project-based appeals (by the European Union and the UN agencies). Finally, there are national and local human rights NGOS, often less professional and less powerful yet innovative. Current constraints – the decline in funding, challenges to legitimacy, and criminalisation of activities – do not affect all organisations in the same way but result globally in the undermining of the movement for the protection of human rights and more generally of international aid and development NGOs. Given this situation, there are several possible ways forward, which we shall discuss further in the final section of this article.

Human rights: their universality called into question

During the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin, from 31 August to 1 September 2025, Xi Jinping wanted to position China as an alternative power, guarantor of a world order that would be more just, more stable and less sanctimonious.[2] China wants to be the key actor in a multi-polar world, setting itself up against the United States, which has chosen to turn inwards and to wage commercial war, and also against the western world in general, which is deemed to represent imperial domination.[3] The countries of the ‘global South’ remind us that ‘we are no longer alone in the world’.[4] In many countries that are beneficiaries of ‘development aid’, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, this discourse is the response to a desire to achieve a ’second independence’. And the claim of human rights to be universal is often perceived as paternalism, colonialism or arrogance.[5]

Human rights organisations are being weakened, while a narrative describing their activities as ‘the imposition of western values’ is gaining traction, particularly when it comes to civil and political rights, or support for the rights of sexual minorities.

In a study we co-authored in 2024 on the rejection of France in Africa, we noted a strong mistrust of democratic and humanistic values imported from the west, and viewed as interference: e.g., more than three quarters of respondents to an enquiry took the view that ‘African values’ were preferable to ‘western values’.[6] UN bodies, previously seen as  pillars of universal normative legitimacy, are now increasingly challenged, by both authoritarian powers and liberal democracies pulling back from their former positions.[7] In parallel, international aid – vital for a great number of local NGOs – is significantly contracting, with a fall in financial contributions from the United States and many European countries since 2024. The disengagement of several private foundations is also harming the fundamental rights sector. And the concentration of resources in large consortia has the effect of limiting the funds available to cascade down to local NGOs.  Human rights organisations are being weakened, while a narrative describing their activities as ‘the imposition of western values’ is gaining traction, particularly when it comes to civil and political rights, or support for the rights of sexual minorities.

Restriction of civic space and depletion of financial resources: NGOs caught in a vice

The major human rights NGOs play an influential role in recording and denouncing violations of fundamental freedoms at the global level. Their annual reports have long been key publications for the media and for political decision-takers. These NGOs have for years exercised a ‘diplomacy of conscience’;[8] but they are now confronted with a swiftly moving trend to curtail civic space worldwide. Engaging in activities via the media and via communication strategies, which is the way they work – deploying moral and political denunciation, combined with a high media profile – is called into question. The French-Nigerian anthropologist Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan describes this as ‘the failure of moral imperialism’.[9] However, these high-profile organisations (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Foundation, Freedom House …) are not always prepared to work to strengthen the structures of civil society at local level. Although partnerships may exist between local NGOs and the big-name human rights organisations as far as report-writing goes, or resolving emergencies, these organisations mainly act alone, not in coalition, probably at the expense of creating a strong local associative fabric. International NGOs are increasingly attacked by governments or interest groups for their perceived or potential political bias, even though they claim to be absolutely neutral.

The same is true of medium-sized human rights organisations that are active on the international scene, working most often as part of networks (FIDH, FIACAT, CIVICUS …) or alongside local actors. Their economic model often depends on setting up projects as part of consortia that depend on official government funding, or funds from private foundations. These foreign funding sources are used to attack the NGOs, accused of being in the pay of foreign powers. Human rights organisations are accused of being ‘foreign agents’, i.e., spies or traitors to their countries, and laws limiting their activities are widespread (in Russia, India, Georgia and Hungary).[10]

These NGOs are obliged to give careful thought to the increasing risk that the official funding they receive may be serving the soft power interests of donor governments, at a time when strong geopolitical rivalries are resurfacing.[11] Within the sector, many organisations and associations receive support from foundations with political affiliations (the National Endowment for Democracy, Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung …), which naturally raises questions about the degree of independence and ‘neutrality’ of the NGOs concerned.

A study carried out by the worldwide network CIVICUS also shows that, after health, the protection of human rights  and citizen engagement in countries of the global South have been the most seriously affected by the abrupt dismantling of USAID.

