Within a few decades, all environmental indicators have turned to red (rise in temperature and sea levels, pollution, the mass extinction of species, soil degradation, water shortages, deforestation, the melting of the polar ice caps, of permafrost, etc.). Peak oil was reached in 2008 according to the International Energy Agency¹⁹, and it is estimated that there will be 9.8 billion human beings in 2050. What is more, many prospective analysis reports predict that crises related to failed states, the persecution of minorities and epidemics will get worse. It is in this context that a science has emerged – collapsology (from the latin collapsus meaning ‘to collapse’) – although this is not a completely new discipline. Indeed, it is the continuation of the collapse theory which was first mentioned in the 1972 report commissioned by the Club of Rome, The Limits to Growth, which focuses on a subject that humanity is loath to face up to: the imminent collapse of our thermo-industrial civilisation. Having witnessed the terrible impact of disasters caused by nature’s wrath and the destitution of people caught up in conflicts, poverty and political crises, the aid sector will be in the frontline of the response if global systems collapse.

Four principle scenarios for the future

The following theoretical scenarios were developed based on the work of David Holmgren and Pablo Servigne²⁰. These authors have developed different ideas about how our societies will evolve, whether at the planetary, regional or city level, due to the effects of climate change, biodiversity loss and declining fossil fuel reserves. The timescale and location of these scenarios therefore change depending on geographical areas and their exposure to climatic risks, as well as the population’s level of resilience. Looking at these different scenarios is neither an exercise in science fiction, nor an attempt to tell the future: it is a way of identifying certain trends that are already underway and looking ahead in order to develop the right approach to these possible changes.

The green utopia scenario

The slow decline of oil reserves and changes in mentality allow societies to improve the way they manage ecosystems and to gradually pursue their transition towards renewable energy, which limits global warming and reduces pollution. In this first scenario, modern societies succeed in carrying out their energy transition, but also, more globally, their environmental transition (waste management, the development of organic farming, changes in consumer behaviour, etc.) while maintaining a certain level of prosperity and material comfort²¹. The main characteristics of the green utopia scenario are the transition to renewables, the re-localisation of economies, the development of resilience and the preservation of a stable global governance system.

The self-organisation scenario

Following the depletion of the world’s oil resources, globalised economies collapse. This has a domino effect: the economic crisis leads to the breakdown of supply chains which in turn leads to serious political crises and drastically weakens the role of state authorities who, eventually, are no longer able to fulfil their functions and lose their legitimacy to govern so that their countries become chronically unstable. In this fragile context, it is societies that are the most dependent on the thermo-industrial system that are affected. Urban societies reorganise themselves to form autonomous local communities while rural societies reinforce the traditional village system.

The climate apartheid scenario

Here, climate change is sudden, leading to numerous natural disasters: major droughts, violent hurricanes and floods caused by rising sea levels. These phenomena are made worse by the devastating effects of contaminated soil, air pollution and accelerated biodiversity loss. Governments continue to exploit resources and attempt to gain as many as possible, leading to tension between states, weakened global governance and the rise of nationalism. Tensions lead to spatial segregation between the elites and the rest of the population. Islands of opulence are formed in parallel to the development of slums; governments become authoritarian and restrict freedoms in order to protect the interests of a minority.

The planetary chaos scenario

A succession of disasters, feedback loops, black-outs…: terms that describe the world as it might be in a scenario that would resemble an apocalyptic Hollywood film. The planetary chaos scenario involves genuine climatic cataclysms that destroy a large part of the resources and infrastructures that are necessary to the survival of modern man. In this scenario, the collapse is not caused by the end of fossil fuels but rather by the scale and continuous nature of natural disasters. In this hypothesis, there is a drastic reduction in the world population which is unable to survive major climatic disruption and the spreading of epidemics and famine. Only a few clans manage to organise themselves in a world that has become very hostile to human and animal life.

What impact could this have on the practices, strategies and policies of the aid sector?

These scenarios imply changes at different levels for aid sector practices, strategies and policies, which may be considered necessary in the long term, but could also involve more short-term changes. In the following paragraphs we look at what these changes might be.

Consequences for aid policies and the international aid sector

Adaptation and preparation: new strategic (and politicy) priorities for the aid sector?

In order to meet current challenges and anticipate future risks, whether we are heading for a favourable scenario or we have to prepare for the worst, it seems urgent to re-orientate aid policies and funding towards climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies, as well as disaster preparedness. As such, aid actors need to start thinking about their responsibilities, as Médecins Sans Frontières has begun to do with the Lancet, for example, in conducting prospective analysis about the impact of climate change in relation to future health risks²². What roles will humanitarians have in these areas, whether of a technical nature (supporting adaptation and preparation), or a political nature (denouncing the political and economic causes of what is happening)?

The rise of identity politics and nationalism: the end of solidarity as we know it?

Pessimistic scenarios question the very principle of international solidarity and its future. Hans Morgenthau²³ suggests that international relations will deteriorate and the interests of states will take precedence over any other form of action. What is more, within these same states, the struggle to take control of the remaining resources will take precedence over solidarity. In the IARAN report, ‘The Future of Aid: INGOs in 2030’, the ‘Narrow Gate’ scenario is characterized by the rise of nationalism, leading to a decline in the relevance of global governance institutions, and where the humanitarian ecosystem is challenged by the politicisation of crises, particularly those in areas of chronic fragility’²⁴. Are the reduction of humanitarian space and the criminalisation of those providing assistance to migrants in the Mediterranean and in a variety of European countries not already signs of such changes? How should we therefore organise ourselves to assert the principle of humanity and the central importance of human dignity in such contexts in the face of such changes?

The power of mutual assistance and the mutations of aid architecture: the need for localisation?

Not everyone shares this vision of the future. In their book, ‘L’entraide, ou l’autre loi de la jungle’²⁵, (Mutual Assistance, or the Other Law of the Jungle), Pablo Servigne and Gauthier Chapelle underline the fact that there is both competition and cooperation within the living world. Indeed, ‘when a sudden disaster takes place, individuals who are stressed or in a state of shock look for security first and foremost; they therefore do not tend to be violent’²⁶. This phenomenon explains why it is rare for people to panic when disasters take place: on the contrary, mutual assistance appears to be common (spontaneous assistance, support for the weakest, cooperation for access to food and energy…).

By reducing inequality of wealth, this scenario opens the door to greater solidarity²⁷, but the sudden decline in petrol reserves makes exchanges over long distances more complicated (in-kind assistance, sending expatriates). As a result, the central factor of resilience is the reinforcement of societies’ ability to self-organise with regard to energy and food, and also politically²⁸. This perspective would accelerate the localisation of international aid via the emergence of new local actors, the re-localisation of decision-making, and the reinforcement of collaboration between local and international organisations.

The consequences for aid strategies

Restoration and preservation of the environment: a central aspect of resilience?

For a number of years, there has been widespread acceptance that reinforcing resilience is a way of tackling both disaster risks and poverty, which are intimately linked, in an integrated manner²⁹. Working on resilience therefore brings together actors with a variety of mandates, and, as such, it can be a useful concept, even though it is difficult to operationalise.

What the ‘collapse’ concept brings to the ‘resilience’ approach, due to the systemic risks that it introduces, is the central strategic importance of preserving and restoring the environment. Systems whose resilience depends on external actors and mechanisms, such as social security nets, appear vulnerable to the shocks that are being forecast. It is therefore necessary to invest massively in food-producing agriculture, urban or peri-urban agriculture, the preservation or restoration of ecosystems, etc.

Local assistance: more than ever at the heart of risk management

The survivors of a disaster have a central role as humanitarian actors can testify³⁰. In the initial stages of a disaster, before the initial relief effort arrives, individuals take action: inhabitants, elected representatives, teachers, doctors from the local health centre… According to Fernando Briones, Ryan Vachon and Michael Glantz³¹, these ‘zero-order responders’ make crucial decisions based on their own resources and skills. The work of these researchers highlights behaviour and considerations that could provide aid actors with useful lessons³². For example: in at-risk situations, individuals make decisions that take into account both immediate and long-term needs; social cohesion and organisation³³ are the foundations of resource management and the distribution of roles; and, lastly, individuals use improvisation, innovation and creativity to meet their primary basic needs³⁴. As mutual assistance within a group relies on a fragile balance which can change radically in an instant, what are the conditions that are necessary and the organisational principles that should be encouraged to promote solidarity between individuals and groups, if, as Servigne and Stevens argue, cooperative groups survive better?