Another feature of the destabilisation of the human rights ecosystem is competition between not-for-profit organisations that claim to be working for universal rights but are, in reality, working against them. The Government-organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs) sponsored by authoritarian states or the Business-Oriented non-governmental organisations (BONGOs) destabilise and criminalise actors that have already repressed or under attack. In western countries, NGOs and foundations may now frequently be found acting as ‘Trojan horses’. An example: a fake NGO claimed to be defending the rights of migrants forced to work illegally on building-sites in Qatar, using this as cover to try and infiltrate and take over Amnesty International, via fraudulent emails.[12] Further, relatively modest-sized organisations on the ground, on the frontline of progress with human rights, are sustaining serious losses from the repression or suppression of human rights activists. Every year, more than 400 human activists are assassinated worldwide, according to Frontline Defenders. Elsewhere, while the number of NGOs accorded consultative status at the UN (at ECOSOC) tripled between 1992 and 2002,[13] the NGO Committee that examines applications has since been largely obstructed by authoritarian states. The development of new regional institutions (the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the African Court and Commission on Human and People’s Rights, the Council of Europe) has, however, provided new openings for advocacy by NGOs.

A study carried out by the worldwide network CIVICUS also shows that, after health, the protection of human rights  and citizen engagement in countries of the global South have been the most seriously affected by the abrupt dismantling of USAID.[14] Under pressure as they now are, these local organisations are cutting back their objectives, concentrating on awareness-raising activities rather than outright denunciation; they now avoid some regions, and some issues. Notable among their risk management strategies is membership of international coalitions which afford them protection, legitimacy and influence.

Rethinking funding to ensure the survival of NGOs under threat

More actors, less money: competition is a serious risk. It is crucial for aid actors to examine their consciences over asymmetric partnership relationships and/or aid localisation, while imagining a decolonised future for international development cooperation.

The freezing of America’s official development aid has obliged NGOs to re-think more intensively, with how to survive now the priority issue. Refashioning their economic and organisational models is central to the extensive work in progress. Some, especially in the humanitarian sector, even see this as an opportunity for a ‘reset’ of the international aid and development sector. The significant growth of financing for humanitarian activities (and to a lesser extent human rights activities) up until 2023 had two key consequences: an increase in the number of NGOs everywhere in the world, and systemic dependence on the major donors who are today pulling back. More actors, less money: competition is a serious risk. It is crucial for aid actors to examine their consciences over asymmetric partnership relationships and/or aid localisation, while imagining a decolonised future for international development cooperation.

In the domain of human rights specifically, a comprehensive re-think is needed of the role of NGOS at a time when geopolitical and ideological confrontation has returned to the fore. Relationships with governments and the financing they provide must be clarified. Ways of working together must be enhanced and improved, as must the networks that already exist. The major human rights NGOs – particularly those that count on the general public’s generosity for their relatively solid financial footing – must more than ever assume an umbrella role and be catalysts for smaller organisations. The development of emergency funds or pooled funds for organisations and/or activists at risk are also needed more than ever in countries where democracy is currently in retreat. Projects developed by specialists in the protection of human rights activists in countries at risk (FIDH, Frontline Defenders, Protection International …) should be replicated for different issues and in different situations: mutualised emergency funds, rapid relocation of people in danger, training in IT security, high-profile advocacy, strategic litigation making use of the pool, building cooperation networks …[15]

Crowd-funding initiatives in diaspora communities to pay for rapid action to support human rights have shown their worth in contexts as different as Sudan or Iran and could be multiplied many times over.

Change cannot, however, rely only on the NGOs’ capacity to introspect. The philanthropy sector must also increase its awareness of the current crunch situation. Already, in the United States, representatives of citizen movements are challenging foundations, individual donors and patrons, on the lines of: ‘We say we want to save democracy. So why aren’t we funding the people who can?’[16] Options already exist for approaches such as trust-based philanthropy, which aims to rebalance the relationship between donors and beneficiaries. It starts from the assumption that not-for-profit organisations and local communities have a better understanding of what they need and how to achieve it. What is needed: flexible, multi-year funding (core funding, untied) rather than subsidies limited to specific projects; lighter touch administrative procedures; genuinely reciprocal partnership arrangements; and above all support that is not only financial but extends to strategy and human relations, too. Such a paradigm is desperately required, to enable human rights NGOs to continue their activities to preserve our freedoms and support democratic progress.