The consequences for aid practices

Degraded mode: adopting a low-tech approach

The aid sector is not immune to the mutations of the hyper-industrial society that the majority of aid organisations come from. For about ten years now, new technologies have entered the day-to-day lives of humanitarian workers and the idea of innovation has almost become synonymous with new technologies³⁵. Different sections of the aid sector have become increasingly dependent on technology, and therefore on energy and materials that include a lot of rare-earth elements (spreadsheets and word processing tools; the collection, management and use of data on mobiles; emails, Skype and webinars; electronic cards for beneficiaries; medical imaging…). How can this model be revised in the context of a climate emergency where any energy that is used contributes to the carbon footprint of our civilization, and where there is a danger that dependence on tools that use rare-earth elements will make access to technology prohibitive? What would a ‘degraded mode’ of assistance look like? That is to say, assistance that only used the most efficient and environmentally-adapted techniques or technologies? How would the high-tech practices described above evolve?

Genuinely ‘green’ aid practices

Faced with these prospects, there is an urgent need to review aid practices from the perspective of their environmental impact and their sobriety in relation to the consumption of natural resources. Should reducing the environmental footprint of aid not be seen as a veritable cross-cutting issue and the concrete application of the principle of ‘doing no harm’³⁶ ? In order to be coherent between what humanitarian actors promote among crisis-affected populations and their own internal practices with regard to climate change adaptation, the humanitarian sector needs to look at its operational methods (travel, partnerships, types of programme, etc.). Current efforts to reduce the impact of humanitarian operations need to be further developed: the use of green energy to run offices, local purchases without packaging, carbon off-setting for emissions that cannot be reduced, etc. Is it not the role of humanitarian actors to be exemplary in this area, to adopt green practices and minimise their environmental impacts, whether visible, invisible, observable in the short- or long-term, directly linked to their operations or attributable to their partners and service providers?

Conclusion

It seems more and more evident that preserving the environment and reducing poverty are two sides of the same commitment to reduce the dangers facing the Earth. Therefore, in order to avoid getting bogged down in pessimistic visions without solutions, we need to explore the opportunities that will come from the depletion of fossil fuel reserves and the growing awareness of our dependence on the environment. Are the risks of collapse not a unique chance to reconcile Humanity and Nature? We are convinced that new priorities are going to emerge, and that it is therefore essential and urgent to continue to discuss our doubts and our visions for the future in order to establish strategies that will allow us to prepare for the risks ahead.

Véronique de Geoffroy, Groupe URD – Executive Director
Lisa Daoud, Groupe URD – Researcher, evaluator, trainer
With the contribution of Romane Vilain (trainee at Groupe URD)

1. https://www.lemonde.fr/blog/petrole/2019/02/04/pic-petrolier-probable-dici-a-2025-selon-lagence-internationale-de-lenergie/
2. Future Scenarios: How communities can adapt to peak oil and climate change, David Holmgren, Chelsea Green, 2009 and Imaginer l’avenir des villes, Pablo Servigne, 2017.
3. See, for example, the work of Mark Jacobson from Stanford University (Wind, Water and Sun scenario).
4. See, for example: Climate Change and Health: an urgent new frontier for humanitarianism, MSF and the Lancet, November 2018.
5. Morgenthau, H. Politics Among Nations: The struggle for Power and Peace, 1948.
6. IARAN, IRIS, Action contre la faim, Centre for Humanitarian Leadership, Futuribles, The Future of Aid: INGOs in 2030, 2017.
7. Servigne, P. Chapelle, G., L’entraide, ou l’autre loi de la jungle, 2019.
8. Ibid., p. 49.
9. A study by the universities of Berkeley and Toronto showed that people from lower social classes are more prone to generosity and mutual assistance than those from higher classes. Inequalities also tend to reduce the level of solidarity. (In Servigne, P. and Chapelle, G., L’entraide, ou l’autre loi de la jungle, 2019, p. 86).
10. According to Servigne and Chapelle, ‘decentralised, horizontal, changing and organic’ in nature, p. 159.
11. See the special issue of our review, Humanitarian Aid on the Move, on ‘Resilience’ (n°11, 2013).
12. See the real-time evaluations carried out by Groupe URD in numerous disaster contexts: Hurricane Mitch 1998, Tsunami 2004, Haiti 2010, etc.
13. Briones, F. Vachon, R. Glantz, M., Local responses to disasters: recent lessons from zero-order responders, 2019.
14. Lessons from the El Niño Costero (2017) and hurricanes Irma and Maria (2017).
15. Particularly the existence of a feeling of equality, according to Pablo Servigne and Gauthier Chapelle.
16. Briones, F. Vachon, R. Glantz, M., Local responses to disasters: recent lessons from zero-order responders, 2019. According to the article, coping with disasters could even help to develop societal skills.
17. Groupe URD, ‘Innovation in the Humanitarian Sector’, Humanitarian Aid on the Move, Bibliography, November 2016. See also ‘Humanitarian Technology’, IRIN, 21 March 2018.
18. See, for example, Groupe URD’s work on this issue online and the special issue of the review, Humanitarian Aid on the Move, on the aid sector’s approach to the environment (n°12, 2013).
19. https://www.lemonde.fr/blog/petrole/2019/02/04/pic-petrolier-probable-dici-a-2025-selon-lagence-internationale-de-lenergie/
20. Future Scenarios: How communities can adapt to peak oil and climate change, David Holmgren, Chelsea Green, 2009 and Imaginer l’avenir des villes, Pablo Servigne, 2017.
21. See, for example, the work of Mark Jacobson from Stanford University (Wind, Water and Sun scenario).
22. See, for example: Climate Change and Health: an urgent new frontier for humanitarianism, MSF and the Lancet, November 2018.
23. Morgenthau, H. Politics Among Nations: The struggle for Power and Peace, 1948.
24. IARAN, IRIS, Action contre la faim, Centre for Humanitarian Leadership, Futuribles, The Future of Aid: INGOs in 2030, 2017.
25. Servigne, P. Chapelle, G., L’entraide, ou l’autre loi de la jungle, 2019.
26. Ibid., p. 49.
27. A study by the universities of Berkeley and Toronto showed that people from lower social classes are more prone to generosity and mutual assistance than those from higher classes. Inequalities also tend to reduce the level of solidarity. (In Servigne, P. and Chapelle, G., L’entraide, ou l’autre loi de la jungle, 2019, p. 86).
28. According to Servigne and Chapelle, ‘decentralised, horizontal, changing and organic’ in nature, p. 159.
29. See the special issue of our review, Humanitarian Aid on the Move, on ‘Resilience’ (n°11, 2013).
30. See the real-time evaluations carried out by Groupe URD in numerous disaster contexts: Hurricane Mitch 1998, Tsunami 2004, Haiti 2010, etc.
31. Briones, F. Vachon, R. Glantz, M., Local responses to disasters: recent lessons from zero-order responders, 2019.
32. Lessons from the El Niño Costero (2017) and hurricanes Irma and Maria (2017).
33. Particularly the existence of a feeling of equality, according to Pablo Servigne and Gauthier Chapelle.
34. Briones, F. Vachon, R. Glantz, M., Local responses to disasters: recent lessons from zero-order responders, 2019. According to the article, coping with disasters could even help to develop societal skills.
35. Groupe URD, ‘Innovation in the Humanitarian Sector’, Humanitarian Aid on the Move, Bibliography, November 2016. See also ‘Humanitarian Technology’, IRIN, 21 March 2018.
36. See, for example, Groupe URD’s work on this issue online and the special issue of the review, Humanitarian Aid on the Move, on the aid sector’s approach to the environment (n°12, 2013).