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Laurent Duarte is a consultant with the cooperative La Cause, which specialises in human rights, democratic processes, advocacy strategies and networking dynamics. He co-founded in 2014 and directed from 2016 to 2023 the movement Tournons La Page (Let’s Turn the Page), enhancing his expertise in civil society, especially in francophone Africa. He leads independent research and research-action projects, including in partnership with CERI-Sciences Po Paris, teaches African geopolitics at IRIS Sup’ and is General Secretary of the association “Ensemble Contre la Peine de la Mort” (ECPM).

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[1] Marina Nord et al., 25 Years of Authorization – Democracy Trumped? Democracy Report 2025, SSRN Scholarly Paper no. 5227625 (Social Science Research Network, 13 March 2025), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5227625.

[2] Matheo Malik, « Poutine, Xi : La déclaration de Tianjin (texte intégral) (Putin, Xi: The Tianjin Declaration (text in full) », Le Grand Continent, 2 September 2025, https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2025/09/02/declaration-tianjin-ocs/.

[3] Brand, Ulrich & Markus Wissen, Le mode de vie impérial: vie quotidienne et crise écologique du capitalisme (The imperialistic way of life : the daily life and ecological crisis of capitalism), Montreal, Quebec. Lux Éditeur, 2021.

[4] Badie, Bertrand, Nous ne sommes plus seuls au monde (We are no longer alone in the world), Paris, La Découverte, 2015.

[5]Ritter, Dominik. Que peut-on apprendre des multiples critiques des droits de l’Homme ? (What can be learned from the many criticisms of human rights?). Revue d’éthique et de théologie morale, 2022/HS N° Hors-série, 2022. p.199-208. CAIRN.INFO, shs.cairn.info/revue-d-ethique-et-de-theologie-morale-2022-HS-page-199?lang=fr.

[6] Richard Banégas et al., De quoi le rejet de la France en Afrique est-il le nom ?  (What should we call the rejection of France in Africa ?) : report, Centre de recherches internationales (CERI) ; Tournons La Page (TLP), 2024, 96 pages, https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-04778450.

[7] Glasman, Joël, Après Gaza, l’humanitarisme sans libéralisme ? (After Gaza, humanitarianism without liberalism ?) AOC media. 2024. En ligne : https://aoc.media/opinion/2024/03/25/apres-gaza-lhumanitarisme-sans-liberalisme/

[8] Ann Marie Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms (Princeton University Press, 2010), https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400824229.

[9] Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, De quoi se mêlent-ils? – L’échec de l’impérialisme moral en Afrique (What are they interfering in? – The failure of moral imperialism in Africa).  AOC media, AOC media – Analyse Opinion Critique, 13 June 2022, https://aoc.media/opinion/2022/06/13/de-quoi-se-melent-ils-lechec-de-limperialisme-moral-en-afrique/.

[10] https://www.devex.com/news/foreign-agent-laws-are-spreading-like-wildfire-and-crippling-ngos-110804

[11] Ken Opalo, « The geopolitics of international development (after foreign aid) », Substack newsletter, An Africanist Perspective, 2 October 2025, https://www.africanistperspective.com/p/the-geopolitics-of-international.

[12] Une fausse ONG domiciliée à Lille tente de piéger Amnesty International (A fake NGO based in Lille tries to trick Amnesty International), France 3, consulted 15 October 2025. https://france3-regions.franceinfo.fr/hauts-de-france/nord-0/lille/fausse-ong-domiciliee-lille-tente-pieger-amnesty-international-1163077.html

[13] Les ONG de défense des droits de l’homme aux Nations unies (Humanitarian NGOs at the UN), Revue Projet, consulted 2 October 2025, https://www.revue-projet.com/articles/2002-1-les-ong-de-defense-des-droits-de-l-homme-aux-nations-unies.

[14] CIVICUS, « Shifting Resourcing Landscapes », CIVICUS Global Alliance, March 2025 https://www.civicus.org/index.php/what-we-do/enabling-and-resourcing/shifting-resourcing-landscapes.

[15] See, for example, the study of capitalisation F3E, Agir Ensemble pour les droits humains, Initiative pour les défenseurs·es des droits humains dans le monde, March 2025 : https://reseauf3e.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/RAPPORT-FINAL-x-AEDH-V.ANONYME-OK.pdf.

[16] We Say We Want to Save Democracy. So Why Aren’t We Funding the People Who Can?  The Forge, 18 August 2025. https://forgeorganizing.org/article/we-say-we-want-to-save-democracy-so-why-arent-we-funding-the-people-who-can/